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Preface
Although the significance of integrity seems undisputed nowadays, this
has not always been the case. Integrity is still a relatively young policy area.
It steadily climbed up the political, administrative, and academic agendas
since the early 1990s. Integrity policies, strategies, monitors, and
 evaluations gradually matured and gained more attention of both 
national and international institutions, such as the EU.  
The Netherlands was among the front-runners in this regard and can look
back on twenty-five years of experience. And just as during our former EU
Presidency in 2004, we would like to highlight the importance of this
topic again at the European level, especially since upholding integrity is a
process which requires continuous attention. Public organisations are in
constant change, which also imposes new ethical challenges.
This publication focuses on how integrity is managed within the Dutch
public sector. It gives an overview of the national policy framework and
structures, continues with several examples of integrity approaches  
within individual public organisations, and concludes with some
 academic reflections. 
As such, the book describes the main aspects of the ‘Dutch integrity
 approach’. Characteristic for this approach is that we are not solely fixated
on avoiding criminal acts such as corruption and fraud, but that we also
emphasise the ethical aspects of public officials’ behaviour. This requires,
besides rules, regulation and investigation, all kinds of training and
awareness raising activities. As a third pillar – next to regulation and
 training – we are searching for methods to institutionalize public
 integrity. The firm and sustainable embedding of integrity is a challenge, 
not only for the Netherlands but for all EU member states. 
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All these different perspectives are discussed in this publication, not only
to help us reflect on our own approach, but also to inspire you to reflect on
integrity management in your own country. We are very thankful to be
able to share our experiences. Hopefully, an international exchange of
ideas can develop into new effective methods curbing corruption and
 fostering integrity. I hope that you will join us in this endeavour to foster
integrity as a core element of good governance.    
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
Dr. Ronald Plasterk 
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Introduction
In today’s world, public organisations pay more attention to ethics and
 integrity. In the Netherlands, public integrity was placed on the agenda in
the early 1990s (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2014). Dutch efforts in the field of
 integrity management can therefore be qualified as relatively long lasting.
This book provides an overview and analysis of the Dutch integrity
 management approach. It describes how the Dutch integrity system
 operates from both a national (part I) and an organisational (part II)
 perspective. The final section of the book (part III) contains academic
 reflections. All in all, the book provides insights that might inspire other
countries in their own efforts to manage integrity. This book’s target
 audience includes  policy-makers, ethics and integrity entities, anti-
corruption agencies,  integrity and compliance officers, as well as NGOs,
students, and  researchers.
In this chapter, we start with a brief outline of the Dutch social, political
and administrative context, followed by an overview of the main develop-
ments in integrity management within the Dutch government during the
last 25 years. We then briefly reflect on the main concepts: integrity,
 integrity violations, and integrity policies. We argue that integrity
manage ment can be studied at different levels and from different
 pers pectives. We conclude with some initial reflections on the Dutch
 system, and  introduce the upcoming book chapters.
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1
About the Netherlands 
The Netherlands1 is the main constituent country of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. It is a small, densely populated country with 16.9 million
 inhabitants (in 2015), located in Western Europe, with three island territo-
ries in the Caribbean2. Amsterdam is the country’s capital while The Hague
holds the Dutch seat of government and parliament. Since 1848 it has been
governed as a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy, or-
ganized as a ‘unitary decentralized state’ with central authority in combi-
nation with decentralized, in particular, local authorities. The Netherlands
is a member of the European Union and the euro zone, has a market-based
mixed economy, had the thirteenth-highest per capita income in the world
in 2013, and ranked as the fourth happiest country in the world, reflecting
a high quality of life. 
Public administration in the Netherlands has four tiers: central govern-
ment, the provinces, the municipalities and the water authorities. In
 addition, there are many (more or less) independent agencies, including
public-private organizations, with responsibilities for addressing and
 solving social problems. This fits into a governance tradition of coopera-
tion and tolerance between minorities, with cooperation between different
pillars in society and coalition governments (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014), even
though more polarization and fragmentation have become visible in the
last fifteen years (Besamusca & Verheul, 2014). 
The Dutch governmental system executes a number of tasks on behalf of
the citizens, with a total of approximately 915,000 civil servants (includ-
ing the educational system). The national state employs about 117,000
civil servants, the municipalities 148,000 (Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, 2015). The Netherlands has a relatively large and well-
functioning central government, as illustrated by the scores on the World
Governance Indicators (World Bank) which, according to Transparency
 International (2012), include a strong reputation for integrity. 
More than two decades Dutch integrity policies at a glance
Although integrity has always been an important issue, it did not attain a
permanent position on the Dutch political agenda until the early 1990s.
Until then, integrity was just incidentally debated and policies often
 consisted of unwritten agreements and voluntary measures. An outline of
Dutch integrity policies is presented below in three phases.
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Phase 1 Agenda setting and regulation (1990-2003)  
In the early 1990s, concerns arose in the Netherlands about the intermin-
gling of the underworld with regular society. There were signs of attempts
by criminal organisations to obtain key positions in the Dutch machinery
of government through bribery and infiltration. This attracted the atten-
tion of the Ministry of Justice and of the General Intelligence and Security
Service. With the aid of risk analyses, government ministries and a number
of large municipal authorities were scrutinized for vulnerable processes
and their resilience to integrity violations was defined. At the same time, 
a number of integrity scandals occurred within some municipalities. This
led the then Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to place
 integrity firmly on the agenda. 
The Ministry of the Interior published its first integrity policy papers in
the mid-1990s. Integrity policies were subsequently included in the Civil
Servants Act. This included rules on side jobs, the reporting of financial
 interests, as on whistleblowing procedures and protection. The General
 Intelligence and Security Service set up a hotline were people could report
integrity violations anonymously. The Ministry of Finance developed a
method for conducting integrity audits and the Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations produced a brochure for confidential integrity
counsellors. Most measures in this phase were primarily rule-oriented.
And although the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations regu-
larly stressed the importance of value-oriented aspects, this did not result
in concrete initiatives during this period.
Phase 2 Awareness and support (2003-2007) 
Integrity policies intensified from 2003 onwards in response to a severe
fraud and corruption scandal in the construction industry. In 2006 this led
to an update of the Civil Servants Act. Among other things, it required gov-
ernment bodies to pursue integrity policies, to set up codes of conduct, and
to introduce the oath of office. In this phase, government authorities also
committed to a number of Basic Standards. These formulated further
 instructions for the design of integrity policies. For example, government
organisations are required to devote attention to recruitment and selec-
tion, to conduct surveys for vulnerable positions, to protect confidential
information, and to develop procurement and contracting procedures. 
In order to support government bodies with the implementation of these
new standards, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
 decided in 2006 to form the Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS). 
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In addition to the impact of the construction industry fraud, this policy
 intensification is understandable in the light of various studies, which re-
vealed that the government did not yet have its integrity policies in order.
One of the conclusions was that integrity was not yet truly internalised.
This led to more attention for the awareness aspect of integrity. Since then
integrity became a topic in introductory courses for new employees, it was
placed on the agenda during team meetings, and all kinds of integrity
 related courses have become, more or less, common practice within the
Dutch government.
Phase 3 Integrity systems, organizing integrity, monitoring integrity (2007-present)
During this phase there has been growing interest in the theme of admin-
istrative integrity (elected and appointed holders of political office). This
has resulted from a stream of incidences of misconduct and has led to an
amendment of the Provinces, Municipalities and Water Authorities Act,
explicitly highlighting the importance of, and responsibilities for,
 administrative integrity. Compared to integrity policies for civil servants
(officials) one could assert that the concern for administrative integrity is
of a more recent date. This is certainly seems to be the case for integrity
programmes, measures and activities targeted at this specific group. 
In addition, this period has been marked by growing attention to report-
ing systems for integrity violations (see also Chapter 4). A critical research
report (Utrecht School for Policy Research, 2008) led to an adjustment of
the existing internal reporting (whistleblower) regulation. During this
 period, a number of external reporting, advisory, and investigation institu-
tions were also formed, like: a hotline for reporting integrity violations, a
centre which advises whistleblowers on how to report their suspicions of
misconduct, a Whistleblowers Expert Group, and the Council for Integrity
Investigations in the Public Sector. Finally, a Bill was submitted on a
‘House for Whistleblowers’, intended to provide for the creation of an
 adequate and safe reporting possibility for whistleblowers. 
Thirdly, a large number of policy studies were conducted. These were
aimed at: the implementation of integrity policies within the Dutch govern-
ment (Netherlands Court of Audit, 2010; Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, 2008; BIOS, 2012); internal reporting systems (De Graaf
et al, 2013) and the nature and scale of integrity violations within the
Dutch government (De Graaf & Struwer, 2014); as on organisational aspects
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of integrity management: the impact of the financial crisis on public sector
integrity programs (BIOS, 2012; Hoekstra, 2016); the quality of integrity
policy documents (BIOS, 2013); the institutionalization of integrity in
local government (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2013); and how public organisa-
tions (can) cooperate in the field of integrity management (BIOS, 2015). 
Finally, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations evaluated its
own coordinating role, and the integrity policies they prescribed for the
public sector (2014). Furthermore they commissioned a future-oriented
survey identifying the integrity implications of current trends in public
administration (Van Veldhuisen & Snel, 2014). Although such studies and
evaluations were continually conducted during 25 years of integrity poli-
cies within the Dutch government, the number of such studies during this
period is striking. Furthermore we observe a growing interest for integrity
systems, organizing integrity, and monitoring integrity (Lamboo & Hoek-
stra, 2015).  
Integrity and integrity violations 
This book focuses on the integrity of governance. Perceptions of the
 concept of integrity vary quite considerably. This section therefore briefly
discusses the different interpretations, partly as a guide for the description
and understanding of the many initiatives raised in later chapters. In the
literature and research, at least eight visions of integrity appear (Huberts,
2014). These are summarised in the table below. 
Table 1 Visions of integrity
Integrity as wholeness
Integrity as integration into the environment
Integrity as a professional responsibility
Integrity as conscious and open action based on moral reflection
Integrity as a (number of) value(s) or virtue(s), including incorruptibility
Integrity as compliance with laws and codes
Integrity as compliance with relevant moral standards and values
Integrity as exemplary moral behaviour
These eight visions are identifiable to different degrees in research and
policy practices. This is unavoidable to some extent. Definitions remain
contentious, always with the message that clarity regarding interpretation
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is relevant to debates on integrity. At the same time, a number of principles
are clearly prominent. The integrity of governance concerns the central
moral values that are important and are widely shared. Key values include,
for example, wholeness (consistency, including in the private sphere),
 incorruptibility (no conflicts of interest) and justice (compliance with rules
and codes, including within the profession). These values are important
for acting with integrity and for the question of what unethical action
 involves (integrity violations). This means that many different types of
 integrity violations can be distinguished (Huberts, 2005; Lasthuizen 2008;
Lasthuizen, Huberts & Heres, 2011). 
Table 2 Typology of integrity violations
Corruption: bribery
Corruption: favouritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage)
Fraud and theft of resources 
Conflicts of (private and public) interest through ‘gifts’
Conflicts of (private and public) interest through sideline activities
Improper use of authority
Misuse and manipulation of information
Indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers
Waste and abuse of organisational resources
Misconduct in private time
The first types of integrity violations involve corruption and fraud. These
phenomena have different meanings (De Graaf, 2007; Lawton et al., 2016),
but they always involve abuse of a professional position in order to gain
private benefits, with (corruption) or without (fraud) external parties. The
international debate on administrative and political integrity very often
focuses on such violations. At the same time, it was and is clear that the
ethics of governance involves a wider range of issues, certainly in the
Dutch context. A broader typology, including conflicts of interest, abuse of
information and powers, intimidation and discrimination and misconduct
in the private sphere is both useful and relevant in order to gain a grip on
these. This is also reflected in the integrity affairs in which both civil ser-
vants and politicians become involved. At the same time, a critical note is
called for. The broader typology also raises questions. There is often a grey
area. Which side job, which form of wastage, which conduct in private
time, or which manners are morally reprehensible or in conflict with
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 current basic moral standards and values. And when is there an error or an
mistake, without any reason to doubt the integrity of those involved, or
when is there ‘integritism’ (Huberts, 2005; 2014)? The integrity affairs that
actually occur fully reflect this dilemma. 
Dilemmas also arise through the awareness that good governance requires
dealing with different public values that cannot (all) be realised (Smulders
et al., 2013; De Graaf et al., 2014). Values such as justice, responsiveness,
integrity and effectiveness may conflict. The need for fast and decisive ac-
tion may be at odds with the requirement to act with due care and in-
tegrity, or maintaining friendly and direct relations with social groups and
businesses may conflict with the requirements of unbiased and independ-
ent decision-making. This awareness is important when considering the
significance and scope of integrity and integrity policies, the theme of this
book. 
Integrity policies
Van Tankeren and Montfort (2012) state that regardless of the definition of
integrity (Table 1), integrity policy can be described as the set of intentions,
choices and actions designed to promote and protect integrity within
 organisations. That set may involve a wide range of initiatives and instru-
ments, which will ideally be a combination of ‘software’ (ethical culture),
‘hardware’ (rules and procedures), and an ‘operating system’ (organisation
and coordination of integrity policies).   
Table 3 Elements of integrity policies 
Integrity policy elements
Software This concerns measures aimed at positively influencing the ethical culture
within the organisation. They are designed for the internalisation of
 (public) values. They contribute to a culture marked by openness, safety,
mutual respect and trust. Managers play a particularly important role in
this. Examples of the ‘software’ include: introductory courses, dilemma
training courses, and codes of conduct. 
Hardware The culture and values within the organisation have to be supported by 
a clear set of rules, procedures and guidelines. Supervision, control and
 enforcement form the ‘hardware’ of integrity policies. Financial, Legal,
Audit and HR departments play an important role in this. Procedures for
procurement, contracting, side jobs, as well as reporting and investigation
procedures, are examples of hard controls. 
Operating system Integrity policies must be based on a shared vision. The measures (both
soft and hard) should be consistent and interconnected in order to be
 effective. The policies should also be institutionalized and embedded.
Other important aspects of the ‘operating  system’, include monitoring,
evaluation, and risk analyses. Integrity officers play an  important role in
organising and coordinating integrity within organisations. 
The three elements combined form the basis of integrity management at
the organisational (meso) level. Integrity management is defined as: the
consistent (systemic) efforts of an organisation focused on promoting
 integrity. The institutionalisation of integrity is a specific element of
 integrity management that refers to the process of advancing its sustain-
ability, since care for integrity should be continuous rather than inciden-
tal. This is commonly referred to in terms of securing, anchoring,
embedding or safeguarding organisational integrity. Many examples of
this are presented in part II of this book. 
Integrity at the macro level (part I of this book) concerns the structure and
organisation of the integrity system and policies at the national level. Key
issues are the responsibilities of the various actors and institutions that
form part of this system, and that play a role in the formulation, imple-
mentation, or enforcement of centrally-established anti-corruption and
integrity laws and regulations. The interplay between the actors and insti-
tutions involved is considered crucial. This has resulted in several national
integrity studies (see also Chapter 13) that apply a systematic and intercon-
nected focus on integrity management (National Integrity Systems NIS). 
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We focus less directly on the micro level, which involves the actions of indi-
vidual persons. This includes the various roles that a person fulfils during
his or her lifetime, and the ability to deal with conflicting values. It also
concerns resisting temptations and dealing with moral dilemma’s.
Integrity management: perspectives 
Different views on integrity management have been developed within
both Public and Business Administration. In this section, we first reflect on
the question whether integrity can be influenced and managed within an
organization. Next, we address two strategies for integrity management,
followed by a discussion on institutionalisation. 
Views on the susceptibility of integrity: apple versus barrel
To what extent can integrity be influenced and managed within organisa-
tions (Treviño & Nelson, 2004)? Some assume that values and standards are
taught during childhood and that an organisation or its management can
have little, if any influence on them at a later stage. From that perspective,
integrity management is restricted to the establishment of good recruit-
ment and selection policies (‘hire’), taking measures against incidents in
the event that an unethical employee (‘bad apple’) oversteps the mark by
starting an investigation, and – if necessary – dismissing the employee
 involved (‘fire’). 
Others assume that organisations are capable of encouraging and support-
ing ethical behaviour by their employees. From that perspective, the atten-
tion shifts from the limited ‘hire & fire’ policies to organisation-wide
integrity policies and systems that involve the organisational structure
and culture. This means that if something goes wrong, not only will the
‘bad apple’ be removed, but attention will also be given to any flaws in the
organisational structure and culture (‘bad barrel’) that could infect the other
‘apples’. Or to quote the French poet and writer Victor Hugo (1862): 
‘If a soul is left in the darkness, sins will be committed. The guilty one is not he
who commits the sin, but he who causes the darkness.’ 
These flaws caused by organisational darkness could include: the imposi-
tion of unrealistic targets, unclear or contradictory rules, and other issues
that encourage  integrity violations. 
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Most experts agree that organizations have the opportunity and – from
the point of view of being a good employer – also the responsibility to sup-
port employees through the implementation of comprehensive integrity
policies. Or to put it differently: employees have a right to policies that
protect them from ‘un-ethicalities’. As such, integrity policies can be com-
pared with internal Health & Safety policies that also are meant to protect
employees, but then from physical and psycho-sociological hazards.  
Views on integrity management: compliance versus integrity
When structuring measures for integrity management, the literature
makes a distinction between ‘compliance’ and ‘integrity’ strategies (Paine,
1994). Characteristic of the first strategy is the top-down imposition of
rules and regulations intended to prevent non-compliant behaviour.
Norm-compliant behaviour is promoted by exercising supervision and the
punishment of offenders. This strategy implies that people cannot be fully
trusted, and that they need rules and supervision to stay on the right path. 
The second strategy focuses on the joint (bottom-up) formulation and
 internalisation of organisational values. Ethical behaviour is promoted by
strengthening the moral competence of employees, teaching them to
 determine what responsible and ethical decisions are. This strategy is of a
more positive nature and supports employees in doing the ‘right’ thing.
Depending on the specific situation, a combination of both strategies is
generally considered to be most effective (Van Blijswijk et al., 2004;
Cooper, 2006). Table 4 summarizes both strategies and illustrates some
differences (Lawton, Rayner & Lasthuizen, 2013: 121).
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Table 4 Strategies and differences 
Orientation Integrity strategy Compliance strategy 
Ethics Self-governance and subjective Conformity with externally-imposed
responsibility according to chosen standards and objective responsibilities
standards within organisations
Aim Enable ethical conduct and moral Prevent and combat unethical conduct  
reasoning and integrity violations
BBehavioural Social beings guided by values, Autonomous beings guided by
assumptions principles, (public service) economic self-interest
motivation and leaders and peers
Policy Integrity strategy Compliance strategy
Methods and Internal controls, ethics education External controls, education of rules
instruments and training, communication and and codes of conduct, reduced 
deliberation, ethical leadership, discretion and autonomy, auditing,
ethical culture and climate, monitoring and controls,
reinforcement by rewards reinforcement by sanctions
Implementation Integrity strategy Compliance strategy
Standards Organizational mission, values and Criminal and regulatory law
aspirations, social obligations, 
including law, rules, codes and 
standards
Leaderschip and Managers, ethics officers Lawyers, compliance officers
staffing
Activities Lead (bottom-up) development Developing (top-down) compliance
of organisational values and standards, education and 
standards, training and communication, handling reports of
communication, integration misconduct, conducting 
in organisational system and investigations, overseeing compliance 
culture, providing guidance audits and monitoring, enforcing
and consultation, assessing values standards with clear sanctions
and performance, identifying and 
resolving problems and dilemmas
Education and Ethical decision-making and values, Compliance standards and system, 
training dilemma training codes of conduct
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Views on institutionalising integrity: informal versus formal 
The question that subsequently arises is how integrity management can 
be firmly embedded within organisations? The literature (again) distin-
guishes two approaches to create a sustainable ‘good barrel’: informal and
formal institutionalisation (Brenner, 1992).
The nature of the informal approach is implicit and concerns less visible
and tangible processes. It does not concentrate primarily or directly on
ethics, but certainly affects the organisation’s ethical climate. Leadership,
fair remuneration, appraisal and promotion systems, trust and job satis-
faction are often mentioned as organisational carriers for ethics and
 integrity. 
By contrast, the formal approach is explicitly, directly and visibly aimed at
promoting integrity within organisations (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe &
Umphress, 2003). This includes the development of integrity structures,
standards and systems that support organisational ethics in a sustainable
way. Although a balanced institutionalisation approach is recommended
(Rossouw & Van Vuuren, 2004), advocates of the formal approach under-
line the strength of its visibility and clarity to employees (Berman, West &
Cava, 1994) and emphasise that a formalised approach contributes to the
effectiveness of integrity policies (Van den Heuvel et al., 2010). Yet another
reason for a formalized integrity management approach is that, in case
 employees are prosecuted because of suspected integrity breaches, judges
nowadays take into account the organization’s deployed integrity activi-
ties. What did the employer do to prevent the employee from turning into
a ‘bad apple’ is then the central question to be answered. Tangible struc-
tures, systems, and documents specifically aimed at integrity management
are certainly helpful in that regard. Table 5 summarizes both approaches
and highlights some main differences (Hoekstra, 2016). 
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Table 5 Formal versus informal approaches
Approaches for institutionalising integrity
Aspects Formal Informal 
Policies Specific policies, directly and explicitly General policies with an indirect and
aimed at fostering integrity implicit influence on the ethical climate 
Products Integrity structures, systems, procedures, Organisational culture, values, leadership, 
standards and plans fair and just company procedures  
Responsibility Specific integrity officers are responsible Everyone is responsible for ethics and
in general, and they support line individual line managers are responsible
management in managing integrity for ethical behaviour in their units
in their units    
Objectivity Ensures an objective and univocal Susceptible to subjective and ambiguous
company-wide integrity management interpretations of individual managers,
approach, based on coherent actions  because of a decentralized approach  
Visibility Highly visible and tangible, for both Less visible and tangible, for both internal
internal and external actors (employees, and external actors (employees, managers 
managers and external watchdogs). and external watchdogs). New employees
Provides clear and accessible benchmarks are required to internalize the
for new personnel organization’s culture
Accountability Strong steering, monitoring and Indirect steering and monitoring
accountability mechanisms mechanisms, more difficult to account for 
Pressure Can be organised quickly and is Internalising ethics in the organisational
therefore a common response to external culture requires long term efforts. Pitfall:
pressure, which calls for immediate certain degree of ambiguity and slowness
action Pitfall: abused as symbolic action 
Some initial reflections 
How do the Dutch integrity policies score in terms of the perspectives out-
lined above, and which line can be distilled from the historical develop-
ment of these policies? The policy developments seem clear and even
logical. The topic was placed on the agenda, backed-up by the formulation
of rules and standards, and enriched with value-oriented aspects. In addi-
tion to the ‘hard- and software’, we – more recently – witness an increase in
interest for integrity systems, -management, -monitoring, and institution-
alization.  
In 2015 there has been a fair amount of attention to violators of integrity,
certainly in the media. This increased the call for integrity screening to
eliminate ‘bad apples’. But it is also clearly recognised within public
 administration that this requires broad integrity policies to expel
‘organisational darkness’. 
Compared to some other countries, the Netherlands seems to rely more
strongly on a values based (integrity) strategy. Whereas other countries
 follow rules based (compliance) strategies, the Dutch civil service has
 gradually adhered to a more positive integrity strategy (Hoekstra, Belling
& Van der Heiden, 2008). Instead of a limited focus on ‘just’ avoiding
 criminal behaviour, the Dutch public sector also emphasises the moral, or
ethical, aspects of public officials’ behaviour. As such, integrity policies in
the Netherlands are not solely fixated on avoiding criminal acts such as
corruption and fraud, but also address all kinds of ethical issues, including
bullying, discrimination, intimidation, lying, cheating, theft, cutting cor-
ners, relationships on the work floor, the use of social media, and sexual
harassment. Moreover, integrity policies are not just dedicated to avoiding
wrongdoing. To a large extent they focus on training civil servants,
 enabling them to make the right ethical decisions, to encourage them to do
it right, to act responsibly, and to make better moral judgements within
the specific governmental context. 
The popularity of the integrity (values) approach (see also Chapter 14) also
causes some concern: ‘... its qualities should by no means be exaggerated: 
a value-based strategy without clear norms and rules and sanctions has no
bite. Rather, the existing evidence on instruments suggests that a balance
of compliance-based and values-based approaches may work best’
 (Huberts, 2014: 179). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Develop ment (OECD) also emphasises that: ‘The balance should be main-
tained and one should ... be aware of a too enthusiastic and radical switch
towards the values-based approach...’ (OECD, 2009: 13). The Dutch Min-
istry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations also reports that the integrity
approach has some disadvantages, because it focuses primarily on higher
ethical standards with too little attention to potential violations. The
 Ministry is therefore aiming for a mix of the compliance-based and values-
based approaches, with a variety of integrity instruments (Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2014).
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With regard to the institutionalisation of integrity, there appears to be a
preference for the more informal, indirect approach. Themes such as ethi-
cal leadership, professionalism, good employment practice, and public
trust are rather fashionable within Dutch public administration. This does
not alter the fact that in recent years, numerous policy studies emphasise
that the institutionalization of integrity requires more attention
 (Hoekstra, 2016). This is – by the way – consistent with international
 comparative studies, which indicate that the embedding of integrity is a
weak point in integrity management within all EU Member States
(Demmke &  Moilanen, 2012). 
About the book 
In this section we explain the structure of the book and the relationship
between the different chapters. Integrity is considered at both the macro
and the meso level in this publication. Part I provides a description of 
a number of central players and core elements of the Dutch national
 approach.3 In part II organisations explain how they design their integrity
policies within these frameworks. Finally, in part III, researchers reflect on
the current state of integrity affairs in the Dutch public sector. 
In Chapter 2 Richard Hagedoorn and Melanie Hermus discuss the in-
tegrity regulations and policies for civil servants and (political) administra-
tors. They describe the system responsibility and coordinating role of the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in relation to the integrity
policies of the public sector. This chapter addresses (national) integrity
policies, laws, standards, evaluation, monitoring and support. The authors
also outline a number of trends and developments in Dutch public
 administration which influence integrity (programs), such as: cut-backs,
 increased flexibility in the labour market, and decentralisation. 
In the Netherlands, individual government organisations are themselves
responsible for implementing and enforcing integrity policies. In Chapter
3 Marijn Zweegers and Alain Hoekstra explain how BIOS supports govern-
ment organisations in that respect. BIOS plays an intermediate role,
 because it translates national legislation into ready to use instruments. As
such it enhances organisational implementation processes. In contrast to
other international anti-corruption or integrity agencies, BIOS does not
 investigate incidents, but has a purely preventive task. BIOS develops
 instruments, shares knowledge, organises networks, conducts research
and advises organisations.  
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All preventative measures and support can’t prevent things from going
wrong. Integrity violations still occur regularly. How can these be re-
ported, and how are reporters protected? In Chapter 4 Alex Belling and Ed
Fenne focus on internal and external reporting mechanisms that can be
deployed if the preventive policies nevertheless fail. The authors describe
the different reporting systems, devoting particular attention to the role of
confidential integrity counsellors. 
What happens once abuses have been reported? In cases where the report
appears to be correct, investigations must be conducted. Hans Groot out-
lines how organisations can conduct internal integrity investigations in
Chapter 5. Groot provides a number of practical guidelines for conducting
internal investigations. Peace talks, uniform protocols, the importance of
after-care and coincidence with criminal investigations are all raised here. 
Integrity violations such as fraud or corruption cannot be settled solely
through internal investigations. The procedures for criminal law investi-
gations into public integrity violations are described in Chapter 6. Erik
Hoenderkamp places the emphasis here on the role of the Rijksrecherche
(‘Central Criminal Intelligence Agency’) and the Public Prosecution
 Service. 
In Chapter 7 Terry Lamboo and Jessica de Jong describe the developments
in integrity monitoring during the past decade. This is no longer confined
to evaluating whether policy measures have been implemented, but also
involves checking the extent to which these have penetrated to the work
floor, and how integrity is perceived by employees, politicians and admin-
istrators. The authors emphasise the importance of monitoring and briefly
discuss the number and nature of the violations. This first section of the
book thus primarily concerns a number of important (macro) aspects of
the Dutch NIS, namely policies, support, reporting, investigation and
monitoring. 
In part II we move to the (meso) organisational perspective and focus on a
number of individual government organisations. How do they address in-
tegrity? A choice has been made here to give the floor to a small municipal
authority first, because this illustrates how a small organisation with fewer
resources can also comply with the policy frameworks outlined. As a com-
parison a larger municipal authority follows, that of Amsterdam. Then
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two large national organisations are presented: the Custodial Institutions
Agency (DJI) and the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration. We
close with the Province of Limburg, which shows how an organisation can
design and implement integrity policies via an external network on a re-
gional level. 
In Chapter 8, integrity officer Aafje Stout describes how she manages in-
tegrity within the small municipality of Hellevoetsluis, and which chal-
lenges she faces in that position. She describes the roles of the integrity
officer and the loneliness of that job, but also how she manages to involve
other actors (ethics coalition) within the organisation.
Jeanine Kooistra describes in Chapter 9 the development of the Amster-
dam Integrity Bureau (IB), which employs twenty integrity officers. This
integrity office supports the municipality and has four pillars: internal in-
vestigations, risk analysis, screening, and training and advice. The core ele-
ments of the policies are described on the basis of a model. The chapter
focuses in particular on integrity risk analyses as the foundation for in-
tegrity policies and measures. 
The Custodial Institutions Agency also has its own office with its own
 integrity coordinator. The Custodial Institutions Agency’s integrity
 approach is explained in Chapter 10. Attention is devoted here to investi-
gations, training, recording violations and conducting research. Dick van
Lingen describes how integrity is integrated into the daily operations, as in
regular staff interviews and training. In this way, integrity is embedded in
the organisation, to ensure that it receives permanent attention. 
The Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration also has a separate
 department for promoting integrity. Hans Visser argues in Chapter 11 that
integrity is a shared responsibility and how, in accordance with this, he has
organised an internal integrity network. Specific responsibilities have
been assigned within the Tax and Customs Administration for the devel-
opment, application and monitoring of integrity policies. Those responsi-
ble work closely together, which benefits the effectiveness of the policy.  
Chapter 12 also focuses on the network approach, but with regard to exter-
nal networks with other organisations rather than the internal ones. Rick
Duiveman reveals how a broad alliance between provincial, municipal and
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water authorities is used to promote integrity. The Netherlands has several
of such alliances, but Limburg holds the largest one. Limburg has opted
for a joint integrity approach and regulations, but also shares facilities
such as the position of the regional confidential integrity counsellor.
Part III consists of three chapters written from a more academic perspec-
tive. Just as a search for consistency in fostering integrity is important
within an organisation, as shown in the integrity infrastructure of BIOS
and the Amsterdam model, this is also important at the national level. The
Dutch National Integrity System (NIS) serves that purpose. The NIS model
makes clear what institutions contribute to a country’s integrity perform-
ance. In Chapter 13 Willeke Slingerland summarises the results of her
2012 NIS study. The emphasis lies on the presence and quality of the NIS
institutions, and whether they have the necessary resources. It also makes
clear the areas in which the NIS is vulnerable. Slingerland emphasises the
importance of cooperation and how the different elements and structures
reinforce each other in the Netherlands. 
This analysis is consistent with that of Christoph Demmke in Chapter 14,
from a more international EU perspective. In various studies Demmke has
examined how EU countries deal with corruption and integrity, and puts
the Dutch developments in that perspective. He takes a positive view, but
also presents some reservations. In addition, he considers decision-making
at the European level and the role that the Netherlands placed in agenda-
setting and decision-making. He sees a pioneering role, giving hope of a
step forward during the Netherlands’ EU presidency in 2016. 
In the final chapter, Leo Huberts reflects on the contributions presented on
the basis of his research and knowledge of integrity in the Netherlands
and beyond. Is there such a thing as a ‘Dutch approach’ to corruption and
integrity? What are the key features of this and what can be learned from
this for the development of policy in other, similar countries? He takes a
fairly positive view of this, with hope for the EU presidency, but also
 devotes attention to the dilemmas that the Dutch approach faces in the
Netherlands itself. All in all, an attempt to place the Dutch approach in a
realistic perspective.  
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Notes
1 We present a brief introduction, simply based on for example en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Netherlands and www.government.nl/policy-areas/government-and-state. See
for more information on the governance system: Andeweg and Irwin 2014 and for
statistics the website of the Ministry of the Interior: kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl/
 (unfortunately in Dutch), with also specifics on number of employees.
2 Because of the major differences in the social and governance context, we will not
discuss the Caribbean part of the Kingdom (a very interesting topic, but not for an
outline of the ‘Dutch approach’). 
3 This is followed by sketches on a national level and from a number of organisations.
This required choices to be made, and we do not pretend that this overview is
 exhaustive. This explains why a number of actors, such as the Netherlands Court 
of Audit, local audit offices, the National Ombudsman and local ombudsman
 organisations, as well as various other organisations that play a role in this, are not
explicitly included in this book.  
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Integrity in public administration 
Responsibilities of the Minister of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations
Richard Hagedoorn, policy advisor, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Melanie Hermus, senior policy advisor, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Introduction
In the Netherlands, integrity is regarded as one of the most important
 conditions for good governance. It is strongly related to public trust in the
government and thus to the legitimacy of government actions in general.
A breach of integrity by the government may have major consequences 
for the image of and trust in public administration. Strengthening the
 integrity of the public administration has therefore been an important
goal of successive Dutch  cabinets for quite some time.
The subject was placed prominently on the political agenda in 1992 by
 former Minister of the Interior Ien Dales. In this period, growing concern
arose over possible infiltration of public administration by organised
crime, combined with several scandals within various municipalities in the
Netherlands relating to corruption in public procurement and leaking of
confidential political information. In response to these developments,
minister Dales delivered a speech at a congress for municipal authorities,
in which she spoke the famous words ‘A little bit of integrity is not possible’.1
The speech is often seen in the Netherlands as the starting point for
 integrity policy as we know it today. The policy has undergone many
changes, but Dales’s words still resonate in the lively dialogues among
politicians, journalists and specialists about what ‘integrity’ and ‘acting
with integrity’ means in practice. Over the years, this theme has developed
further and a stronger connection has been made with good governance.
In 2009 this resulted in the Dutch Code for Good Public Governance 2
which includes integrity as one of the seven leading principles.
In this chapter we describe the tasks and responsibilities of the Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations in this field. First the context in which
the minister operates, as this largely determines the reach of his responsi-
2
bilities. We then briefly describe changes and developments in the
 integrity policy.  Finally, a number of new developments in the integrity
policy and some current challenges are discussed.
Why is the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations responsible 
for the integrity of the Dutch public administration?
As already mentioned, the government has attached considerable value to
 securing the integrity of the government for many years. A special role is
 assigned to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations here.
Among other things, he is responsible for the provision for good and effec-
tive public administration and a government on which the public can rely.
With this, the minister also has overall responsibility for the professional-
ism, integrity and quality of civil servants, administrators and elected
 representatives. 
Constitutional relationships
The responsibilities of the ministry for integrity policy within the public
administration aref confined by the constitutional relationships. The
Netherlands is a ‘decentralised unitary state’. This means that central gov-
ernment is responsible for the national laws and regulations which often
describe in more general terms the obligations with which the subnational
levels of government (provincial and municipal authorities and the water
authorities) must comply. These levels of government have a considerable
degree of freedom as they have their tasks, responsibilities and powers
which they can realise as they see fit, within the general frameworks set by
central government. This concerns  matters such as local taxes, licences and
permits, economy and tourism, care and welfare, housing construction
and spatial planning. The subnational authorities are responsible for the
quality of the execution of their tasks. Supervision and control take place
by the accountability of administrators to the people’s representatives at
the local or provincial level. 
Outline of the national integrity policy 
The national integrity policy is aimed at preventing unethical behaviour
and misconduct and at promoting an ethical (working) environment. The
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations acts as the coordinating
minister. This means that, within the Dutch system of the decentralised
unitary state, individual government organisations are responsible for set-
ting up, implementing and enforcing the integrity policies of their organi-
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sations, within the central frameworks set by the minister. The system has
also proven that individual organisations are best able to develop their
specific integrity policies in a way that is most appropriate and relates best
to their organisations (‘couleur locale’). The Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations has primary responsibility for the legal and institu-
tional system that forms the framework for authorities within the public
administration to develop their integrity policies. In addition, he provides,
supports and facilitates the different tiers of government (Parliamentary
Session, 2005-2006). 
We refer to this responsibility as a system responsibility, as the minister is
not (directly) responsible for the results to be achieved but for creating the
right conditions. This responsibility with regard to integrity is reflected
primarily in the following functions: 
• standardisation: via laws and regulations, including the Civil Servants
Act, the General Administrative Law Act, the Municipalities Act, the
Provinces Act and the Water Authorities Act;
• monitoring: conducting research and monitoring in order to evaluate
the quality and effectiveness of the system. Individual organisations
are not evaluated;
• support: entails activities focused on agenda-setting and facilitating
 institutions that provide support such as guidelines, handbooks and
training courses; for example, the ministry subsidises the Dutch
 National Integrity Office (BIOS) and various professional organisations
for activities in the field of integrity; 
• intervention in case of serious incidents, the minister can formally
 request information of the relevant administrative body on the nature
of the incident, its settlement, and how the administrative body
 intends to prevent such cases in the future. In severe cases of financial
mismanagement, or continuous administrative disorder, formal
 measures can be invoked by the King’s commissioner or the Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom  Relations in order to restore good adminis-
tration within a given administrative body.3
The ministry works closely with various partners and stakeholders,
 including other ministries, associations of municipal, provincial and water
authorities,4 professional associations of mayors, aldermen, council mem-
bers et cetera, as well as the Netherlands Court of Audit, the National Om-
budsman, universities and individual (government) organisations. Because
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the Netherlands has an open, transparent and egalitarian culture, the re-
sponsible policy officers of the ministry may maintain this broad informal
network of representatives of the different organisations. This network is
regarded as a necessary condition for effective and efficient development
of the national integrity policy established by the ministry. Information
and expertise are exchanged, relevant issues are identified, instruments
such as model codes of conduct are developed through co-creation and
support is sought for new national policies. Associations and professional
organisations in public administration also encourage their members to
invest in activities and measures that promote integrity.
Differences in the approach for civil servants and holders of political office
The ministry pursues integrity policy for both civil servants and for hold-
ers of political office.5 The general roles of the minister are the same and
provisions within laws, policies and codes of conduct for civil servants and
for political office holders are largely similar. Nonetheless, there are some
important differences between the policies for civil servants, administra-
tors and elected officials as a result of differences in the nature of the
 position, the appointment methods and the context in which the groups
operate. These differences are also reflected in the laws and regulations,
which are therefore also raised in this section.
References to civil servants concern employees in the public sector. A
 generally accepted principle in the policy is that, in the first instance, the
integrity of civil servants relates to the relationship between the employer
and the employee. As a result, primary responsibility for integrity policy
rests with the employer. This is also made clear in the Civil Servants Act,
which states that ‘good civil service practice’ must be made possible and
must be supported by ‘good employment practice’. In this context, good
employment practice means, among other things, that the employer must
reduce potential temptations and risks as far as possible, for example by
setting up an integrity policy, promoting integrity awareness among civil
servants and by taking disciplinary action if the situation requires it. 
Both elected officials (representatives) and appointed officials (administra-
tors) are not subject to a competent authority and, therefore, have no em-
ployer/employee relationship. This means that disciplinary measures that
exist for civil servants, such as the possibility of dismissal, cannot be
 applied to holders of political office. With the exception of criminal law,
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measures concerning holders of political office are far more often of a
 political nature. There is also a distinction between elected representatives
and appointed administrators. For example, an elected body such as Parlia-
ment can adopt a motion of no confidence in a minister, and a municipal
council may do the same with regard to an alderman. This can lead to the
resignation of the administrator. People’s representatives are elected by the
population and have the mandate of the voters. Whether a people’s repre-
sentative resigns for reasons of integrity is up to the elected representative,
and, ultimately, to the electorate. After all, elected representatives answer
for their performance to the electorate, via elections. The political parties
play an important role in securing the integrity of elected representatives.
They are responsible for recruiting suitable candidates and also for train-
ing and disciplinary enforcement, such as deprivation and suspension if
necessary. For Crown-appointed administrators such as mayors and King’s
commissioners,6 breaches of integrity may, in the final instance, form
grounds for dismissal by the Crown.
Design of the national integrity policy
Since the 1990s important steps have been taken in public administration
in the design of the integrity policy. The development of this policy was
not without its ups and downs. Over the years, scandals and new insights
have resulted in changes in laws and policies contributing to the compre-
hensive integrity policy that we know today. The realisation of the differ-
ent roles that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations plays,
standardisation, monitoring and support, are discussed below.
Standardisation via laws and regulations, basic standards and codes of conduct
A number of requirements concerning integrity and integrity policy have
been laid down in law and in various regulations on labour conditions. But
legis lation is not the only means of standardisation. In addition, in 2005
an administrative agreement between the ministry and the professional
associations of the subnational governments has been reached on addi-
tional requirements for good integrity policy. This agreement outlines
basic standards for the integrity policies of administrative bodies and
 organisations. The ‘Model Approach for Basic Integrity Standards for
 Public Administration and the Police Force’ (Basic Standards)7 established
an integrated approach in the field of integrity for the entire public
 administration. In 2006, this integral approach was strengthened through
some amendments to the Civil Service Act.   
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Civil servants
The Basic Standards overlap with provisions of the Civil Service Act (see
Table 1). However, the Basic Standards are more detailed and as such
 provide more practical guidelines for implementation. In addition, they
address vulnerable gaps in the integrity policy which are not covered by
law.
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Table 1 Framework of integrity standards for civil servants 
Standards Regulations
Pursuit of an integrity policy Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Annual report on integrity policies (to the elected body) Civil Servants Act
Relevant information in centralised internal registers Basic Standards
(including the total number of breaches of integrity, 
reported conflicts of interest, etc)
Code of conduct Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Taking an oath or making a pledge Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Integrity as part of human resource management Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Attention to integrity in recruitment and selection Basic Standards
Security and antecedent investigations and 
Certificates of Good Conduct (VOG) Basic Standards
Attention to integrity in assessments, work meetings, Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
training and education
Overview of vulnerable positions and measures to prevent Basic Standards
breaches of integrity
Regular analysis of integrity risks relating to vulnerable Basic Standards
actions, positions and processes
Reporting, registration and disclosure (for high risk officials) Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
of side-activities 
Reporting and registration of financial interests Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
(for high risk officials)
Regulation and reporting obligation for gifts Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Taking measures aimed at protection Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
of confidential information 
Procurement and contracting procedures Basic Standards
Procedure for reporting suspected misconduct Civil Servants Act, Basic Standards
Confidence officer for integrity Basic Standards
Procedure for investigating and sanctioning (alleged) 
violations of integrity Basic Standards
Source: Policy review on Integrity (Policy), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, May 2014
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Appointed and elected officials
Statutory rules for integrity for appointed and elected officials in sub -
national levels of government are laid down in the Municipalities Act, the
Provinces Act and the Water Authorities Act. These rules are largely similar
to those laid down for civil servants: 
• For example, codes of conduct must be drawn up for holders of politi-
cal  office, they must take the oath or make a pledge, and they are bound
by rules relating to the handling of confidential information; 
• These laws also contain a prohibition on certain official positions that
are  incompatible with the political office (the so-called incompatibili-
ties). For  example, a council member cannot simultaneously serve as a
minister or work at the same time as a civil servant in the municipal
 authority in which he is a council member;
• In addition certain (economic) activities by holders of political office
are also prohibited to prevent conflict of interests. This concerns, for
example, activities as an attorney or consultant and representing the
municipal, provincial or water authorities, or their opponents.
There are also provisions that regulate the participation of local elected
representatives and administrators in voting and decision-making in cases
in which a holder of political office has a personal interest at stake. 
There are also rules concerning ancillary jobs:
• Administrators may not hold ancillary positions which may undermine
the authority or performance of the political office; 
• Administrators have a legal obligation to report to the representative
bodies if they intend to accept an ancillary position; 
• Ancillary positions of administrators must be publicly disclosed;8
• Administrators must publicly disclose their income from ancillary
 positions. The income from ancillary positions is deducted from their
remuneration. The disclosure of ancillary positions and the related
 income intends to provide public insight into any other personal
 (financial) interests which could play a role in the decisions of the
 administrator. It can also make an important contribution to the
 prevention of (the appearance of) conflicts of interest. 
The regulation of compensation and benefits (beside the statutory remu-
neration) is mainly arranged for in the decentralised regulations per au-
thority (for example municipal bye-laws). An adequate and clear package
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of benefits and provisions (for example to declare official expenses) can re-
duce the temptation for holders of political office to act without integrity
(Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2015: 70).9 All compensa-
tions and benefits for holders of political office are identifiable and verifi-
able as they must be based upon formal provisions in laws and regulations.
Any benefit or provision not explicitly mentioned in laws and regulations,
is not permitted. 
For ministers and state secretaries the integrity rules form part of the con-
fidential ‘Handbook for new Ministers and State Secretaries’. This includes
clear rules concerning the acceptance of gifts and actions relating to finan-
cial businesses. Ministers and state secretaries may not hold any ancillary
positions. The rules applying for the assessment of candidate ministers
and state secretaries contained in the letter from the prime minister to the
House of Representatives are also relevant. These are not legal rules, but
they form a resilient behavioural line. 
For members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Act on the
Swearing In of Ministers and Members of Parliament contains a number of pro-
visions relating to the taking of the oath or making the pledge and the re-
quirement to act in compliance with the obligations of the office. There are
also statutory provisions concerning certain incompatible positions and
disclosure of their ancillary positions. The Rules of Procedure of both
Houses of Parliament require members of Parliament to report gifts and
trips offered and also contain provisions relating to conduct in meetings.
In 2014 the two Houses of Parliament supplemented these Regulations in
response to an evaluation of the parliamentary prevention of corruption
measures by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the
 Council of Europe. The rules for conflicts of interest, accepting gifts,
 foreign trips and ancillary activities have become clearer and more precise
and cover more situations. Awareness is also strengthened through the
 introduction of a confidential integrity counsellor (for the House of
 Representatives) and, for example, an integrity training course for new
MPs joining the Houses of Parliament (the Senate and the House of
 Representatives). 
Model integrity code(s) of conduct
Codes of conduct can offer an effective form of standardisation comple-
mentary to laws and regulations. Codes concern a set of agreements on
what is desirable behaviour. In addition to rights and obligations, it often
also mentions core values which should be upheld in the performance of
their duty. The law therefore requires government bodies to establish such
codes of conduct for both civil servants and for the political bodies (such as
the municipal council) and administrators of the subnational levels of
 government. However, the ministry does not prescribe the content of these
codes of conduct. Their concrete details are left to the administrative
 bodies which can take into account the local context and specific tasks and
risks of the organisation. Furthermore, it is consistent with the principle
that government organisations and subnational levels of government are
responsible for the integrity of their organisations. As part of the support-
ive task of the ministry, model codes of conduct have been established
which government authorities can use as a guide for their codes of con-
duct. Examples are the Central Government Model Code of Conduct for
the civil service organisation, and model codes of conduct for local admin-
istrators and elected representatives, which were drawn up by the ministry
in close cooperation with the associations of municipal, provincial and
water authorities. 
In general the codes of conduct contain rules on the reporting/disclo-
sure of ancillary jobs, dealing with confidential and classified informa-
tion, gifts and invitations to excursions, events, foreign trips et cetera,
and the use of facilities of the organisation. In addition they often con-
tain provisions on procedural agreements relating to reporting and
handling of ethical dilemmas and misconduct. The codes also contain
rules on the acceptance of jobs within a year of resignation or termina-
tion of the official term of office (known as the ‘revolving door’
 construction). 
In 2015 the model codes of conduct were revised in order to relate them
more closely to current day-to-day practice. The revised model code for
civil servants of the central government devotes special attention to new
developments, such as the use of social media. For the holders of political
office the model codes have been fully revised, both for members of the
day-to-day administration and one for the elected representatives.
In the revision process of the model code of conduct for holders of
 political office, special attention is devoted to the formal position of
codes of conduct. It is explicitly stated that codes are internal rules of
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conduct that holders of political office formally establish through
 debates within their administration. Failure to comply with the code of
conduct has no legal consequences as disciplinary consequences are not
available for holders of political office. Compliance to a code of conduct
is a matter of self-commitment. This being said, holders of political
 office can be called publicly to account for their compliance with the
code. Failure to comply with the code of conduct can become part of the
political debate and have political consequences. 
The discussions concerning the details of the model codes of conduct with
practitioners and experts are illustrative of the debate on what constitutes
an effective integrity policy. These show the many different opinions that
exist regarding the ways in which ethical behaviour can be promoted.
There are just as many different views on the usefulness of codes. For
some, a code of conduct is a tool for initiating an internal dialogue on
moral values. For others, the emphasis lies on (further development of)
rules against which people must be held accountable. Others emphasise
the limitations of regulations through ‘soft law’. They argue that the de-
bate requires hard rules and that a law in that regard is the appropriate
means for this. Other questions raised were whether codes of conduct
should contain concrete or abstract standards, only material standards or
also procedural ones? These are some of the questions at issue here and it is
important that we understand how codes of conduct are actually put into
practice. 
Evaluation and monitoring
An important part of a policy cycle concerns evaluation and monitoring.
This is no different for the general integrity policy pursued by the
 ministry. Chapter 7 will discuss the use of periodic monitoring in more
 detail. In this section we discuss the outcomes of a recent evaluation of the
 national integrity policy (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
2014), which aimed to examine the results and developments of the past
20 years.
Monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of integrity policies is com-
plicated and the ministry is well aware of the challenges:
• It is difficult to determine the actual effectiveness of the integrity
 policies. After all, the effect of measures and instruments on the moral
awareness of public officials cannot be viewed in isolation from other
individual, organisational and societal influences and developments;
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• There is but little insight into the actual scale of integrity problems.
After all, like all other forms of misconduct, breaches often take place
in secret;
• Measurements of effects require a more clear definition of the concept
of integrity, integrity awareness or breaches of integrity.
Nevertheless, based on various policy documents and data from the differ-
ent monitors, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the develop-
ment of the Dutch integrity policy. Over the years, the ministry has aimed
for a broad integrity policy for public administration. The policy contains
various elements that in combination form a comprehensive and coherent
integrity policy that is consistent with international (academic) standards
and insights. It can also be concluded from various studies that, over the
years, considerable steps have been taken with the implementation of in-
tegrity policy in organisations. The continuing care for and intensification
of policy by the ministry has led to a growing degree of attention, aware-
ness and structural embedding of (parts of) integrity policy in government
organisations.
It is also notable that the integrity policy has some distinctive
 characteristics:
• The policy has a fair degree of abstraction: central government
 prescribes what organisations must do, but not how they must imple-
ment it. This gives organisations the scope, within certain (statutory)
frameworks, to develop the policy in a way most appropriate for their
organisation and context; 
• The policy takes a positive approach, with the focus on prevention.
 Efforts are therefore made to create and stimulate awareness among
 administrators, civil servants and people’s representatives that
 integrity is of vital importance to the government; 
• The objectives of the policy have remained fairly abstract. In essence, it
can be said that the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has
aimed for a situation in which all government organisations have a
clear integrity policy that contributes towards the embedding of
 ethical awareness in the day-to-day work. 
The evaluation of the policy also showed some possibilities for further
strengthening the integrity policy. Perception studies show that familiar-
ity with measures such as codes of conduct, whistleblower regulations et
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cetera, as well as confidence in the integrity of respondents’ own organisa-
tions and in the moral leadership of management sometimes still fall
short. The effectiveness of the policy could also be further improved by
 creating more consistency in the content of the integrity policy as part of
good governance and by further strengthening cooperation with various
relevant partners such as whistleblower organisations, audit institutions,
the National Ombudsman et cetera.
Support
In addition to standardisation and monitoring, the ministry has an impor-
tant role in supporting public administration. For although government
organisations in the Netherlands are responsible for the integrity of their
organisations, they do not have to deal with this entirely alone. This sup-
porting role is realised primarily via the Dutch National Integrity Office
(BIOS), which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
In addition, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations plays an
important role in promoting integrity in public administration, and each
minister has done so since 1992. The present Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, Ronald Plasterk, on taking office at the end of 2012,
made integrity one of the priorities of his term in office. The minister him-
self emphasizes actively the importance of a government with integrity.
For example, he brings forward the issue in public speeches several times 
a year. Integrity is also a fixed topic in the meetings that the minister con-
ducts in the appointment of new mayors and King’s commissioners. 
The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations also identifies wider
trends and developments that may have an impact on the integrity of the
public administration. After all, the world around us constantly changes.
This means that public administration continually faces new issues and
challenges that can affect integrity. For example, technological develop-
ments are changing how we work, while the financial crisis influenced the
way in which we regard certain social issues. The integrity policy will
therefore have to keep pace. This calls for a clear view on possible risks. To
provide more insight into possible risks, the ministry has commissioned a
risk analysis (AEF, 2014). This has shown that, for the Netherlands, a num-
ber of trends and developments will be of particular importance in the
coming years. Table 2 provides an overview. 
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Table 2 Trends and developments in Dutch public administration
Trend/development Potential vulnerability of public administration
The modern civil Civil servants work increasingly independently, in a dynamic and 
servant and changing environment. They increasingly work at different locations and 
labour market thus more often beyond the supervision of managers. Furthermore, job
flexibilisation mobility and the number of temporary contracts are increasing. As with
contractemployment, this can form a risk for the loyalty to the organisa-
tion and the embedding of a shared pattern of standards and values. 
Conflicts of Administrators and politicians have substantial decision-making powers. 
interest They also need this scope. At the same time, we expect them to work at
the heart of society, which also means that many administrators hold
ancillary positions. In certain cases, this could also result in conflicts of
interest. Furthermore, it is possible that civil servants, through loyalty or
fear, will not act against administrators when there are suspicions of a
breach of integrity. It is therefore important that administrators are able
to organise feedback and that they provide for a safe environment for
employees to speak their minds if they do not agree with management. 
Integritism In the Netherlands we witness a growing tendency to condemn behavi-
our of public officials as lacking in integrity. For example, in some cases
doubts are cast on the integrity of decision-making, while in fact, it is
the quality of the decision (in terms of content, or consultation process
etc.) that is being called into question, not the integrity of the individual
public officials. Integrity is also used increasingly as a political weapon to
harm opponents. In addition individual cases are presented (in media or
politics) in an oversimplified way, where the appearance of a conflict of
interest is equated with an actual conflict of interest. These tendencies
can create a culture of fear, potentially resulting in administrative
 paralysis and reluctance to take action in cases of alleged misconduct.
Administrative fears make it also tempting to over-regulate integrity
risks. These developments undermine the necessary discussions about
moral dilemmas within organisations. 
Cut-backs and In recent years, there have been cut-backs at every administrative level 
financial setback due to the economic crisis. This could lead to increased pressure of work,
with attention focusing on the primary process. However, the impor-
tance of and attention to integrity could come under pressure as a
 result. 
Decentralisations The recent large-scale decentralisations of social services to the local
government mean that local authorities are facing a substantial
 expansion of their responsibilities and budget. These bring along the
 allocation of resources, complex tasks, outsourcing, more intensive con-
tacts with the public and social organisations, a discretionary powers
and a focus on providing customized services to citizens, may enlarge
the vulnerabilities and integrity risks for the local authorities. These
could include matters such as improper attempts at influencing public
officials (bribery, intimidation), fraud, abuse of power, etc. 
Integrity (policy) in development
The general view among experts and academics in the Netherlands is that
a great deal has been regulated in the field of integrity in terms of regula-
tions and instruments. The present challenge therefore lies more in their
application in practice. 
For administrators and elected representatives, the challenges often lie in
the field of avoiding (the appearance of) conflicts of interest (Integrity
Yearbook 2011; letter from the government, 29 October 2012’. Civil
 servants are more concerned about misconduct by colleagues in terms of
(sexual) harassment, abuse of power by managers, wastage and default 
(De Graaf & Strüwer, 2014). However, according to many experts and
 managers in the Netherlands, the approach to such problems should not
be sought in imposing more or new rules and regulations. The focus
should rather lie on offering guides to the application of the rules in
 practice. It is considered important to continue to invest in a preventive
approach at the institutional level, within organisations, and in an active
approach in the event of concrete breaches of integrity. Of course in close
cooperation with the associations and professional organisations within
the public administration. It is important that sufficient attention is also
devoted to organising a safe environment for employees to speak their
minds and to provide critical feedback to management and the authorities
as part of their professional independence. This includes being able to
 report safely on suspicions of abuses and possibly breaches of integrity, as
well as being able to discuss personal dilemmas. After all, views on what
integrity entails are not formed only in rules, but primarily through good
and open discussions. It is therefore important to ensure that the organisa-
tional climate is safe and provides opportunities to do so.
Attention to the role of administrators
It is important that managers and administrators take a leading role in
strengthening the integrity of the public administration. In 2016 the
Netherlands will formalise this in law for the subnational levels of govern-
ment. This law will make mayors responsible for promoting integrity
within the administrative and political bodies. The same has been regu-
lated for King’s commissioners with regard to administrative integrity at
the provincial level. 
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This statutory embedding of the responsibility for integrity gives these
 administrators a title to:
• place integrity on the agenda for (annual) discussions in the municipal
councils or provincial parliaments;
• take preventive measures through the use of education and training
possibilities;
• set up enforcement practices with due care, and in cases of (alleged)
misconduct to take appropriate action;
• to act as a point of contact for public officials of their organisation.
In order to assist mayors (and King’s commissioners) in these often sensi-
tive and precarious tasks, a Support Centre for Integrity Investigations 
of Holders of Political Office has been made available at the National
 Integrity Office (BIOS) since 1 January 2015. Mayors and King’s commis-
sioners can contact this Centre for advice and assistance with practical
 issues concerning the investigation and handling of integrity matters
 involving holders of political office.
Screening/integrity assessment on the designation of candidates for 
political/administrative positions
In the past decade, attention to the assessment of the integrity of
 candidates for elected or appointed offices’ has grown. Of course, several
requirements for the appointment of administrators in municipal,
 provincial and water authorities which are aimed at preventing potential
conflicts of interest are laid down by law. An additional instrument for
 including integrity aspects in the appointment of administrators is the
Certificate of Good Conduct (VOG). A VOG investigation involves consult-
ing legal systems for any criminal records of the person concerned.
 Although the local authorities are free to decide whether to use this
 instrument, the VOG was already a frequently-used practice in the recent
municipal and provincial elections.
Another common new practice is the use of risk assessments for candidate
aldermen and members of provincial executives. These determine which
risks could form a potential limitation for the ability of the administrator
to function well and with integrity. Possible financial and business inter-
ests of the person concerned, and/or certain ancillary jobs could be raised
in that regard. The outcomes of the risk analyses then form the basis for
conducting personal interviews with the relevant candidates. These are
often less about whether the person concerned should be appointed given
the possible risks than about the ways in which risks can be managed or
eliminated, - for example by relinquishing control over certain private
 financial interests, resigning from certain ancillary positions or taking
 account of the allocation of portfolios. The municipal council holds the
 authority to appoint aldermen. It is therefore also the municipal council
that decides which requirements and measures, in addition to the statu-
tory ones, will be imposed for the eligibility of candidates for appointment
as administrators. 
Specific procedures apply for the assessment of the integrity of mayors and
King’s commissioners. The integrity of candidate mayors is assessed at the
start of the application procedure by the King’s commissioner. The Minis-
ter of the Interior and Kingdom Relations makes this assessment for
King’s commissioners. To this end, information on any judicial data is
 requested from the Justice Department Information Service. Since 2011,
inquiries have also been conducted in the form of searches of the records of
the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD)
and the fiscal records of the Tax and Customs Administration. This takes
place at the end of the selection procedure for the proposed candidate for
the appointed position. 
The assessment framework for candidate ministers and state secretaries
has been laid down in policy rules. It has also been laid down in the ‘Blue
Book’ for upcoming ministers and state secretaries. During the formation
of the government, the possibility of any past or present restrictions on the
candidate’s acceptance of the position in question is discussed in the talks
between the so-called ‘formateur’ of the proposed cabinet and the candi-
date minister or state secretary. If this is the case, the question of whether
and, if so, how that restriction can be eliminated is discussed. In the case of
relevant financial and commercial interests, the relevant candidate minis-
ter or state secretary must either relinquish these interests in full or
 provide for a regulation under which he or she will not or cannot exercise
rights of control during his or her term of office. During these talks, the
need to end all paid and unpaid positions and ancillary positions and other
ancillary activities before the inauguration of the cabinet is also discussed.
After the formation, the prime minister reports to the House of Represen-
tatives on any regulations made in relation to incompatible financial and
commercial interests. 
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International assistance and development
Corruption has a strong undermining effect: it not only harms trust in  
the government, but also has a negative impact on the quality of public
service, economic development and the business climate. It may also influ-
ence international security and stability. Political instability in certain
countries or regions is quite often related to public dissatisfaction with
corrupt political elites. These are all matters that are of major direct or
 indirect importance for the Netherlands. The Netherlands will therefore
continue to work to keep anti-corruption and promotion of integrity high
on the international agenda and to make a meaningful contribution
 towards this end. The Netherlands is active in various international anti-
corruption fora of organisations, such as the Organisations for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), GRECO, the EU and the United
Nations.
The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations also works to stimu-
late evidence-based integrity policy, for example by conducting research
and by promoting integrity monitoring. It also works to raise public
awareness of corruption issues and to improve integrity in the public
 sector through support for social organisations such as Transparency
 International (TI). 
The road to integrity
The present Dutch integrity policy was not developed overnight. Quite 
the contrary: it is the result of a step-by-step process which began some
decades ago and is still in development. While the emphasis once prima-
rily lay on compliance-based policy, it is clear that, over the years, there has
been progress towards a balanced policy in which there is attention to both
compliance and values-based policy. 
The current integrity policy is therefore marked by the diversity of types of
instruments. The compliance-oriented rules (‘hard controls’) are aimed
primarily at preventing integrity problems through rules and mandatory
procedures. Examples of such rules include obligations to report ancillary
positions and financial interests. But a strict compliance-based approach
has the limitation that it steers for behaviour aimed at avoiding punish-
ment rather than behaviour aimed at positive self-steering. Against this
background, the aim since 2005 has been a more value-oriented approach.
This approach is distinguished by the stimulation of positive behaviour,
based on ethical considerations, through attention to awareness and exem-
plary behaviour (‘soft controls’). Education and training help, as does the
use of risk analyses. It is the mix of the two approaches that makes the
 policy successful in the Netherlands. The rules and procedures provide a
guide, training promotes awareness, and the protection of whistleblowers
promotes abuse being revealed.
Notes
1 Om de integriteit van het Openbaar Bestuur (About the integrity of Public Administration).
 Address by the Minister of the Interior, C.I. Dales, at the congress of the Association
of Netherlands Municipalities, in Apeldoorn in June 1992: ‘The Netherlands is a
democratic state under the rule of law. That term explicitly encompasses the element
of integrity. A government cannot both be a state under the rule of law and not have
integrity. The government either has integrity or it does not. A government without
integrity cannot enforce the rule of law. A little bit of integrity is not possible. And
the administration stands or falls with the integrity of the government: harm to the
integrity of the government means no less than that the government loses the confi-
dence of the public. And democracy cannot do without that public confidence. Then
there is no longer any democracy. That is a deplorable picture. I share responsibility
for securing the integrity of public administration with you. The person who allows
harm to integrity damages public confidence in the administration and, thereby, the
roots of democracy.’
2 www.rijksoverheid.nl
3 These are financial supervision in cases of a serious financial deficit. In cases of
 serious and continuous administrative disorder, the King’s commissioner may use
his legal power to appoint a mayor, by appointing an acting mayor with the task of
exploring the possibilities for restoring order and strengthening the administrative
capacities. 
4 The Association of Netherlands Municipalities; Association of the Provinces of the
Netherlands; and Dutch Water Authorities.
5 Holders of political office constitute elected officials (representatives) and appointed
officials (administrators such as mayors).
6 Crown-appointed head of a Dutch province, much like a governor.
7 Model Approach for Basic Integrity Standards for Public Administration and the
 Police Force, 26 September 2005.
8 This also applies for senior civil servants.
9 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2015). Bijzondere ambten, een
toegesneden rechtspositie. Integrale visie (rechts)positie politieke ambtsdragers, 
p. 70 (Special offices, a tailor-made legal position. Integrated view of (legal) status 
of  holders of political office) 
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The Dutch National Integrity Office 
Supporting public integrity
Alain Hoekstra, coordinating policy officer, Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS) 
Marijn Zweegers, head, Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS)
Introduction
Public organisations today pay more attention to ethics and integrity. 
In the Netherlands, public integrity has been on the administrative and
political agenda since the early 1990s (Hoekstra and Kaptein, 2014). 
From an international perspective, Dutch efforts in the field of integrity
management can therefore be qualified as long-lasting. Moreover, the
Netherlands has the reputation of being a relatively non-corrupt country
(Transparency  International, 2012) and the work of its Dutch National
 Integrity Office (BIOS)1 is regularly pitched as ‘good practice’ (European
Commission, 2014a and 2014b). 
Origins and organisation  
BIOS originated just after the start of the new millennium. A massive
fraud in the building sector, which also involved corruption of civil
 servants, lead to an intensification of Dutch integrity policies. In addition
to issuing new integrity provisions in the Civil Servants Act, the Minister
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations established BIOS to support public
sector organisations in implementing existing and new integrity provi-
sions. In its early years, BIOS was part of the Ministry, but in 2009 it gained
a more independent position, as required by the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption (2003). The Ministry has subsidised BIOS since
then, with an annual budget of approximately 1.3 million. Because BIOS is
publicly funded, most of its activities are without charge for public
 organisations.
In comparison with other European anti-corruption and integrity  bodies,
BIOS is a relatively small agency. It is therefore also organised in a different
way: it does not investigate incidents, but has a purely preventive task,
 operating as a centre of knowledge and expertise in the field of  promoting
of integrity. The agency has currently 8 employees. The  employees have
different backgrounds, such as law, public administration, philosophy and
3
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accounting. BIOS has also a large external network. This external network
consists of independent advisers, academics and experts who are fre-
quently called upon for assistance, for example to develop  instruments
and conduct research.       
Domain and definition 
Scientists and experts from the Netherlands and elsewhere have different
views on the definition of the term ‘integrity’ (see Chapter 1). In many
countries, integrity is often equated with anti-corruption. In the Nether-
lands, integrity involves more than anti-corruption and has a broader,
more extensive meaning. BIOS’s integrity approach not only concerns pre-
venting breaches of integrity but also promoting an ethical climate
marked by features including openness, safety, respect, trust, leadership,
and justice.
BIOS uses integrity as a feature of the quality of good governance. A link is
sought here with the concepts for ‘good employment practices’ and ‘good
public service’, which are also used in the Civil Servants Act. In relation to
integrity, good employment practices mean that the employer protects
civil servants against potential temptations and miss-steps in their work,
stimulates integrity awareness, and teaches civil servants to take responsi-
ble ethical decisions. The employer can do this by developing and imple-
menting integrated integrity policies. The elements of these policies make
part of the integrity infrastructure (discussed in more detail below).  
Good public service in relation to integrity concerns aspects such as how
civil servants use their powers, resources and information provided by the
employer. This concerns acting according to the leading ethical values and
standards for work in public service. The bottom line here is that good em-
ployment practices enable and support good public service. 
A similar development of the concept of integrity can be realised for
elected and appointed holders of political office (like mayors, council
members, and aldermen). In that structure, reference can then be made to
‘conduct befitting a good holder of political office’. This affords scope for
dialogue and places the emphasis on the professional performance of the
role as a politician. The dialogue does not focus on political and ideological
convictions, but on how politicians operate within the principles of the
democratic state2, under the rule of law, and existing codes. 
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Ambition and activities
BIOS helps organisations to organise, manage and implement integrity
policies. More precisely, BIOS helps organisations to help themselves. This
distinguishes BIOS from ‘ordinary’ ethics consultants that can be hired to
actually set up, audit, or fix integrity systems in organisations, or to inves-
tigate possible wrongdoing. But since integrity is such a core value of good
governance, care for integrity should not – conveniently - be contracted
out to (commercial) parties of this kind. Instead, organisations should be
enabled to take care of ethics and integrity themselves and BIOS supports
them in that endeavour. 
Accordingly BIOS performs little or no custom work for individual
 organisations; most of the activities have a general character. For example,
the integrity instruments, courses, brochures, research reports and meet-
ings that BIOS organises are always of a nature that gives them a broad
scope: they are available for and apply to the government as a whole. In
 addition, BIOS does not focus on individual government employees, but
purely on the officials who must promote integrity within their own or-
ganisations. This could include integrity officers, confidential integrity
counsellors, works councils, human resource management (HRM) employ-
ees, (senior) managers and administrators. BIOS also focuses solely on pre-
vention and, therefore, unlike many other national investigative agencies
and international anti-corruption agencies, does not itself perform any
personal investigations of potential breaches of integrity as such. The
functions and activities of BIOS are briefly outlined in the table below.  
Table 1 Functions and activities of BIOS
Function  Description Some examples
I Development the development of practical dilemma training videos for civil servants
instruments that can be used and counsellors, all kinds of manuals and
by government organisations handbooks, risk assessment tools 
II Sharing gathering and making available providing courses for integrity officers,
knowledge integrity-related knowledge hosting a website 
(www.integriteitoverheid.nl),
and publishing the Integrity Yearbook
III Networking connecting policy-makers, organising conferences, workshops,
practitioners and scholars by hosting network meetings, and round tables to 
a variety of integrity platforms exchange experiences and best practices
IV Research conducting research in the field reports on internal reporting systems,
of public integrity  integrity plans, or on the impact of the 
financial crisis on public integrity
V Advising advising local governments on how how to conduct an investigation,
to address breaches of integrity by how to outsource an investigation,
political office holders  how to learn from such an incident and 
how to prevent it
Integrity Infrastructure: a coherent integrity management model  
BIOS has developed an integrity management system.3 The model is based
on the observation that integrity policies within organisations often have
a fragmented character. In most public organisations various staff-
 departments and officers (like for instance HR, Audit, Works Council,
Legal, Financial, Integrity Advisers) are responsible for certain integrity
 activities or instruments (such as pre-employment screening, training,
 reporting procedures, risk assessments, integrity audits). This multitude
of integrity actors and areas may cause a lack of coherencies, but may also
blur the view on the implementation. 
The model is consequently designed to connect integrity activities within
government organisations. It integrates the seven core aspects of integrity
management, which are visualised in Figure 1 and further fleshed out in
Table 2. Moreover, it combines hard, soft and operational controls (see
Chapter 1), provides a cyclic approach, because the policies are also
 evaluated, and finally, it devotes explicit attention to the coordination 
and institutionalisation of integrity. 
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In this model the integrity officer is positioned at the centre, as its driving
force and coordinator of integrity. Coordination is key since inter-connect-
ing the involved integrity actors ‘is critical to the successful implementation of
ethics and compliance programs throughout the organization’ (ERC, 2007: 25).
Moreover, ‘An organization which implements an ethics and compliance program
without designating an individual to oversee it, risks the possibility that the function
will fail for lack of leadership. Similarly, talking about the importance of ethics with-
out creating a formal function to uphold and promote organizational standards may
be perceived as hypocritical’ (Ethics Resource Center, 2007:13-14). The creation
of such a coordinating function also seems to be important since integrity
officers do not see themselves as experts on all the areas involved, but
rather as facilitators (Trevino et al, 2014). The OECD (2008) summarises
the significance of coordination as it: allows for synergies between instru-
ments, allows for an accumulation of expertise, ensures continuity of
ethics in the long term, and strongly signals that  integrity is considered
important within the organisation. 
Figure 1 Integrity Infrastructure 
Commitment 
& Vision
Monitoring & 
Reporting
Values
& Norms
HRM Policy 
& Culture
Incidents &
Enforcement
Rules & 
Procedures
Organizing &
Embedding
Commitment
& vision
Values
& standards
Rules
& procedures
HRM policies
&  culture
Incidents 
& enforcement
Monitoring 
& reporting
Organising 
& embedding
58 the dutch national integrity office
Table 2 Elements of the Integrity Infrastructure
Seven elements of the Integrity Infrastructure 
Integrity policies can only succeed if the top of the organisation is willing
to  promote them and to provide sufficient resources for them. Additio-
nally, it is  necessary that the top develops a clear vision on integrity
 management: why do we want to pay attention to integrity, how do we
define it, what strategy do we  follow, what is our ambition? 
Public sector values and standards constitute the underlying basis for
 integrity  policies. It is therefore important to establish the organisational
values and standards and then to document them in a code of conduct.
This will make it clear what the organisation and the employees represent
and what they can be held  accountable for. 
Values should be supported by a clear set of organisational rules and
 procedures. These are often summarised as internal administration and
control systems.  Examples are: work processes, the ‘four-eyes’ principle,
 separation of duties, and job-rotation procedures.  
Integrity is also an important subject for HR and should, for example, be
part of  recruitment, selection, screening and exit policies. In addition,
 introductory  meetings, internal courses and staff meetings seem natural
occasions on which to raise employee awareness and to improve the
 organisational culture. 
Investigating and sanctioning unethical behaviour is important. It gives 
a signal that integrity is highly valued and reduces the risk of future
 breaches. Provisions aimed at reporting and enforcement (such as repor-
ting hotlines, integrity advisers, and investigation protocols) are important
integrity elements.
Monitoring integrity policies and programmes is necessary in order to be
able to evaluate and to improve the functioning of the integrity policies.
Evaluations  provide information about the implementation and effective-
ness of the integrity policies.
The above integrity activities should be firmly embedded within the
 organisation. An integrity officer is the person appointed to develop the
integrity management system for the organisation, to coordinate all
 integrity activities and actors and to advise the line management. This
 officer should draft an integrity plan/document which should cover all
 issues of this kind. 
Reflection
BIOS continuously developed itself since its establishment in 2006. It de-
veloped a vision of integrity and designed various instruments that help
organisations to implement integrity policies. The different instruments
are presented on a website. The development of the instruments, such as
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the integrity infrastructure, a risk analysis tool, several awareness instru-
ments, courses for integrity officers and confidential integrity counsellors,
and all sorts of guidelines helped organisations to implement integrity
policies more effectively.  
Over the years, BIOS has developed a new function, the signalling func-
tion. Many tools and a great deal of knowledge had become available, so
that it became time to also consider the extent to which these were imple-
mented and which issues played a role in this. The results are made visible
on the basis of various, sometimes critical, research reports. This helps to
promote integrity within the public sector. 
In the first instance, BIOS focused on promoting integrity in the civil serv-
ice organisations. From about 2011, the promotion of integrity among
holders of political office (administrators) was added. The development of
both ‘disciplines’ still varies somewhat; the policies for civil servants (offi-
cials) seem to be more comprehensive, explicit, and formalised than the
policies for administrators. This explains why the latter is intensified now. 
Since the start of 2015, BIOS has been assigned an additional task of advis-
ing mayors (and their ‘equals’ in other tiers of government) in integrity
 investigations of holders of political office. Conducting integrity investi-
gations is an activity in its own right, calling for a high degree of care.
 Integrity investigations are materially different from police/criminal
 investigations. Because mayors do not deal with integrity investigations
on a daily basis, there has proved to be a need for assistance at the moment
when suspicions of breaches of integrity arise. What should be done, is an
investigation necessary, what precisely is the investigation question, who
should conduct the investigation and how can the client maintain control
during and after the investigation? The Support Centre for Integrity Inves-
tigations of Holders of Political Office has been set up at BIOS to handle
questions of this kind.
BIOS has increasingly become an authoritative centre of knowledge and
expertise on public sector ethics and integrity. Its visibility has increased,
the target group and the functions of BIOS have expanded, and the expert-
ise of the individual employees has further improved. Despite these posi-
tive developments, BIOS must continue to develop, and must remain alert
to trends and (social) developments that influence integrity.  
With regard to its signalling role, in particular, it is important that BIOS is
able to operate independently. After all, critical comments are never wel-
come, even though they are intended to make improvements. BIOS will
have to make these critical comments. Precisely for that reason, its inde-
pendent position is of crucial importance. This applies with regard to all
institutions with which BIOS maintains relationships, including the Min-
istry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, institutions forming part of
the broader integrity landscape, and other national and international or-
ganisations that ask BIOS for advice. 
In the coming years, BIOS will want to further strengthen its authoritative
position, and the agency will continue to further institutionalise public in-
tegrity. 
BIOS is aware that its position and practices are a consequence of the
Dutch context. It seems to be unwise to copy them blindly. The machinery
of government has its own structure and culture in each country, and the
institutional embedding differs. However, based on our experiences, the
following recommendations should be considered since they could be
valuable for other countries as well. 
• Firstly, it is important that integrity policies are laid down in law. A
legal framework is a requirement for organizations to take action. In
the Netherlands, this is laid down in, for example, the Civil Servants
Act, the Basic Standards, and in the Municipalities Act, the Provinces
Act and the Water Authorities Act; 
• It is then necessary for public sector organisations to receive support in
implementing these policies. In the Netherlands, BIOS plays that role;
• It is also important to monitor the actual implementation of the policy
(Dutch National Integrity Office, 2012, see Chapter 7). Regular moni-
toring and evaluation are crucial and enable us to intensify and to
 adjust these policies on a regular basis; 
• If integrity breaches do occur within individual organisations, the
media will immediately seize on this for publication. This is unavoid-
able, but it is possible to objectify the media reporting. Keeping the
public informed of the state of affairs and (proactive) information will
create a better grip on what is published, resulting in more objectivity;
• But integrity and integrity policies also benefit from the criticisms of
NGOs, audit offices, supervisory authorities, and scholars that can
 provide input for improvement;
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• In addition, integrity policies will be more effective (van Tankeren
2010) if a structural, coherent approach is taken with the aid of an
 integrity infrastructure;
• With a clear internal integrity network (see for example Chapter 11),
defining who has a role to play in which area, it will become clear who
does what in the implementation of the integrity policies. This could
include the confidential integrity counsellor, the HRM department, the
security department, finance & control, and the management. An
 organisation will benefit from the appointment of an integrity officer,
who will act as a linking pin; connecting all the actors together, main-
taining an overview, and ensuring that integrity remains on the
agenda. This forms the basis for a sound organisation in which
 integrity is thoroughly embedded as a permanent element.
Notes
1 BIOS is the Dutch abbreviation for ‘Bureau Integriteitsbevordering Openbare Sector’, the
Dutch  National Integrity Office.
2 Netherlands Code for Good Public Governance (2009). Principles of proper public
administration; The model code of conduct for the integrity of people’s representa-
tives in municipal and provincial authorities and water boards (Association of
Netherlands Municipalities (VNG),  Association of Provinces of the Netherlands
(IPO), Dutch Water Authorities (UvW), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Rela-
tions (BZK), March 2015, pdf); and the model code of conduct for the integrity of
(day-to-day) administrators in municipal authorities, provincial authorities and
water boards (VNG, IPO, UvW, BZK, March 2015, pdf). 
3 The model can be found on the BIOS website: www.integriteitoverheid.nl/
toolbox/model-infrastructuur.html
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Reporting1 malpractices in the 
dutch public sector
Alex Belling and Ed Fenne, policy advisors, Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS)
Introduction 
Employees can play a valuable role in identifying and reporting miscon-
duct in the workplace. Reporting malpractices such as fraud, corruption
and abuse of powers is necessary for the competent authorities to be able to
address these serious breaches of integrity. Conduct of this kind and cover-
age in the media undermine confidence in the government. There is also
awareness on an international level of this important role of employees,
and of the fact that ‘reporters need effective protection.2 What is the situa-
tion regarding reporting of malpractices and protection of reporters in the
public sector in the Netherlands? In this contribution, we outline how
 reporting is organised within the government. 
We first explain why a reporting procedure was introduced within the
government. We then discuss the objectives and principles of the regula-
tions, followed by a brief discussion of the procedure itself. We explicitly
devote attention to a specific officer in the reporting procedure, the
 confidential integrity counsellor. Secondly, we discuss the external report-
ing/integrity landscape in the Netherlands. Here we outline the picture of
the number of integrity institutions that have grown over the years. We
also describe the potential consequences of the adoption by Parliament of
the amended ‘House for Whistleblowers’ Bill for the reporting landscape.
We then conclude with some reflections on the Dutch reporting  system.
Development and operation of the procedure for reporting malpractice
A survey of employees conducted in 1999 by a large trade union (FNV,
2000) showed that they did not feel free and secure enough within their
own organisations to report suspicions of potential malpractice. This
 outcome made the government aware that it was missing potential oppor-
tunities to halt malpractice occurring in the public sector at an early stage.
The government therefore set itself the goal of preventing malpractice as
far as possible, more than in the past, and if it nevertheless arose, to iden-
tify and halt his quickly. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to create
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an environment that invited reporting. A sense of security is essential here,
and the central government therefore decided to set up a reporting proce-
dure in 2001 that should protect its employees, as potential reporters of
malpractice, (more effectively) against the potential negative consequences
of reporting. In contrast to the present reporting procedure, this regula-
tion was directed solely at regulating and reporting serious abuses. 
The first reporting procedure was quickly followed up nationwide, as most
of the lower tiers of government embraced the reporting procedure and
 introduced it within their own working environments. The reporting pro-
cedure has developed further over the years. New insights and evaluations
have led to adjustments. There may be differences at a local level, because
Dutch decentralised tiers of government have the freedom to draw up
their own regulations. However, in most cases these are the same as the
 national reporting procedure, as in essence they all have the same aim:
 encouraging internal reporting of malpractice, so that the organisation
can take adequate controlling action. 
The reporting procedure therefore contains provisions to protect the re-
porter from the adverse consequences of reporting suspicions of malprac-
tice. A reporter who is nevertheless dismissed as a consequence of his or
her report, or who receives less salary, misses a promotion or suffers other
negative effects can invoke the protection provisions of the reporting pro-
cedure. In this way, a reporter who has to defend himself or herself against
the adverse effects of a report can claim financial compensation to cover
the costs of legal proceedings. If the court decides in favour of the reporter,
he or she can also count on compensation for legal fees in excess of the
statutory minimum. 
The reporting procedure only protects reporters acting in good faith. The
report must be aimed at drawing attention to the (suspected) malpractice.
A reporter with malicious motives cannot invoke the protective effect of
the regulations. This is the case if a reporter makes a report for the purpose
of deliberately harming another person or because he or she disagrees with
the (political) choices of his or her organisation. The regulation not only
protects civil servants in active service. Civil servants who leave the organi-
sation can still make use of the reporting procedure and the associated
protection for up to two years after the termination of their employment
contracts. 
The reporting procedure also provides for the appointment of a confiden-
tial integrity counsellor. This is an officer with whom employees can
 discuss and to whom they can report undesirable forms of behaviour and
integrity matters in confidence. The confidential integrity counsellor plays
an important role in Dutch reporting procedures and is regarded as a
 success factor for a reporting procedure that works well. The roles, tasks,
conditions and the added value of confidential integrity counsellors are
discussed in more detail later in this paper.
The reporting procedure also describes what can be reported, by whom, to
whom, as well as what the procedure and terms for settlement are. What
can be reported according to the regulations has already been mentioned
as an aside. Primarily, this concerns suspicions of malpractice. The term
‘malpractice’ itself implies that this does not concern trifling matters.
 Malpractice is conduct that involves a violation of a law or regulation or
failure to comply with policy. However, matters that are not laid down in
law or regulations can also give rise to malpractice, for example if this
 creates a risk to health, safety or the environment or jeopardises the proper
functioning of public service. In these cases, potential reporters are
 explicitly invited to report this internally. 
Internal reporting of malpractice (Internal Reporting Mechanism)
The reporting procedure is designed to promote internal reporting of sus-
picions of malpractice. In order to make the barriers to this as low as possi-
ble, potential reporters are offered a number of reporting options. This can
take place openly to the employee’s own supervisor, confidentially to a
confidential integrity counsellor or a designated external party, or anony-
mously via a special national telephone reporting centre. The first option
is the most preferable and will be at issue primarily in a healthy organisa-
tion. In this context, a ‘healthy organisation’ is an organisation where
 malpractice can be reported without fear of repercussions. However, it is
possible that a potential reporter will have good reasons not to report his
or her suspicions to his or her supervisor (yet) or to one of the supervisor’s
superiors. A good reason for the latter could be that the supervisor himself
or herself is involved in the malpractice. Larger organisations also some-
times have a specially created reporting centre (see for example Chapter 9
or 10 for some examples). This name can cover many different activities.
Sometimes it is no more than a telephone number on which employees can
report suspicions of malpractice. In practice, this is sometimes combined
integrity management in the public sector • the dutch approach 65
66 reporting malpractices in the dutch public sector
with investigative activities, but it should also come as no surprise if the
reporting centre is deployed for preventive tasks. But if a potential
 reporter still has doubts about whether to report suspicions of malprac-
tice, he or she can first request a meeting with a confidential integrity
counsellor.3
The confidential integrity counsellor
Confidential integrity counsellors are usually employees of the organisa-
tion who make themselves available for this specific role in addition to
their regular duties. Questions and doubts about possible undesirable be-
haviour by colleagues and integrity matters can be discussed in confidence
with a confidential integrity counsellor. An employee who is struggling
with an integrity dilemma can therefore also contact the confidential in-
tegrity counsellor. As the name suggests, a meeting with the confidential
integrity counsellor is always confidential. A confidential integrity coun-
sellor never discloses the names of the person with whom he or she holds
meetings, including to the employer, if this is requested. The confidential
integrity counsellor offers employees who suspect malpractice support in
taking a decision. The counsellor does this by listening, asking questions
and outlining the options open to the employee. The potential reporters
decide for themselves whether and, if so, which steps to take and so retain
control over what happens. A confidential integrity counsellor is not a
 mediator or a coach and is certainly not an investigator. A confidential
 integrity counsellor who does not follow these principles becomes too
closely involved in the case. He or she then runs the risk of becoming the
problem owner or personal service provider for his or her ‘client’. 
It is possible that, during a meeting with a confidential integrity counsel-
lor, a potential reporter realises that he or she wishes to make a formal
 report on his or her suspicions of malpractice. In that case, the confidential
integrity counsellor is also authorised to receive the report. This possibility
was deliberately included in the reporting procedure in order to avoid
 potential reporters from failing to make reports because they are reluctant
to tell their story yet again at a new reporting centre. 
The task of the confidential integrity counsellor as a reporting centre is
limited to taking receipt of the report and immediately handing this to the
competent authority. The report must contain the most concrete descrip-
tion possible of the suspicions. The reporter’s name does not appear in the
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report. A report is always made in confidence, unless the reporter waives
this right. The competent authority is required to provide the reporter
with proof of receipt of the report. This requires the intermediary of the
confidential integrity counsellor, who, after all, is the only person who
knows the identity of the reporter. At a later stage, when the report is
 investigated by the organisation in more detail and settled, the competent
authority may ask the reporter for additional information or report him or
her on the process via the confidential integrity counsellor. 
Confidential integrity counsellors play a prominent role in the reporting
procedure. This role will only truly come into its own if the organisation
devotes serious attention to this. Research (De Graaf, 2008) has revealed
that potential reporters do not take the step of actually making a report
lightly. The confidential integrity counsellor is there especially to support
potential reporters in this process. In order to be able to offer that support,
the access barriers must be low. Through the historic development of the
confidential work, we still often see this work being performed by employ-
ees associated with an HR department. This executive department is
closely involved in implementing labour law measures such as suspension
and dismissal. This package of tasks means that employees primarily
 regard this department as an extension of (senior) management. 
This positioning of confidential integrity counsellors places pressure on
the sense of confidentiality, which is so important for these meetings. For
this reason, careful selection of confidential integrity counsellors is neces-
sary. A confidential integrity counsellor must be accessible and, in addition
to listening, must be able to conduct a pleasant and constructive conversa-
tion. Interviewing and listening skills are among the basic skills required
and must therefore be mastered. Precisely because trust and integrity are
key concepts for this work, the selection and appointment procedure must
also take place correctly. For example, any suspicion of an ‘old boys net-
work’ or preferential treatment of a candidate confidential integrity coun-
sellor is already disastrous. 
An organisation that is providing for confidential work would be wise to
appoint two or more confidential integrity counsellors. This ensures conti-
nuity and if one counsellor is absent or a potential reporter does not have
confidence in that counsellor, he or she can make use of the alternative. 
We also increasingly see that organisations not only appoint their own
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 employees as confidential integrity counsellors, but also deliberately opt to
hire (external) counsellors. Employees who wish to discuss a problem but
who feel that confidential integrity counsellors are too close to their own
organisation can then contact someone who stands at a greater distance
from themselves or the organisation. Often, this is also an attractive option
for the organisation. It allows more flexibility in terms of capacity deploy-
ment and the construction means that it does not have to deal with the
 obligations it has in relation to its own employees.
Once the appointment has been finalised and the roles, tasks and position-
ing of the confidential integrity counsellor are established, the organisa-
tion must be familiarised with the phenomenon of a confidential integrity
counsellor. Who is this, and what does he or she mean for colleagues and
for the organisation in general? The individual confidential integrity
counsellor plays an important role in this. A proactive attitude is necessary,
because the work of the confidential integrity counsellors primarily takes
place out of sight of their colleagues. In the Netherlands, confidential in-
tegrity counsellors are therefore encouraged to join team talks or meetings
on a regular basis. In this way, confidential integrity counsellors not only
increase their own familiarity and visibility, but can also explain the
frameworks within which they must work. We also advise government
 organisations to use the time of appointment, which is followed by taking
the official oath, as a natural moment at which to discuss the values and
 responsibilities of the office accepted and to point out the support that can
be obtained from the confidential integrity counsellor.
It is important to define the frameworks for confidential work, because the
job title of confidential integrity counsellor creates certain expectations. 
It is possible that an employee or a confidential integrity counsellor, in the
performance of his or her duties, comes across serious situations 
• involving the taking of a life (murder, manslaughter et cetera);
• involving a serious offence committed by a civil servant while in 
office;4
• that creates a risk to persons, the environment or health, or jeopardises
the proper functioning of the service.
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Everyone who works in the public sector in the Netherlands has a statutory
duty to inform the competent authority of their organisation of serious of-
fences of this kind if they become aware of them. An employee who shares
this information with a confidential integrity counsellor and does not
wish to report it formally must be aware that the confidential integrity
counsellor has a similar responsibility. In that case, the confidential
 integrity counsellor is required by law to report the confidential informa-
tion. In the first instance, this suspicion will be reported only to the com-
petent authority of the counsellor’s own organisation and the counsellor
will protect the identity of the source. If the seriousness of the suspicions
leads to the involvement of the Public Prosecution Service, the confidential
integrity counsellor will ultimately also have to reveal the identity of his or
her source. The field of tension between confidentiality and mandatory
disclosure means that the confidential integrity counsellor could come
into direct conflict with his or her employer. Partly for that reason, accord-
ing to the provisions of the reporting procedure, the confidential integrity
counsellor enjoys the same protective regime as the reporter.
External reporting of malpractice (External Reporting Mechanism)
The preceding paragraph explained that the principle for the reporting
procedure is that reports are made internally. It is foreseeable that an inter-
nal report may not always be settled to the satisfaction of the reporter, or
that a potential reporter will have no confidence that an internal report
will be settled securely and with due care (for example because he or she
believes that the management to which the report must be made is itself
involved in the matter). For that reason, the reporting procedure contains 
a supplementary and an alternative reporting possibility. The reporter can
submit the case to an external, independent institution: the Council for
 Integrity Investigations in the Public Sector (OIO).5
The Council handles reports for the central government and for decen-
tralised tiers of government, such as municipal and water authorities.
 Reports to the Council are handled in confidence. The reporter’s name is
not disclosed, but is protected from the outside world. In principle, the
Council must complete handling of a report within twelve weeks. It does
this by issuing an advisory report to the competent authority of the
 organisation concerning which the report was made.
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Other reporting institutions 
Although the OIO is an external body, reports made to it are still subject to
the (internal) reporting procedure. There are also a number of other insti-
tutions for (potential) reporters or government employers. These are listed
below, with a brief explanation.
Confidential Line for reporting breaches of integrity
Civil servants and citizens can call the Confidential Line, which is part of
NL Confidential,6 to report breaches of integrity committed by govern-
ment officials. Via the Confidential Line, reports can be made anony-
mously. There may be reasons not to make a report to a supervisor or
confidential integrity counsellor, for example because the perpetrator is a
direct colleague of the reporter or because the reporter fears dismissal. The
Confidential Line is then an alternative. The Confidential Line service will
not investigate the report itself, but anonymous reports are passed on in
confidence to the organisation responsible for further handling. The
 Confidence Line therefore serves as a ‘last resort’ in the reporting system.
Advice Centre for Whistleblowers (APKL)
The Advice Centre for Whistleblowers (APKL) was launched on 1 October
2012. This arose through a critical evaluation of the operation of the
 reporting procedures within the public sector (USBO, 2008). This inde-
pendent body was set up to advise (potential) whistleblowers in the private
and public sectors on request, in complete confidence, and to offer them
support with potential follow-up steps if they consider making a report.
Everyone who encounters suspected malpractice with a public interest via
their work can contact the APKL. This not only includes regular employ-
ees, but also, for example, contract workers or trainees. The APKL does not
conduct investigations itself. It has no powers or instruments for this.
Other relevant parties in the ‘reporting landscape’
In addition to the organisations mentioned above, still more parties oper-
ate within the reporting landscape. Although they are not formally part of
the reporting procedure, these organisations operate on the fringes of this. 
National Ombudsman
The National Ombudsman investigates the conduct of the government.
As a ‘second-line’ service, the Ombudsman handles complaints about the
government from members of the public. This means that people with
complaints must first make use of the complaints regulations of the gov-
ernment organisation itself. As a complaint from a member of the public
about treatment by a government body is not the same as a report of mal-
practice, the Ombudsman is not formally an integrity institution and does
not form part of the reporting landscape. However, it is possible for a
 report of malpractice to be ‘packaged’ as a complaint, which is then sub-
mitted to the Ombudsman. For this reason, and because the Ombudsman
formed part of the House for Whistleblowers legislation, the Ombudsman
is discussed in this chapter, albeit as an aside. 
Whistleblowers Expert Group
A number of (former) whistleblowers formed the Whistleblowers Expert
Group in June 2010. The tasks that this non-governmental organisation
(NGO) has set itself include acting as a reporting, advisory and referral
 centre for whistleblowers reporting (social) malpractice. In general, the
Whistleblowers Expert Group acts as a lobby group for whistleblowers, in
particular with regard to raising awareness of their protection.
Publeaks
On 9 September 2013 the Netherlands was informed of the launch of a
website for whistleblowers. Via this website (Publeaks.nl), an initiative of a
large number of national media, people wishing to raise malpractices can
come into contact with the press in a safe manner. Via this medium, people
can publicise large amounts of information anonymously and simply,
without personal contact with a journalist. This initiative concerns a low-
barrier instrument, Publeaks has so far produced 40  relevant reports.
Some reflections on the Dutch reporting system
Anonymous reporting 
The Dutch government does not advocate anonymous reporting, because
the facts cannot be verified with the person making the report, but also
 because malicious motives could play a role. For that reason, the reporting
procedure does not provide for the possibility of anonymous reporting. In
order to avoid valuable signals from being lost for that reason, the govern-
ment has opened the Confidential Line as a national telephone reporting
line.7
If the report concerns a serious criminal offence, it will be passed on to the
police for investigation. Other matters are reported to the organisation at
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which the suspected malpractice takes place. The recipient organisation
then has an opportunity to take adequate action. More information on
anonymous reporting is provided above, under the heading ‘Confidential
Line for reporting breaches of integrity’.
Success factors 
Creating a safe environment by formulating a reporting procedure with
assurances is an important first step. Interim evaluations and scientific
 research (De Graaf, 2008) have shown that there are several factors that
 determine whether employees actually report malpractices. Employees
who report misconduct, for example, are not only concerned about their
own safety. Research has shown that whistleblowers are also concerned
about the consequences of their report for the person involved. After all,
their report may lead to someone losing their job and facing financial and
social problems. For that reason, reports of suspected malpractice must be
addressed quickly, investigated with care, and must lead to a fair and just
settlement. Failure to address reports without stating the reasons, unnec-
essary use of invasive investigation methods, disproportionate penalties
and failure to penalise misconduct all inhibit reporting. This is demon-
strated by research. 
The study by G. de Graaf and T. Strüwer (2013) Aard en omvang van integriteitsschendingen
binnen de Nederlandse overheid (Nature and scale of breaches of integrity within the Dutch
government) showed that half of the officials who reported suspicions of malpractices
were dissatisfied with the handling of the report. In their view, reporting had little or no
noticeable effect, they feel they were not taken seriously, and the feedback and progress
of the process were also perceived as inadequate.
Potential reporters must therefore have confidence in the entire process,
Not only for themselves, but also for the person seen as the potential
 offender. Furthermore, the entire process, from reporting to legal settle-
ment, is based on the philosophy of ‘self-cleaning’ capacity, which only
comes into its own if the organisation has the will to provide public
 services in a proper, open and transparent manner. Good internal and ex-
ternal communications in integrity incidents are crucial here. The privacy
of those involved must be respected, but cannot form a reason not to com-
municate. This form of openness and transparency sometimes appears to
conflict with the principles of good reputational management. Rightly or
wrongly, administrators are afraid that the media will explicitly pick out
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integrity incidents and that they will be left to deal with the negative con-
sequences. For this reason, administrators have a tendency to keep quiet
about incidents or to belittle them. They desperately try to keep the inter-
nal ranks closed, but ultimately, the truth, or part of it, nevertheless comes
out or is cast into doubt. In the long term this approach is certainly
counter-productive: it undermines trust in the government.
Protection of reporters 
In the Netherlands the reporting system is based on the ‘self-cleaning’
 capacity of organisations. That system comes into its own to best effect if
reporting of malpractice is regarded as a welcome sign for the organisation
concerned. The organisation concerned must address the report ade-
quately and halt the malpractice as quickly as possible. If the report leads
to a personal investigation, this must be conducted justly and with due
care. Unfortunately, in practice we still see too often that reporters face
negative consequences from their report and are sometimes even threat-
ened by their own employers. It quite often leads to dismissal, breakdowns
in marital and other relationships and other personal suffering. New
forms of communication mean that reporting on conflict situations of this
kind and the suffering caused reach a wide public with increasing speed.
In cases of this kind, due to their news value, the media certainly make
themselves heard. They primarily report on cases where things go wrong.
The disclosure of this one-sided picture does not encourage future
 reporters to report suspicions internally. The question arises of whether
the protective measures in the reporting procedure are sufficient, or
whether this undesirable effect should be addressed in a different way. 
A reporter who has to defend himself or herself in court against his or her
own employer due to dismissal or other measures will certainly regard the
limited compensation provided via the reporting procedure as a shortcom-
ing. The question is whether higher compensation would have prevented
the employer’s behaviour. The problem appears to lie primarily with the
senior management that receives a report on suspicions of malpractice.
Senior managers who conspicuously renege and harm the legal position 
of a reporter acting in good faith should be publicly corrected by the super-
visory authorities. If there is an abuse of power or other dereliction of duty,
the most senior manager will also have to be prosecuted under labour law.
Obviously, any prospect of a golden handshake will then be unlikely.
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New developments and their consequences for the landscape 
On 14 May 2012 a member of the House of Representatives submitted a
Bill intended to offer advice and support and better protection for (poten-
tial) reporters of malpractice. This Bill arose through the concerns of a
number of members of the House of Representatives regarding what they
see as slow progress in replacing the existing reporting provisions within
the government, after an evaluation in 2008 showed these to be inade-
quate and insecure. 
In order to solve the problems observed, the original Bill provided for the
creation of a ‘House for Whistleblowers’. This House was to implement a
number of ambitious elements, such as the creation of a fund for benefits
at the request of whistleblowers. That element was rejected at an early
stage of the Bill’s passage through Parliament. The section on combining
an advisory and investigation function in a single body (the ‘House’) was
also rejected. The proposal to position the House at the National Ombuds-
man suffered the same fate, since in that case, the National Ombudsman
would also have a say with regard to the private sector.
In the amending Bill (‘novelle’) which is currently before the Senate, the
members who submitted it have met the requirements of the Senate to
some extent. The House will no longer be placed with the National Om-
budsman, but will be set up as an independent administrative body (ZBO).
The Advice and Investigations departments within the House will also be
set up separately and specific investigative powers will be introduced for
the public and private sectors. In view of the changes, it seems as if the Bill,
which has now been amended several times and in which the initiators
have abandoned the aforementioned ambitions, will finally make it to the
finishing line. 
In the first instance, this means that a new body will join the already satu-
rated and, consequently, not always equally transparent reporting land-
scape. However, on closer consideration, a modest reorganisation of the
landscape is possible. If we look at the text of the Bill, we see that the
House will consist of an Advice and an Investigations department. There then
appears to be scope to integrate these departments with the APKL and the
OIO. If these existing integrity institutions are indeed transferred to the
‘House’, the landscape would become a little more transparent and thus
the ‘patchwork’ picture presented by the existing reporting landscape
could be corrected somewhat.
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There are also calls for still further upscaling, with prevention and repres-
sion being brought under one roof. In a structure of that kind, BIOS
should be given a place within an umbrella ‘Integrity Institute’. In our
view, BIOS should then be transferred to such a setting with its existing
package of tasks (prevention) and its current functional independence
based on Article 6 of the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
Notes
1 In this article, the authors use the term ‘reporting’ and derivative words instead of
the term ‘whistleblowing’ since this contribution describes mainly the internal
 reporting system, not the situation in which an employee is leaking internal
 information to the media.
2 We refer here to Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations (UN) Convention Against
Corruption (Bulletin of Treaties 2004,11) and Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)7 of
30 April 2014 from the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection
of whistleblowers and also to the EU Anti-Corruption Report from the European
Commission of 3 February 2014, COM (2014) 38 Final. 
3 The Advice Centre for Whistleblowers (APKL) described in Chapter 4 plays a similar
role and can also be consulted by employees.
4 Criminal offences that can be committed only by civil servants, such as abuse of
power.
5 Two circumstances provide grounds for a report to the OIO. The reporter disagrees
with the substance of the conclusion of the competent authority regarding the
 report. For example, the competent authority may find that the report is unfounded.
Or there may be a procedural argument: the settlement of the report takes longer
than the procedure prescribes.
6 An organisation that acts as a reporting centre for several fields in relation to crime
and crime control.
7 www.devertrouwenslijn.nl
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Integrity investigations in the Netherlands 
Quality and credibility
John Mathew Groot, advisor Support Centre for Integrity Investigations of Holders of Political 
Office, Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS)
Introduction
The Netherlands has a council (Chapter 4) , but not a national agency for
 integrity investigations. Whether this is necessary and/or desirable was
 recently examined in detail (Zouridis & Van der Vorm, 2013). Apparently,
the disadvantages of such a national agency outweigh the benefits in this
country. The main disadvantage of a national integrity agency lies in a
 typically Dutch aspect of integrity investigation: responsibility for this
rests primarily with the administrative body concerned.
The disadvantages of organising your own investigation are not hard to
imagine: looking the other way, denial, lack of uniformity, the legal frame-
work, professionalism and the inherent pitfalls of self-evaluation. But
 according to the researchers, these are minor problems. The primary
 responsibility, therefore, is apparently an important matter. This is not the
case everywhere. New York City, for example, has its own Department of
Investigation (DOI), the tasks and jurisdiction of which are clear and can
be described as very broad:   
‘Investigations may involve any agency, officer, elected official or em-
ployee of the City, as well as those who do business with or receive ben-
efits from the City. As New York City’s watchdog, DOI’s strategy attacks
corruption comprehensively through systemic investigations that lead
to high-impact arrests, preventive controls and operational reforms
that improve the way the City is run.’ (www.nyc.gov)
The Netherlands tend to be fearful of such a central approach. These fears
are almost certainly related to fears of central government intervention,
but also have a more noble reason: repression and investigation are the
final resort in the promotion of integrity. The real way to address integrity
lies in prevention, which goes beyond the very broadly-formulated ambi-
tions of the DOI. Furthermore, there is a conviction that every level should
be assigned primary responsibility for its own integrity, because it could
otherwise be too easy to evade it.
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5
This contribution concerns (internal) investigations of possible breaches of
integrity. Distinctions are sometimes made here between official (concern-
ing civils servants) and administrative (appointed and elected office
 holders) integrity. These will be clearly named. If the distinction is not
mentioned, aspects that apply for both sides are involved. Following a
 general discussion of integrity investigations, this contribution raises the
following points for attention which play a role in internal integrity
 investigations (as performed by the organisation itself): 
• peace-time talks in order to reach agreements ‘under a clear blue sky’;
• protocols: providing for the necessary uniformity;
• after-care: avoiding a return to ‘business as usual’;
• convergence with criminal investigations: don’t linger on this.
I will end with a brief reflection on trends, problem areas and ambitions
for the coming years.
General discussion of integrity investigations
Breaches of integrity committed by civil servants (officials) or elected/
 appointed administrators damage the credibility of the government.
 Issues that come to light are sometimes incorrectly lumped together.
Among groups, this can create a sentiment of diminishing trust in the
 operations of the government, or even of mistrust. This therefore calls for
careful investigation of possible misconduct.
In the Netherlands, interest in matters of this kind is still growing. The
media devote a great deal of attention to it and are often the first warning
parties. Contributions in social media also often concern integrity inci-
dents and their investigation. National newspapers and other media call
on the public to report such matters to them, anonymously if need be.
Publeaks,1 a foundation set up by the media, facilitates anonymous
 uploading of documents for journalistic investigations as safely as possi-
ble. That high level of interest can be explained. Civil servants are monop-
olists who work with public funds and must handle these with the utmost
care. Administrators are elected or appointed to serve the public cause and
should never allow their personal interests to take precedence.
Such a high level of attention entails a risk. Public confidence in public
 servants can sink below a critical level and lead to cynicism. It is also some-
times far too easy to do irreparable harm to reputations, resulting in civil
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servants being unfairly dismissed as lazy, incompetent or crooks. Raising
misconduct issues within the relevant organisation first remains a healthy
principle. Deviations from this principle must remain exceptions with
sound justification. After all, healthy feedback and warnings form part of
well-organised business operations. This is the most important reason for
organising investigations into potential breaches with extreme care.
In the absence of a national agency in the Netherlands, investigations of
possible breaches of integrity are conducted by investigation agencies.
These may include private investigation agencies, internal departments,
(forensic) accountants and management consultancies. Legal service
providers also operate in this market. Lawyers have attorney-client privi-
lege, which means that the Public Prosecution Service cannot demand the
information gathered. Accountants are subject to disciplinary law, which
in earlier years led to critical observations concerning the quality of the
 investigations they conducted. Lawyers do not have internal rules of that
kind and face suspicions of excessive involvement with their clients. On
the other hand they can realise the necessary (legal) follow-up themselves.
Sometimes, cases are investigated by (former) administrators or professors
in a particular field. All in all, the supply is diverse and differences in qual-
ity can be distinguished. Investigations usually focus on fact finding,
 compared with the current accepted set of codes and standards. The issues
involved are usually conflicts of interest, leaks or incorrect handling of
confidential information, misappropriation of funds, undesirable conduct
and occasionally, simply theft.
As mentioned, the media report on potential misconduct, but so do
 employees and administrators. Members of the public also make reports,
sometimes anonymously. Naturally, investigations based on anonymous
reports are complicated. Proper verification is often not possible and the
primary source of a report is very often important for the assessment of the
alleged facts. There are systems available in the Netherlands for anony-
mous reporting, where verification is made possible. However, these are
not widespread. Efforts to promote a ‘whistleblowers’ procedure that does
justice to all concerned in the case of possible misconduct have reached an
advanced stage. A number of major fraud scandals in recent years were
marked by high personal damage to the sources. This included loss of jobs
and lack of legal protection. Good quality investigative journalism is
under pressure, and the profession is aware of it. The media show an
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 increased need for speed and sometimes there is not enough time for
 necessary checks. Fortunately cases still come to light in which it can be
 established, albeit in retrospect, that the underlying journalistic
 investigations were of decisive importance. 
Peace-time talks
A first point of attention for integrity investigations is that integrity proce-
dures and agreements on these should preferably be made before anything
goes wrong. This avoids arguments in the political arena regarding the in-
vestigation procedure, or even concerning the question of whether the in-
vestigation is necessary at all. Preparations in ‘peace time’ also have a
preventive effect and increase awareness. Furthermore, it is also a fine
 alternative to the good old dilemma training, which has become somewhat
‘worn-out’. It is therefore better to ask the question in advance. Suppose a
member of a municipal executive is accused by civil servants of undesir-
able conduct and intimidation. Who should investigate this case? How will
the publicity be handled? What role must the municipal council play, and
at what point? Isn’t the municipal executive as a whole too closely involved
or possibly even party to the alleged misconduct? Can the King’s commis-
sioner help? These are questions that are easier to discuss when the case is
still entirely hypothetical. Such talks need not lead to a ‘violations by
bosses’ manual, but it does no harm to codify who will take what steps at
what times. This discussion is in itself an ample return on the investment
made. It can often be very simple. Similar towns with their own investiga-
tive capacity may reach agreements on mutual assistance where a case
 involves a member of the municipal executive, for example.
Protocols
The importance of a good investigation protocol is another point for atten-
tion. A protocol codifies the working method and investigative resources.
It gives statements on their deployment. Good investigations show a
healthy balance of proportionality and subsidiarity of investigative actions
as well as the method used for this. Researchers may experience a protocol
as a straitjacket. A protocol must indeed always be followed, while
 determining the truth is usually a dynamic and sometimes even a purely
creative process. However, the protocol is convenient for the person
 concerned (the subject of the investigation) and also acts as a guide for
legal professionals who have to consider the case at a later date. The courts,
for example, will explicitly include the question of whether an investiga-
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tion was conducted with due care in their assessment of the matter. In that
sense, the protocol is also useful for the investigator. If he has worked
 according to the book, he will as a rule pass the test in court. The strait-
jacket, however, is not the only disadvantage for the investigator. Investi-
gations are always aimed at finding the truth. For an investigator, it is
usually not effective to give away all his methods in advance to the person
concerned, who, after all, may potentially be a malicious offender. Never-
theless, a protocol is more than advisable. It should also be noted that in
cases of this kind, gathering evidence is not normally subject to the strin-
gent requirements of criminal proceedings (see ‘6. Concurrence’ below).
After-care
Integrity investigations have a very high impact, not only on those
 involved and the organisation in question, but also on the public and its
perceived confidence in official organisations and administrators. Very
often a mistake is made, once the integrity investigation has been com-
pleted. Quite often, there is a tendency to return to ‘business as usual’.
However, closure of the case and the broadest possible communication 
are extremely important, which makes them a third point of attention.
It is essential that the entire environment can count on signals and investi-
gations receiving the attention they deserve. The resulting growing trust
in the organisation will pay for itself. Reports will continue to come in.
Favourable developments are also seen in something as banal as sickness
absence. The relationship between low sickness absence and high trust in
the organisation and in the management has been demonstrated in vari-
ous studies. It is therefore advisable for an integrity investigation to be
 followed up by at least one evaluation meeting in which managers and/or
civil servants may take part. In that way, an insight can be gained into the
course that was followed and its outcome. Misunderstandings that have
arisen can thus easily be eliminated. Control of an unwanted flow of ru-
mours and the formation of camps with regard to legal prosecution is a
worthwhile goal at such a meeting. There are often completely opposing
views on the course that should be followed. There must be an opportunity
to discuss this with each other. As a rule, such talks lead to the reaffirma-
tion of standards and values that apply in the organisation. It is certainly
worthwhile to discuss the lessons learned. If a decision is made to close the
matter the easy way and to return to ‘business as usual’, the issue could
continue to spread for years and become part of an episode that is collec-
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tively perceived as distressing. That would be a pity and, as already
 mentioned, is unnecessary.
Concurrence     
If the alleged misconduct involves a criminal offence, it should be reported
to the judicial authorities. Whether this always happens cannot be deter-
mined with certainty. After all, the relative facts are often only known
within the organisation in question. In the Netherlands, the judicial
 authorities themselves decide whether or not to prosecute and what
 resources will be released for that purpose. 
As mentioned above, internal (in-house) investigations are subject to less
stringent rules. According to established jurisprudence (ECLI:NL:CRVB:
2011:BT1997), in civil service disciplinary law, the strict rules of evidence
applying in criminal law do not apply. For a finding of dereliction of duty
that could give rise to disciplinary punishment, it is necessary that the
available and soundly established facts have led to the conviction that the
civil servant concerned has committed the misconduct of which he is
 accused. Also according to established jurisprudence (ECLI:NL:CRvB:
2011:BT2637), in relation to a disciplinary investigation, the administra-
tive body must independently investigate the facts that could give rise to
disciplinary punishment. Under certain circumstances, information that
came to light in a criminal investigation can be used, but there is no
 obligation to wait for such information to become available.
This very resilient line of the Central Appeals Court, the highest legal body
for the assessment of civil service disciplinary law, encompasses the obliga-
tion to perform independent investigations and not to wait too long for
the actions of the judicial authorities. In fact, such waiting may be
 penalised, in the sense that this can lead to the (partial) loss of the right 
to impose sanctions.
It is clear that there is concurrence, and how this is followed up differs
from one organisation to another. Who does what may also be agreed in
the ‘three-way talks’ (civil service employer, the police and the Public
 Prosecution Service). For example, it is possible that the organisation’s
own investigators view internal documents and hear witnesses and that
the police take the suspects away for questioning. After all, the organisa-
tion’s own investigators do not have such powers. At the same time, the
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 organisation’s own investigators will often know more about internal
 procedures and processes. Criminal proceedings take a great deal of time
and manpower. Employers cannot usually afford to leave employees in the
dark about the potential consequences for their employment for all that
time. Cooperation and consequently, concurrence, is therefore useful and
necessary.
In concurrence matters, another distinguishing difference may be raised;
the caution in administrative law. This caution is regulated in Article 5:10a
of the General Administrative Act (Awb): a person to be questioned with a
view to imposing sanctions on him, is not obliged to make statements for
that purpose concerning the violation. He is informed before the hearing 
that he is not obliged to answer questions.
We find ourselves here in the grey area between administrative law and
criminal law. A true caution is only issued in criminal proceedings. It is an
expression of the principle known in Latin as Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum,
or in short, the ‘nemo tenetur’ principle. Literally, this means ‘no man is
bound to accuse himself’. We know this as the right to remain silent: i.e.
the right of a suspect to refuse to answer questions from investigating
 officials, public prosecutors, courts et cetera. 
Note that this concerns criminal law only. In administrative law, a com-
pletely different principle applies. That principle is laid down in Article
5:20 of the Awb. Everyone is required to provide a supervisory authority,
on request, with all the assistance that can reasonably be required for the
exercise of its powers, within a reasonable term set for this. This is indeed
precisely the opposite to the right to remain silent. It is the obligation to
speak. In fact even more than that, it concerns ‘every assistance’ and there-
fore also includes the surrender of business assets and, under certain con-
ditions, granting access to professional e-mail traffic. In conclusion, the
purpose of the talks between (the investigator of) the employer and the
employee is of great importance. If this involves a hearing in connection
with the possible imposition of a sanction, the person concerned is not
obliged to cooperate with it fully, whilst in all other respects, the employee
is required to provide full cooperation.
Trends, problems and ambitions
In my introduction, I referred to the Tilburg University study of ‘problems
and solutions in integrity investigations in the Netherlands’ (Zouridis &
Van der Vorm, 2013). This concerns a study of civil servants and holders of
political office. The central problem definition of this study dates from
2013 and reads as follows:
‘Which solutions, including a national agency for integrity investigations,
are conceivable and feasible for (any) problems that arise in setting up and
conducting investigations into alleged breaches of integrity by civil
 servants, holders of political office and managers of independent adminis-
trative bodies?’
And the sub-questions are: ‘What is the landscape of investigative
 institutions, working methods and investigations like in relation to the
 investigation of suspected breaches of integrity by holders of political
 office, managers of independent administrative bodies and civil servants?
Which problems do those who set up and conduct these investigations
 encounter? Which solutions for these problems are conceivable and
 feasible, including an integrity investigations institution?’
The study has shown that the different types of investigators all work in
accordance with a uniform legal framework. The clients for such investiga-
tions see no added value in a national investigations agency. It was how-
ever commented in the field that there was a need for individual advice in
current cases. To that end, the Support Centre for Integrity Investigations
of Holders of Political Office was set up as a follow-up to the Tilburg study
at BIOS (Dutch National Integrity Office). This Support Centre has been
operational since 1 January 2015 and provides advice on investigations,
without conducting any investigations itself. At present, experiences with
this form of support have been very positive. The decision-makers on
 integrity investigations appreciate the discreet, solution-oriented advice 
in which powers remain where they belong, at the relevant organisation
 itself. This confirms the need to bundle expertise without the need to set
up an unwanted new national investigations agency for integrity investi-
gations.
It should be noted that integrity investigations in the Netherlands are still
regarded as a logical last resort in a balanced integrity policy. The continu-
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ing need for a balanced integrity policy was emphasised once again in the
latest Speech from the Throne by the King, on Prince’s Day. A policy in
which clear rules are fairly enforced. Prevention will take first place in the
future. Quite rightly, there is more attention to preventive investigation.
The screening of candidates for appointed/ administrative offices for in-
tegrity risks has taken off quickly. Screening of (civil service) employees
who are assessed for work with vulnerable groups such as children, the
elderly and the handicapped has also become ‘mainstream’ in a short space
of time. For example, it was recently announced that in 2014, more than
100 candidates were rejected for jobs in child care in this way, due to dubi-
ous antecedents. Preventive screening of this kind (another term used in
this regard is ‘risk analysis’) was embedded in law in the Netherlands fol-
lowing the Amsterdam ‘sex crimes case’, in which it was revealed that a sin-
gle perpetrator was able to very frequently abuse, sometimes very young
children, for years in the performance of his work as an employee in a child
care centre. 
The risk of cynicism concerning corrupt and greedy bankers has not yet
been eliminated in this country. In the media, cases are easily lumped to-
gether, with all the consequences for public trust in civil servants and ad-
ministrators. The Netherlands ranks in the top 10 of the corruption
perception index of ‘Transparency International’, but needs to remain
alert on integrity issues. Both a preventive approach to integrity and sound
investigations contribute towards protecting the level of public trust in of-
ficial organisations and administrators.2
The quality of investigations is improving. There is competition between
the different disciplines (lawyers, accountants, investigative agencies et
cetera) active in integrity investigations. Investigations and the relevant
 investigators are also increasingly involved in legal proceedings. This will
undoubtedly put positive pressure on the ‘due care’ exercised. The degree
of ‘due care’ was high already, but as a result of this legal ‘stick’, it will
 increase still further.
Cooperation between (commercial) providers of integrity care is an
 obvious development. In terms of care for integrity, the government is 
far ahead of the compliance-oriented care deployed at banks and in the
business sector. This is just a matter of time. Attention to public sector
 integrity with a focus on civil servants in particular, has existed since the
early 1990s. The compliance field in the Netherlands not only has a funda-
mentally different approach towards integrity, but it has quite simply not
existed that long yet. 
It cannot be ruled out that private parties will increase to play a more
 active role in the conduct of investigations into breaches of integrity
within the government. 
The government is exercising restraint in its involvement in various areas.
Self-reliance leads to public-private partnerships in fields in which govern-
ment exclusivity was previously taken for granted. The possibility of new
integrity risks looming here is quite feasible. For investigations into possi-
ble misconduct, this is a complicating factor. A civil servant is required to
answer questions from the competent authority. Holders of political office
are held to account by the electorate and cannot work without trust.
 Private parties can evade investigations of possible misconduct more
 easily. Legal provision must be made to avoid this effect in public-private
partnerships.
Notes
1 www.publeaks.nl/over-publeaks.html
2 www.transparency.org 
Literature
www.nyc.gov/html/doi/html/about/about.shtml
www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_barometer_2013
Zouridis, S., & Vorm, B. van der, (2013). Omwille van geloofwaardigheid (In the interests of
 credibility). Tilburg: Tilburg University.
integrity management in the public sector • the dutch approach 85
86 criminal investigation 
Criminal investigation  First aid for 
administrative mishaps?
Erik Hoenderkamp, policy advisor, Rijksrecherche
Introduction
In the public sector, monitoring of integrity is aimed primarily at prevent-
ing violations, in order to ensure that matters such as government
 decisions, their implementation and the distribution of public funds take
place fairly, transparently and in accordance with the principles of a state
under the rule of law. And to ensure that government action remains
within the scope defined by the rule of law. The different tiers of govern-
ment (central government, the provincial authorities, the municipal au-
thorities and the water authorities) and the different bodies and agencies
within them, hold responsibility for this themselves. If things nevertheless
go wrong and violations have been detected, they can take measures to halt
these and to call those responsible to account. 
However, there are some violations that call for a different approach to
 political, administrative or official intervention (alone). In the case of seri-
ous violations of integrity which also constitute criminal offences, action
under criminal law comes into play. This contribution concerns the
 deployment of criminal law to control serious offences such as corruption
and fraud in the public domain, and how this relates to the administrative
approach. This article provides a brief description of the national policy,
features of criminal action and the role of investigative bodies and the
Public Prosecution Service in combating corruption and fraud in the
 public domain. 
Policy framework, primacy in administration and reporting obligation
The administrative approach to integrity violations in the Netherlands
 follows the autonomy of the administrative tiers, with the Minister of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations as the system manager for e. g. legislation
and support for government organisations from the different administra-
tive tiers in the creation of integrity policy. 
6
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The investigation and prosecution of serious offences affecting or involv-
ing abuse of public office is the responsibility of the Minister of Security
and Justice. The judicial machinery is not organised along the lines of the
administrative tiers. This means that integrity violations that are also
criminal offences can be countered simultaneously via different systems
and at different levels. 
Public officials such as civil servants, administrators and politicians have
an obligation to report offences involving abuse of office to criminal law
enforcement agencies. It could be argued that the justice department
rather than the administration has primacy in relation to serious offences
involving abuse of office. But this is overly strict: even in the case of crimi-
nal proceedings, government organisations remain responsible for their
own integrity. And as employers, they must address offenders employed
within or contracted by their own organisations. This means that investi-
gations of corruption and fraud in the public domain may be necessary
under both administrative/disciplinary law and under criminal law. This
requires coordination and at the same time, respect for both the necessary
space for administrative action and the need for unimpeded gathering of
evidence for criminal prosecution. 
In this context, the Netherlands opts for combating corruption with all
available remedies and instruments (Ministers of Security and Justice and
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2015), through a broad and inte-
gral approach involving close cooperation, within the limits of each party’s
position. This article focuses primarily on two concrete policy objectives:
the detection and (timely) reporting of indications of corruption and the
importance of solid investigation of corruption, including effective law
 enforcement and imposition of sanctions.
Application of criminal law against serious offences involving abuse of office
The report of a criminal offence to a criminal law enforcement agency
marks the borderline between administrative and criminal action. Civil
servants, politicians, the courts and administrators must report criminal
offences involving abuse of office as soon as they believe that they have ob-
served one. Examples include payment, offering, requesting or acceptance
of bribes by civil servants, or the disclosure of confidential information.
Other examples include forgery or falsely drafting declarations or state-
ments. 
Swift reporting enables the Public Prosecution Service to determine in
good time whether investigation and criminal prosecution are (also) neces-
sary. However, if there is to be a report, a potential criminal offence must
first be observed and identified as such. The administrative domain must
have sufficient detection capacity for this. That calls for alertness and
 surveillance, and sufficient knowledge.
Administrative and criminal law definitions of integrity violations differ,
as do the groups of persons to be investigated. Not all violations of in-
tegrity are penal offences: criminal law enforcement is based on detailed
and limitative descriptions of offences stated in a Penal Code.
Under criminal law, the term ‘civil servant’ is broadly defined (Court of
 Appeal of Amsterdam). Under Dutch criminal law, a civil servant is a
 person who, under government supervision and responsibility...: 
... is appointed to a position ...  
... with an undeniably public character ...  
... to perform duties of the State or one of its bodies.
Few requirements are made under criminal law for the formal status of an
appointment: a freelancer who works for the government can be regarded
as a civil servant under criminal law, as can a managing director of a
 private limited liability company that performs state tasks. The protection
of the administration and the machinery of government against under-
mining of integrity is more important under criminal law than the nature
of an appointment. A legal point of view well established in Dutch case law
and consistent with the development of decentralisation, privatisations
and public-private partnerships within the public sector (Court of Appeal
of Den Bosch).
Added value of criminal law
Criminal investigation offers added value in relation to other forms of
 investigation, firstly because of its independent character. With a discipli-
nary investigation, even if the government body in question deploys and
external party, there is a risk that the effectiveness will be limited, for
 example by restrictive investigative questions, or because an influence on
the conclusions is sought for administrative and/or political reasons. Even
if that influence does not in fact exist, the client status of an organisation
that is investigated can give rise to persistent and disruptive discussions
regarding bias or selectivity. 
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Criminal investigations are conducted by an investigative body that does
not have any dependent relationship with the government body con-
cerned. It is headed by a public prosecutor of the Public Prosecution
 Service, which is part of the judiciary. The outcome is presented to an inde-
pendent criminal court, unless the prosecutor decides to settle the matter
by other means. Stakeholders in the case can submit that decision to the
Court of Appeal, which may still order the Public Prosecution Service to
take a suspect to court.
Then there are the investigative powers. Criminal investigators have possi-
bilities that are not available, or are less available to private or disciplinary
investigators, and can therefore produce evidence that would otherwise
 remain hidden. Particularly with complex and serious criminal offences,
such as payment of bribes via intermediaries and protective constructions,
leaks of information, or where evidence is located physically or as data
 outside the government’s or administration’s offices, or even outside the
Netherlands, those powers are virtually essential. They give access to the
private domain of public officials and their entourage, to administrations
within and outside the government body concerned and to the office
 environment and the online world of the suspect. They provide an insight
into the flow of goods, funds and services linked to the suspect, into the
suspect’s finances and into his relationship networks. They also enable in-
vestigation outside the Netherlands. 
This makes it possible to look beyond the directly visible consequences of a
violation, such as the provision of confidential information. Other things
may come to light, such as a criminal alliance that buys the information,
uses it to enable other crimes and also pays bribes for this. Criminal inves-
tigation then not only provides an insight into the wider circle of those
 directly involved, but also into vulnerabilities and underlying threats for
government and administrative bodies. These can then be eliminated, or
the organisation’s resistance to them can be strengthened.
A third advantage of criminal investigation is that it reduces the chance of
re-offending, and not only because of the deterrent effect of the risk of
being caught and the threat of punishment. Today, a Certificate of Good
Conduct (VOG) is mandatory for many positions, before an appointment
can be made. If a job applicant has committed crimes in the past and has
been sentenced for these, he cannot obtain this VOG for certain positions.
That denies him an opportunity to commit similar crimes.
The fact that criminal proceedings are public provides another advantage,
apart from transparency. A court case can lead to commotion and insight.
Officials, administrators and politicians are then given arguments for
 putting their affairs in order. This applies not only to the organisation
 involved; a criminal investigation can also help to identify weaknesses in
procedures, regulations and laws that could be amended, or to make
abuses in the private sector visible. By this criminal investigation con-
tributes towards prevention of violations of integrity and strengthening 
of resilience to criminal undermining of government performance.
Some serious offences (involving abuse of public office) cause so much
damage that a penalty or sentence is called for. To that end, criminal inves-
tigations can also be directed against persons other than civil servants. 
A civil servant who accepts bribes is committing a serious offence. This car-
ries a sentence of up to twelve years of imprisonment and a high financial
penalty. The value of the bribes can also be confiscated. However, the party
who pays the civil servant is also committing a crime and can also be sen-
tenced to prison or be ordered to pay a penalty for this. If the briber is a
company, the penalty can rise further. In a recent case, the penalty imposed
was more than  150 million. The maximum penalty for companies is 10
percent of the annual revenue.
In short, timely criminal investigation can make the difference between
halting the visible symptoms of an integrity violation and determining the
sometimes inconvenient truth that lies behind it, which constitutes the
real problem and calls for broader action.
Criminal law is not always the best remedy
At the same time, the deployment of criminal law is not always the best or
the only solution. If a civil servant or administrator has committed a less
serious offence and has been punished sufficiently under disciplinary or
public law, criminal investigation sometimes adds little to the disciplinary
investigation. The administrative approach then suffices. The public pros-
ecutor and the criminal court therefore take account of the consequences
for a suspect of, for example, dismissal or negative publicity. 
Criminal evidence must also comply with strict requirements: the court
has the final say and must be convinced beyond all doubt of the guilt of the
suspect before it will convict him. This makes criminal investigations
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labour-intensive. They not only take time and money: the longer an inves-
tigation takes, the more likely it becomes that the employer of a suspect
will face more pressing dilemmas, such as the question of what should be
done with the employee under suspicion during the investigation, since it
can sometimes take years before his guilt or innocence is established.
There is also the question of whether the number of offenders will remain
confined to that one suspect, or whether only one activity is involved. For
that reason alone, it is important that criminal investigations are not only
conducted with care, but also as quickly as possible. 
In addition, due to the fact that criminal proceedings are public, it may
 become generally known that a serious integrity violation has taken place
within a government organisation. For those with political responsibility,
this represents a reputation risk and may harm the image and moral
 authority, and thereby the support and effectiveness, of the organisation
concerned, or even the entire government. As little time as possible must
pass between the disclosure of the fact that the investigation has been
opened and the outcome, including any court verdict. A good communica-
tion strategy is also important. The administrative downside of the inde-
pendence of criminal investigation is that the government organisation
affected by a crime has no control over the investigation: that rests with
the Public Prosecution Service. That service will focus on finding evidence,
but at the same time will be aware of and bear in mind the interests to be
seen as a government body that holds integrity high. 
In summary, the ‘blind’ deployment of criminal law can cause more dam-
age than is necessary to serve the higher interest: protection and restora-
tion of the performance of public tasks in relation to integrity. Criminal
law is a strong remedy that is necessary to investigate certain violations
and penalise the perpetrators. But the choice of criminal law is not without
consequences and should therefore be assessed in the light of alternatives.
To return to the principle of the Dutch policy: deployment must fit within
a broad and integral approach involving close cooperation, provided that
this serves objective and effective determination of the truth and effective
enforcement and sanctioning, with a role for criminal law which also
 depends on timely reporting and is ultimately determined by the Public
Prosecution Service.
Specialist criminal investigation into bribery of public servants
In the event of very serious offences involving abuse of public office com-
mitted within or close to public centres of power and requiring investiga-
tion at a distance, the specialised and independent criminal investigation
service Rijksrecherche comes into play. Unlike other investigation services,
this agency does not operate under the direct control of the minister who
holds political responsibility for it. The Rijksrecherche operates under the
authority and management of the Board of Procurators General, the high-
est authority of the Public Prosecution Service. As the prosecution, this is
part of the judiciary. This position creates a distance between the Rijks -
recherche and the political/administrative stakeholders in investigations.
At the same time, good, expert control of the Rijksrecherche remains
 possible; a necessity within the system of checks and balances.
The Rijksrecherche employs one hundred specialised investigators with
the same investigative powers as the police. Investigations are headed by a
public prosecutor and are aimed at finding the truth. Drawing conclusions
and prosecution of suspects is the responsibility of the prosecutor. Where
this can be done effectively, while retaining distance, the Central Criminal
Intelligence Agency works together with other investigative services such
as the police, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD) and
the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (KMAR). The Rijksrecherche
can also advise institutions, as an expert, on politically and administra-
tively sensitive investigations.
The deployment of the Rijksrecherche is coordinated via a committee
within the Public Prosecution Service. That committee considers the statu-
tory duties and deployment criteria for the Rijksrecherche and the guide-
line for investigation and prosecution of corruption instructions of the
Public Prosecution Service. As a rule, the Rijksrecherche is not deployed if
other investigative services can conduct independent investigations with-
out creating the appearance of bias.
In recent years, the Rijksrecherche has brought major bribery cases to
light. These involved both political administrators and civil servants. In
addition to prison sentences for the culprits, these investigations provide
an insight into the proliferating effect of corruption if it is not discovered
and addressed in good time, and demonstrate once again the importance
of sufficient resilience and detecting capacity of government bodies. That
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strengthens awareness that timely and effective enforcement is important
in the field of integrity.
The Rijksrecherche conducts on average almost twenty investigations each
year that are directed specifically at corruption of public servants. In addi-
tion, there are up to dozens of investigations each year into crimes that
could be related to this.
Table Number of investigations by the Rijksrecherche into corruption of public 
servants (Public Prosecution Service 2014)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bribery of public servants 15 24 18 12 21
The number of criminal investigations says little about the scale of bribery
of public servants. Not everything is discovered, reported or investigated
and other interventions are also sometimes chosen (as already mentioned,
criminal law is not always the best remedy). As an illustration, reference is
made to a recent study by the VU University. Of more than 7,000 govern-
ment officials, almost 150 saw ‘corruption/bribery’ and more than 175
(also) saw fraud, theft and embezzlement (De Graaf et al., 2014). The rela-
tionship between the number of signals and the number of officials would
indicate a larger scale than the figures of the Rijksrecherche, which involve
a small fraction of a percent of all government officials.
Earlier, the Rijksrecherche analysed bribery of public servants using
 reports received and investigations performed by the Rijksrecherche, the
FIOD and the former Social Security Information and Investigation Service
(SIOD) in the years 2003 to 2007 (Public Prosecution Service, 2010). This
analysis, too, showed that the number of reports in relation to the number
of civil servants is low, and is not spread evenly over the administrative
tiers. This inequality is not explained by differences in the vulnerability to
bribery between the tiers of government. 
The reports of suspected bribery for the years 2003 to 2007 showed that
the domains most frequently affected were construction and property, 
the prisons service, border controls and access and residence including
 naturalisation. Most investigations concerned bribery in relation to
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 ‘construction and property’. The civil servants concerned had tasks such 
as participating in economic transactions on behalf of the government,
 supervision and enforcement and policy-making and setting standards.
 Almost all the officials investigated had functional contacts outside the
government. Risks appear to be associated with one-to-one contacts and
unclear and fluid boundaries between networks, relationship manage-
ment and bribery. The organisational culture also plays a role here,
 particularly where work takes place without established procedures or
agreements, where an informal organisational culture exists or where
there awareness among civil servants is inadequate. The latter applies
equally within public-private partnerships. Often, the return on bribery
for the briber is a multiple of the value of the benefits for the civil servant.
FIOD, police and fraud
Together with the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration, the
FIOD falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Finance. Investiga-
tions are headed by a public prosecutor of the National Public Prosecutor’s
office for serious fraud and environmental crime and asset confiscation of
the Public Prosecution Service. The FIOD is leading in combating fiscal of-
fences and is an important investigator of crimes that are committed
within complex financial structures, such as fraud, corruption and money
laundering. The FIOD also investigates criminal breaches of integrity in
the financial sector. Government officials are sometimes involved in cases
of this kind. An insight may arise into crime that harms the correct func-
tioning of the government, such as abuse of allowances and subsidies. A
government agency may be the abused party in this case, but government
officials may also be (co-)perpetrators, for example because they have been
bribed. In investigations of this kind, the FIOD often cooperates with the
Rijksrecherche. 
In the fraud domain too, criminal law is not always applied automatically:
it must be the best way to address the undesirable behaviour. Confiscating
criminal assets is an important element of a criminal law approach. It is
 extremely important that this sends the message to the public that crime
must not pay. 
Estimates of the scale of fraud vary, but run to many billions of euros.
These include funds withdrawn from the public sector (e.g. subsidy and
 allowance fraud) or kept from it (as with tax evasion). Although the scale of
fraud cannot simply be captured in hard figures, it is potentially large
enough to influence the financial administration of government bodies
and the effectiveness of their spending. For that reason, the FIOD, in par-
ticular, has been strengthened in recent years. But the police, too, devote
structural attention to fraud and money-laundering. It has formed units
for that purpose, recruited specialists in combating financial and economic
crime and the police force accommodates the Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU), which receives and analyses reports of unusual transactions.
Conclusion
From the point of view of criminal law enforcement, it is positive that
 political, official and administrative awareness of threats to integrity and
risks of fraud has grown in recent decades, as has the awareness that timely
detection of violations is important. Segments of the private sector also
 appear to be more alert to the risks of poor compliance, including in their
dealings with the public sector. The Rijksrecherche sees risks in the decen-
tralisation of government action and the performance of public tasks via
public-private constructions or through central facilities such as shared
service centres, where it is not always clear who is responsible for their
 political and administrative supervision.
Another development is growing cooperation through intensification 
of contacts between administrative and criminal law parties. For example,
an institutionalised forum has arisen through the emergence of multi-
 disciplinary Regional Information and Expertise Centres (RIECs), in which
the police and various administrative organisations participate. Informa-
tion from administrative bodies and criminal law enforcement agencies is
 gathered here and, following analysis, is placed at the service of govern-
ment-wide prevention, detection and control of fraud and corruption. For
example, it is easier to refuse criminal businesses a licence or to reject a
party acting in bad faith from a contracting process.
Investigations by the Rijksrecherche also show that serious violations of
integrity or their criminal nature are not always recognised and/or
 reported (in a timely manner). The administrative gateway to the criminal
law process, where detection and reporting of potential abuses originate, is
precisely where gains can be made. If criminal law can be deployed at an
earlier stage, investigations can be conducted faster and at lower costs than
if this is delayed (for too long). It will also prevent a criminal violation of
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integrity from spreading further. These are important arguments for the
creation this year of a contact centre within the Rijksrecherche, where
 government officials with knowledge of a crime can obtain advice on
 reporting. 
For the process after reporting, the cooperation between different investi-
gation services and with the Public Prosecution Service means that large-
scale corruption investigations can be conducted more effectively and
efficiently. This is also necessary: capacity in investigation services is scarce
and the national call for and complexity of corruption investigations
means that heavy demands are made of that capacity. These factors make
clear that the specific and timely deployment of sufficient capacity in the
police force, the Rijksrecherche and other investigation services will
 continuously require attention in the coming years.
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Monitoring Integrity  The development  
of an integral integrity monitor for public 
administration in the Netherlands
Terry Lamboo, senior advisor, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Jessica de Jong, policy officer, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Introduction 
The Dutch public administration is known for its high standards for
 integrity and the preventive scope of its integrity policies (EU Anti-corrup-
tion report, 2014). As early as 1992, integrity was placed on the political
agenda by the Ministry of the Interior. This resulted in comprehensive
 integrity policies, including various laws and regulations (see Chapter 2).
However, it took until 2004 before the Ministry conducted its first moni-
tor of the formal implementation of integrity policies within the Dutch
public administration, which was repeated in 2008. In 2012, the scope of
the Integrity Monitor was expanded to include employee surveys. The
main objective of the initiative to fully monitor both the policies and the
perceptions of integrity (policies) is to enhance the attention to integrity in
the organisational culture. At the same time, the Integrity Monitor fits
into the broader desire for evidence-based policies. This chapter will first
describe the development of monitoring integrity in the Netherlands,
 followed by a presentation of the survey results. The chapter concludes
with a reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the current monitor-
ing process and looks forward to the revised monitor for 2016.1
Usage of monitoring
Monitoring in general is descriptive in nature, collecting facts and
 statistics to show trends in certain areas, while evaluations are intended 
to measure the impact and effectiveness of interventions. The Dutch
 Integrity Monitor is primarily meant to describe a trend and provide a
 picture of the status of integrity policies and culture of Dutch public
 administration. The Integrity Monitor contains no theory to predict how
policies initiated by the Ministry, or others, could influence the percep-
tions of  integrity policies and culture. However, the results can still guide
policy-makers in adjusting policies. The monitor is primarily used to
7
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 inform  Parliament about the current status of integrity policies of the
Dutch public administration and about the actions taken by the Minister
of the Interior in response to the reported results. Another goal of the
monitor is involving the decentralised public administrations in taking
 responsibility for complying with regulations for integrity policies and for
enhancing ethical awareness. Also the associations of the decentralised
government agencies (the Local Government Association, Union of Water
Authorities and Association of Provinces) can use the result to sharpen
their policies and provide support to organisations. Lastly, the monitoring
results can be used for more in-depth secondary (academic) analyses. The
breadth of the questioning in the integrity monitoring, including ques-
tionnaires for civil servants, political office holders, Council clerks and
 Director Secretaries provides a unique database for further research. The
following paragraph describes the process of policy changes due to the
subsequent Integrity monitors. 
Monitoring integrity from 2004 until 2012
In 2004, in the wake of scandals and a renewed focus on the need for effec-
tive integrity policies, the Ministry published its first Integrity Monitor of
the implementation of integrity policies among the four levels of public
administration (Van Wonderen, 2004). This was a check-box inventory: do
organisations have an integrity policy, and does it contain various soft and
hard controls? The results showed a lack of implementation of policies. As
the responsibility for integrity policies lay with individual organisations
which are controlled by their local councils, all the results were published
on the internet and could be searched by organisation. This level of trans-
parency was rather unique and was not repeated with later monitoring,
partly due to the extension of the survey to include perceptions of the
 respondents instead of factual questions only. Also, it was thought that
 respondents would give more honest responses once the results were not
searchable by organisation. 
After the formal changes of the Civil Servants Act and the formulation of
the Basic Integrity Standards for Public Administration and the Police
Force (both in 2006), the second monitor in 2008 focused on the imple-
mentation of the various aspects of integrity policy as required by law,
 regulations and other formal agreements. The results showed clear
progress in the formal implementation of the policies; most elements of
integrity management were implemented. For example, the number of
 organisations that had a code of conduct rose from 65% in 2004 to 89% in
2007. Only a few requirements were implemented in less than two thirds
of the organisations surveyed. The main examples were a yearly account of
 integrity policies for the representative body (35%), a regulation for report-
ing financial interests (49%) and a regulation for publication of secondary
activities (59%), both of which should be targeted at specific civil servants
(for example, management, procurement officers).
In 2006, the third integrity audit by the Netherlands Chamber of Audit
showed - again - disappointing results. The rules were in place, but most 
of the time the implementation of formal preventive measures came no
further than the paper it was written on. However, the Ministries objected
to the focus on formal measures, which are easy to assess. They stated that
their policies focused on organisational culture and awareness and the role
of managers, which were assessed to a lesser extent in the audit. 
The Ministry of the Interior took up the challenge by developing a staff
survey to measure perceptions of integrity and integrity policies. The use
of employee satisfaction surveys is common practice in Dutch public
 administration. The integrity survey was developed as part of the facilita-
tive role of the Ministry. In 2003 the ‘Internetspiegel’ programme had
been  established by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
with the intention of developing uniform surveys for government organi-
sations, to enable them to benchmark and learn from each other at lower
costs. The Internetspiegel Integrity Survey consists of multiple elements
which measure the organisational policies (hard controls, general controls,
soft controls) and elements which measure the desired effects (following
rules, morally aware behaviour, ethical behaviour). The survey is based on
the work of Treviño and Weaver (Treviño & Weaver, 2003). 
2012: an integral Integrity Monitor
The aforementioned developments paved the way for new integrative
monitoring. In 2010, the Ministry initiated a coordinated effort to moni-
tor the integrity and integrity management of public administration. In an
‘administrative agreement’ with the associations of the decentralised tiers
of government,2 it was agreed to monitor the (perceptions of) integrity and
integrity policy. With this agreement, the Ministry, together with the asso-
ciations, indicated that securing integrity in the organisational culture is
of the upmost importance. 
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The Integrity Monitor 2012 consists of the following parts:
• Checklist of formal policies and inventory of the number of discipli-
nary cases or alleged integrity incidents to the secretary-directors and
the clerks of the representative body.  
• Perceptions study of integrity and integrity policy among civil servants
and elected and appointed holders of political office (written survey,
distributed by mail to enhance response rate).
In this way, for the first time, public administration could gain a coherent
view of the current integrity policies, the perception of these policies and
the integrity culture, and the number of incidents investigated. The check-
list maps the formally implemented policies as prescribed in the Civil Ser-
vants Act and the Basic Standards. These were extended with elements of
the Integrity Infrastructure of the Dutch National Integrity Office.3 They
were extended to also include the perception of the secretary-director 
and the clerk of the priority given to integrity and integrity policies by
 appointed politicians and elected politicians.4 Also, for the first time, the
Monitor included a perceptions survey of political office holders. The
 survey for civil servants was shortened and adapted to the executive and
political context.
However, for reasons of privacy and enhancement of the response rates,
the various surveys could not be linked to individual organisations, which
is a serious limitation of the 2012 Monitor. This means that only general
conclusions can be drawn about the relationships between developments
in integrity policies, awareness of policies and organisational culture.  
102 monitoring integrity
Figure The Integrity Monitor 2012 Model
The survey results
Checklist and perception of implementation of formal integrity policies 
An overview of the results of the checklist survey conveys that most
 elements of integrity policies, as required by law and other formal agree-
ments, have been implemented by the central government, provinces,
 municipalities, and water authorities. The results do show some variations
between the levels of government, with central government being a front-
runner in terms of implementation of policies, while municipalities lag
somewhat behind. This is not surprising, as the majority of municipal
 authorities are relatively small organisations. The results also show some
differences between policies implemented for civil servants, elected and
appointed politicians. Both elected and appointed politicians are ahead
with regard to providing overviews of secondary jobs, but trail behind
with regard to the oath of office and confidential integrity counsellors. The
latter is probably because politicians do not have an official employer who
is obliged to appoint a confidential integrity counsellor. 
Checklist
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organisation
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Checklist
regarding the
Executive
Checklist
regarding the
Council
Clerk
Actual Policy Surveys
Perceptions Surveys
Civil servants
Policy
Culture
Effects: following 
rules, conscious, 
work attitude
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Effects: following 
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Effects: following 
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work attitude
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Table 1 Implementation of formal integrity policies according to secretaries 
and clerks*
Type Laws and Standards specified according For civil For appointed For elected
to survey questions servants politicians politicians
Law & General integrity policies
Standards
integrity policies laid down in writing 98%
code of conduct 97% 95% 97%
oath of office (or solemn affirmation) 95% 75% 75%
monitoring/evaluation of integrity policies in 2010/2011 54%
procedure for accepting trips abroad 81% 86%
Law Integrity part of personnel policy
integrity involved in parts of the personnel policy 98-100%
integrity part of appraisal/assessment interviews 91%
integrity part of management or working meetings 82%
training and development (are part of the 
personnel policy) 54% 55% 69%
attention for integrity, risks and moral awareness 95% 97%
Law & Procedure for reporting of misconduct
Standards
procedure for reporting of misconduct 97%
confidential integrity counsellor 92% 73% 71%
access to independent body 63%
procedure for investigating misconduct/
integrity violations 60%
Law & Conflict of interest regulations
Standards
regulation for reporting secondary jobs 98%
overview of secondary jobs 70%
mandatory disclosure of secondary jobs 
(for selected officials) 59% 98% 100%
regulation for reporting financial interests 49%
Standards Vulnerable positions and processes 
segregation of tasks or duties 83%
risk assessment of vulnerable positions 
and processes 43%
overview of vulnerable positions 28%
* Where there is no percentage included, the question was not asked to either the secretary or clerk.
The table presents a mixed picture. Every aspect of the total integrity poli-
cies have elements that are generally implemented, while other elements
that make implementation more specific, seem to lag behind. 
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For example, concerning civil servants, almost every organisation has in-
tegrity policies (98%) and a code of conduct (97%). At the same time
whistleblower regulations and procedures providing access to an inde-
pendent body (63%), procedures for disciplinary investigations (60%), the
disclosure of secondary jobs (59%), regulations for financial interests (49%),
and activities directed towards the identification of vulnerable positions
(43%) are weakly developed. 
For a correct interpretation of the results, it needs to be taken into consid-
eration that these figures have been established on the basis of a self-evalu-
ation, whereby social desirability in answering the questions has to be
taken into account. More importantly, these figures say little about the
quality of the measures taken. A subsequent analysis of actual integrity
policy plans carried out by the Dutch National Integrity Office (Hoekstra,
Makina & Talsma, 2013) showed that there are fewer organisations with a
well-developed and formalised integrity policy plan than the self-evalua-
tion suggests. Furthermore, we have asked civil servants in a survey to
what extent they are aware of those policies being present and imple-
mented in their organisation. Their awareness appears to be quite low on
several aspects. Three-quarters of the respondents (74%) indicated to be
aware of the existence of various procedures concerning integrity (for ex-
ample, regarding secondary jobs, gifts and expense claims). However, to a
much lesser extent are employees (47%) familiar with the general integrity
policies, and only one in three (36%) indicated to be aware of the proce-
dures with respect to dealing with suspicions of misconduct.
Table 2 Awareness of integrity policies and perceptions of organisational culture 
by civil servants
Type Cluster Total
Hard controls regulations, code of conduct 74%
procedures concerning dealing with violations 36%
General controls integrity policies 47%
Soft controls exemplary management 39%
values and standards 65%
cooperation with colleagues 78%
fair treatment 57%
Outcomes honest attitude towards work 88%
moral awareness 66%
non-compliance with rules (negative statements) 39%
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Personnel integrity perceptions 
In the end, integrity policies are aimed at producing outcomes. In the case
of integrity policy, this means that the aim is to have high moral awareness
among personnel and low figures for non-compliance with integrity rules.
Nearly nine in ten of those surveyed (88%) think their colleagues do have
an honest attitude towards work (the questions were phrased negatively,
such as being dishonest about results, being non-productive during work,
reporting sick). 
Two in five employees (39%) reported that in their perception, certain in-
tegrity rules (six items, for example, concerning the acceptance of gifts or
invitations, and dealing with confidential information) were sometimes
not followed, although in terms of frequency this relates mainly to ‘sel-
dom’, whereas only about 2% of the respondents thinks rules are broken
‘frequently’. 
Two thirds of the appointed and elected politicians state that their col-
leagues have an honest working attitude and moral awareness. This means
that one third still see a lack of those elements among their colleagues and
work still needs to be done to improve attitudes and awareness. Various
 instruments have been developed for that purpose (see Chapter 2).
The results of the 2012 survey among civil servants were compared with
the surveys conducted in 2006. Remarkably, these showed no differences
in results despite the increased attention to integrity in those years and 
the efforts of many organisations to strengthen the implementation of in-
tegrity policies. A possible explanation is that as integrity policies started
in 1992, one could have expected clear changes in the administrative cul-
ture in the first years, which could then have stabilised in later years. There
are, however, no data available for this time period to test such a hypothe-
sis. Or that that changes have been made in some organisations but not in
others. Due to that, on an intermediate sector level, no results can be seen.
For future monitoring, it would be interesting to analyse differences in
trends between organisations to see whether trends are visible on this
meso level. Another more technical explanation might be that the surveys
do not cover the subjects that have been changed due to the efforts made. 
It would be relevant to analyse whether different survey questions on
 integrity could show more variation in time. All these considerations are
taken into account in the development of a revised Monitor for 2016.  
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Registration of disciplinary investigations
In the survey, senior management was asked how many disciplinary
 investigations were registered in 2011 and what kinds of (disciplinary)
sanctions have been administered. The figures in Table 3 represent the
breaches and sanctions that occurred in the civil service, presented per
 sector. 
Table 3 Registered disciplinary investigations for the year 2011
investigations disciplinary other disciplinary  reporting to
dismissal measures/actions public prosecutor
Central Government 439 40 117 14
Municipalities 79 21 66 12
Provinces 8 2 14 2
Water Authorities 6 3 0 1
Total 532 66 197 29
As this is one of the first attempts in the Netherlands to collect such data, 
it may not come as a surprise that the quality of this data should be viewed
critically. Because this is a survey, not all organisations have submitted
data. Moreover, the table does not provide a complete overview, since
 almost a fifth (17-21%) of the senior officials surveyed were unable to state
how many investigations were conducted and what sanctions had been
 applied. In those cases, registration was lacking, incomplete, or otherwise
unclear. The Central Government has improved its registration since 2011
and provides the House of Representatives with an overview each year, in
more detail:
Type of breach Percentage of total breaches registered by 
Central Government in 2014 5
Financial abuse 10%
Abuse of power/conflict of interest 5%
Leaking and abuse of information 5,5%
Abuse of competencies 2,5%
Abuse of enforcement powers 0,5%
Sexual harassment 8%
Misbehaviour in private life 28%
Violation of internal rules and misuse of company resources 40,5%
Total 100% (N=607) 
Reflection
The Integrity Monitor is an initiative of the Ministry of the Interior in
close cooperation with public administration sector organisations (Local
Government Association, Union of Water Authorities and Association of
Provinces) and the Dutch National Integrity Office. This co-production
seems to work well. It ensures response rates, support for the results and
the actions to be taken in terms to address weak areas, and at the same time
emphases organisational responsibility in this endeavour. The combina-
tion of surveys was successful, as it presented a more realistic image of the
implementation of integrity policies within public administration.
However, there is also room for improvement to be taken into account for
the Integrity Monitor 2015. First of all, the results of the surveys among
clerks, secretaries, appointed and elected politicians and civil servants
could not be combined for analyses of perceptions at the organisational
level, as all surveys were anonymous. Furthermore, the questions for civil
servants and the elected and appointed officials on the one hand and the
questions for clerks and secretaries on the other, were not comparable.
Therefore, it was not possible to make a good comparison of the perceptions
on implementation of integrity policies and the actual implementation
 according to the clerks and secretaries. Thirdly, the method of gathering
information on the number and types of integrity breaches and sanctions
taken is insufficient and resulted in incomplete overviews. 
For the Monitor 2016, some changes are being considered in order to in-
crease the relevance for organisations, and for policy development. A major
change could be that the monitor provides information on the organisa-
tional level. This will not only provide organisations with input for their
integrity policy, but it would also facilitate analyses for identifying trends
and risks at the organisational level. In addition, the monitor can be im-
proved by extending the focus on organisational culture to include profes-
sional performance and values of civil servants and political office holders.
Various studies have shown that integrity depends for a large part on gen-
eral organisational culture factors. For example, how leadership is exe-
cuted both ‘at the top’ and at the work floor, or the extent to which
colleagues support each other. As the Ministry is not just responsible for
enhancing integrity but for the quality of the public administration it
would seem relevant to broaden the scope of the Monitor. It will also
 reduce research burdens on civil servants when several questionnaires can
be integrated for a monitor with a broader scope. 
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In order to explore such a broad monitor, several meetings were held with
experts on integrity, safe workplaces 6 and organisational culture early
2016. The sessions resulted in four main items being an underlying factor
for both integrity and safe workplaces. Those are: a healthy organisational
culture, quality of leadership, meaningful implementation of policies and
meaningful integration of integrity and safety policy with primary work
processes. The expectation drawn from the sessions is that the inclusion 
of questions about these topics would result in a more meaningful expla-
nation of changes through time and differences between organisations.
Secondary analysis of current data on integrity, safe workplaces, organisa-
tional culture and leadership are planned to sharpen those hypotheses.
This should result in an adaption of the questionnaires. 
Lastly, the monitor could be improved by intensifying the information
gathering on the number and types of breaches and sanctions. This could
be done, for example, by interviewing clerks, secretaries and integrity offi-
cers by phone instead of sending them surveys.
In this chapter we have shown how, as the debate on integrity continues,
the Integrity Monitor adapts to new developments and policy needs. The
Monitor is actively used as a policy tool, as it indicates the focus of atten-
tion of the Ministry and other stakeholders. For example, the monitor of
2012 showed that registration of breaches is lacking. The Ministry subse-
quently made an effort to improve registration. Integrating integrity with
a broader perspective on professional public administration and main-
streaming integrity within organisational policies remains a challenge for
the coming years.
Notes
1 This chapter is adapted from Lamboo & Hoekstra, 2015
2 Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Regional Water
 Authorities (UvW) and Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), and in
 addition the Group of the Integrity Coordinators of the Ministries.
3 www.integriteitoverheid.nl
4 Appointed politicians in the Netherlands are the chairmen of water authorities,
 provinces and municipalities, and members of the boards, comparable with
 members of the cabinet: aldermen in municipalities, daily members for water
 authorities and representatives for provinces. In the Netherlands a ‘dualistic’ local
government system is present, which means that appointed members of the boards
are not part of the representative body, such as the municipal council, the general
members for water authorities and State Members for provinces. Members of those
bodies are referred to as ‘elected politicians’.
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5 Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 
6 ‘Safe Workplaces’ is a program by the ministry to reduce aggression and violence by
citizens against public officials. On the topic of Safe Workplaces a monitor has been
conducted since 2010 (every two years). For 2016, efforts are being made to combine
the two monitors, to reduce research burdens for respondents and to explore
 whether both topics have similar underlying (explanatory) factors.
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An organisation with integrity: feasible or 
a question of ideals?  On the design of the 
integrity  position within the Hellevoetsluis 
municipal authority
Aafje Stout, legal advisor and integrity coordinator, the municipality of Hellevoetsluis
The municipality of Hellevoetsluis
The municipality of Hellevoetsluis lies about 30 kilometres south of
 Rotterdam and has a population of some 40,000. Despite the fact that the
municipality of Hellevoetsluis cannot be counted among the larger Dutch
cities in terms of population, it does have a unique and historical character
as a fortress town on the Haringvliet inlet of the North Sea. 
Management and organisation 
The municipal executive (referred to as ‘the executive’ below) forms the
day-to-day management of the municipal authority. It is responsible for
drawing up and implementing the integrity policy. The executive also
 accounts to the municipal council for the integrity policy pursued. The
municipal council, which is elected by the population every four years,
 supervises the executive and determines the frameworks within which the
executive and the civil servants of the Hellevoetsluis municipal authority
work. The municipal council therefore also has a role of laying down
frameworks for and monitoring integrity. The mayor chairs both the mu-
nicipal council and the executive. An amendment of the Municipalities Act
will enter into force in the foreseeable future. As a result of this amend-
ment, mayors will be assigned a statutory duty to promote administrative
integrity within their own municipalities. The municipal secretary heads
the municipal organisation. The municipal secretary is responsible for
 integrity within the official organisation. The municipal secretary steers
the integrity coordinator. The organisation consists of eight departments.
Hellevoetsluis municipal authority has about 240 employees. 
8
The integrity policy and the integrity coordinator
Rules apply in the organisation of the municipal authority, with which
civil servants and administrators must comply in the performance of their
tasks. These rules are laid down in various regulations. However, there was
no umbrella policy. Because of this, and due to the fact that this is required
by the Civil Servants Act, the Hellevoetsluis municipal authority adopted a
integral integrity policy in 2010. 
At the same time as the adoption of the integrity policy, the executive
 appointed an integrity coordinator. At that time, the job of integrity coor-
dinator was still a new type of position, and is therefore still in develop-
ment. Government organisations realise the position in different ways.
There are organisations which deploy a separate integrity office in the 
‘integrity’ task field. Other organisations assign responsibility for the
 performance of tasks in the field of integrity to a personnel department.
Yet other organisations appoint a separate official for this. The Dutch
 National Integrity Office (BIOS) offers integrity management training
courses. These training courses are aimed at providing an insight into the
role of an integrity officer. Attention is also devoted to rules and tools that
an organisation needs in order to secure internal integrity. The courses
teach participants to think more deeply about integrity within an organi-
sation. The position of integrity coordinator has now existed in Hellevoet-
sluis for just over five years. It is a job that is always changing. 
The tasks that the integrity coordinator performs are:
• Preparing and providing for the adoption of an integrity policy and
keeping it up to date; 
• Preparing a code of conduct and keeping it up to date; 
• Informing new employees about how the integrity policy is organised.
Notifying employees about the existence of current regulations;
 Providing information on the integrity reporting centre (I shall return
to this in a moment) and the presence of confidential integrity counsel-
lor within the organisation;
• Supervising processes when (suspicions of) misconduct arise;
• Preparing and updating regulations describing how the municipal
 authority deals with (suspected) breaches of integrity;
• Creating awareness among employees by maintaining a discussion on
integrity. Ensuring that integrity is on the agenda and remains so in
talks within the departments;
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• Conducting regular talks with confidential integrity counsellors on
matters that relate to integrity;
• Maintaining contacts with the management on the subject of integrity.
Offering support in discussions of the subject of integrity in a
 department;
• Setting up a regional network of colleagues in neighbouring munici-
palities in order to exchange knowledge and experience;
• Preparing annual reports and presenting these to the executive. With
this annual report, the executive can inform the municipal council
about the integrity policy pursued. 
Key elements of integrity policy
Some of the tasks of the integrity coordinator described above are among
the key elements of a good integrity policy. These key elements can be di-
vided into substantive and process-related key elements.
Substantive key elements of integrity policy
New employees
An organisation with integrity starts with employees with integrity. A
good recruitment policy is important in this regard. When a new employee
is hired, a Certificate of Good Conduct (VOG) is always requested. This is a
certificate issued by a screening authority of the Ministry of Security and
Justice, showing that the past conduct of the future employee does not
give rise to any objections to performing a specific task or job in society.
For example, it is not desirable that someone who has been convicted of
fraud in the past should hold a financial position. In addition, a new em-
ployee must provide a copy of his or her diploma. If this is required by the
organisation, an employee may be asked to take part in an assessment. At
the time when a new employee is appointed, he or she is invited to attend a
meeting for new employees. During this meeting, the structure of the or-
ganisation is explained. A special moment is also included in order to ex-
plain the matter of ‘integrity’. New employees are referred to the current
regulations within the organisation. Attention is also devoted to the differ-
ent officers in the field of integrity, so that the employee knows who he or
she can contact with queries or comments on this. At the end of this day,
new employees take the oath or pledge laid down in the Civil Servants Act.
A civil servant who takes the oath or pledge swears or pledges that he or
she will adhere to the rules of conduct with which a civil servant must
comply. Administrators also take an oath or pledge. The difference be-
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tween an oath and a pledge is primarily a religious difference. With an
oath, the person swears on the Bible and by God, which is not the case for
the pledge. 
Code of conduct
An integrity policy that functions well starts with good manners. These
manners are determined by answering the question of how we wish to
treat each other. Can we call each other to account for behaviour? How do
we communicate with each other? As soon as this is clear, you can work
 together on good service provision. In the Hellevoetsluis municipal au-
thority, a code of conduct for civil servants has been adopted, as well as a
code of conduct for administrators. A code of conduct contains the core
 values of an organisation and the standards with which employees and ad-
ministrators of this organisation must comply. A code of conduct provides
a clear framework for employees and administrators. It offers a guide at
the moment that different interests have to be considered in order to take 
a decision on the action to be taken.
Creating awareness
All sorts of regulations exist in order to ensure that employees perform
their jobs properly. The existence of these regulations is not enough. Far
more important is that employees are aware that integrity is not just some
vague concept. Integrity is an integral part of everyone’s work. Everyone
deals with integrity in the performance of their job. Integrity is woven into
the day-to-day work of every civil servant, at every level. In Hellevoetsluis,
all employees have taken part in an ‘integrity’ workshop. This forms a first
step towards increasing awareness in the field of integrity. Because in-
tegrity must be protected and kept ‘alive’, once-only workshops are not
enough. For that reason, after these workshops a start was made with an
online learning environment. Regularly, employees are presented with an
online dilemma. Employees are asked to take a position (anonymously) on
the dilemmas presented. In this way, everyone is ‘forced’ to think about
this subject. On the basis of the responses, a working package on integrity
is developed twice a year for managers. This working package can be used
for discussions of the subject during work meetings. 
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Procedural rules, integrity reporting centre and confidential integrity
 counsellors
In 2013, the executive adopted the procedural regulations to be followed
in the event of suspected abuses. These regulations contain rules on how to
deal with reports of suspected breaches of integrity. Adoption of these
rules secures a uniform approach to (suspicions) of integrity violations.
The rules offer employees a sense of confidence in the way in which a
 report by or about them will be handled. They state that employees can
make reports to their supervisors, a confidential integrity counsellor for
integrity or to the integrity reporting centre. They also record the proce-
dure to be followed. The rules are public, so everyone can view them. One
of the matters regulated in the rules on reporting abuses is the establish-
ment of an integrity reporting centre. This reporting centre consists of
four employees (including the integrity coordinator). The reporting centre
handles reports and advises (on request and otherwise) the competent au-
thority. All sorts of matters concerning integrity are discussed at the re-
porting  centre. In this way, you support each other, and think together
about issues or processes. 
In addition to the existence of procedural regulations and an integrity re-
porting centre, two confidential integrity counsellors have been appointed
within the Hellevoetsluis municipal authority. There is an internal confi-
dential integrity counsellor. This is an employee of the organisation. There
is also an external confidential integrity counsellor. This confidential in-
tegrity counsellor worked for the organisation in the past and therefore
knows it well, but is no longer employed there. The confidential integrity
counsellors have regular meetings with the integrity coordinator. At these
meetings, they discuss matters that are related to integrity, such as the
preparation of a code of conduct and the organisation of a workshop on
 integrity. In view of confidentiality requirements, and in order to ensure 
a clear allocation of roles, the substance of current investigations is not
 discussed. The confidential integrity counsellors are in no way involved 
in investigations into possible breaches of integrity. That is a task of the
 reporting centre.
Since the procedural regulations entered into force, a number of investiga-
tions have been conducted into possible breaches of integrity. In none of
these cases has dereliction of duty been established on the grounds of
which disciplinary measures needed to be imposed. It has been found,
among other things, that permanent attention to processes in the organi-
sation is necessary. Good processes are essential for the creation of a safe
working environment. 
All investigations have been closed in writing. On a number of occasions, a
(closing) meeting was held between those concerned. During such a meet-
ing, the people involved can tell their own story. These meetings help to
meet the desire to be heard. Such talks can also lead to understanding of a
person’s actions. If the situation allows for this, people can offer each other
apologies. In this way, efforts are made to maintain relationships and
 restore trust. Such meetings are always led by a third party, such as a staff
member of the reporting centre. 
The reporting centre is also regularly asked for advice on different sub-
jects. These may be simple questions, such as whether a bunch of flowers
can be accepted as thanks for good cooperation, but they may also concern
more complex matters, such as questions on ancillary activities of employ-
ees or administrators. The fact that growing numbers of employees are
contacting the reporting centre to make reports or to ask for advice is a
positive development.
Process-related key elements of integrity policy
Formalisation of the integrity policy
The first key element is to adopt an integrity policy and to keep it up to
date. The way in which an organisation develops and adopts an integral
 integrity policy is not laid down in the Civil Servants Act. A good integrity
policy contains more than a review of existing integrity regulations and
the procedures of the organisation. A policy plan must be based on a clear
vision and mission, and a strategy for realising these. The Hellevoetsluis
municipal authority adopted such an integrity plan in 2010. The purpose
of this plan is firstly to establish clear principles applying in relation to
 integrity for both civil servants and administrators. Secondly, the plan is
aimed at drawing permanent attention to integrity and at continually
steering for this in a preventive manner. The mission and vision relating to
integrity are based on the standards and values of Hellevoetsluis munici-
pal authority. These standards and values form the foundation of the in-
tegrity plan. They show how the municipal authority wishes to work and
what it regards as important.
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These values are translated into concrete standards. The majority of those
standards have already been laid down in law in the Civil Servants Act and
in the Model Approach Basic Integrity Standards for Public Administration and the
Police Force (Modelaanpak basisnormen integriteit openbaar bestuur en politie),
April 2006. The Basic Standards contains the minimum conditions and
 integrity measures with which a government organisation must comply.
The mission of the integrity policy in Hellevoetsluis is to comply with the
basic standards and to maintain this.
Maintaining contacts 
In order to perform the job of a integrity officer properly, it is important to
provide for a good network; both an internal network within the officer’s
own organisation and an external network with fellow officers working
for other organisations. Within a network, officers support each other by
exchanging information and sharing knowledge and experience. A wide
network contributes to good performance of the job.
In order to secure integrity, it is necessary to keep discussing this with each
other. As an integrity officer, you need the support of the management for
this. Together, you continually search for ways to draw integrity to the
 attention of employees and the management. One way to do this is to
 include the subject as a fixed item on the agenda for work meetings and to
actually discuss this with each other. Another way to draw integrity to the
attention of employees and the management is by organising meetings on
integrity. Attendance of these meetings must not be optional. The manage-
ment must state that attendance of these meetings is mandatory for every-
one. 
It is important for an integrity officer to adopt an active role in the search
for ways to draw integrity to the attention of employees, and to sustain
that attention. The administration and the management are responsible
and as an integrity officer, you stimulate, motivate and support them with
a clear vision and the accompanying tools (Zweegers & Hoekstra, 2013: 82-
85). The integrity officer must ensure that he or she is sufficiently visible
within the organisation. In addition to discussing the subject of integrity
in their departments, managers must also convey that they regard the
 subject as important. It is also important to hold regular meetings with the
confidential integrity counsellors in order to keep each other informed of
current matters. It is good to know what the current issues are within an
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organisation. You can steer for these (in policy terms) if necessary. Struc-
tural meetings with members of the integrity reporting centre are also
valuable. Even at times when there are no (suspicions of) breaches of
 integrity, it is good to keep in contact with each other. For this reason, 
the integrity reporting centre meets every three months, in addition to
 incidental talks. 
Apart from these internal contacts, it is worthwhile to maintain contacts
with fellow integrity officers who work at other organisations. The
 exchange of knowledge and experience in this field contributes towards a
good integrity policy. Knowledge is increased and at the moments when
questions arise for which there is no answer within your own organisation,
you can consult each other. For this reason, Hellevoetsluis municipal
 authority is working to set up a regional network of integrity officers.
Accountability 
Each year, the integrity coordinator draws up an annual report. This
 annual report is presented to the executive. The executive can present the
 annual report to the municipal council. The annual report is intended to
provide information on the progress and activities in the field of integrity
in the preceding year. It also provides an insight into the number of
 reports made and the amount of advice that the reporting centre has
 provided. The annual report also looks forward to the plans and ambitions
for the future.
Evaluation of the job after five years
As an integrity officer, you try to make people aware of their own responsi-
bility for acting with integrity. You try to make people enthusiastic, and to
encourage colleagues to contribute ideas, all with varying results. Integrity
is not the favourite subject of many managers, or of many employees. It is
often regarded as ‘difficult’. Small benefits, such as free tickets to an event
that you have organised or a Christmas hamper from a contractor who has
carried out a large job for the municipal authority ‘suddenly aren’t allowed
any more’. It takes an effort to make employees (and administrators) realise
that a good integrity policy primarily brings them benefits; that it con-
tributes to a safe working environment, in which everyone treats each
other with respect. And in which everyone can be open and honest and can
perform their work well in an enjoyable manner.
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There are times when you just have to take a deep breath. When you won-
der whether this job is still worth it. But if you then see steps being taken,
you get positive responses from the organisation and the issue is coming to
life, you recover your enthusiasm and motivation to provide for a sound
and well-supported integrity policy. 
As an integrity officer, it is good to build up a network of fellow officers in
order to exchange knowledge and share experiences. BIOS organises meet-
ings for integrity officers a number of times a year. Attendance of these
meetings helps the officers to maintain a critical view of the integrity pol-
icy in the municipality of Hellevoetsluis. In addition to offering an oppor-
tunity to learn, attendance of these meetings also helps you to find new
energy to continue at times when you are struggling with your mission to
get the notion of integrity into someone’s head. At such a meeting about
2.5 years ago, the participants were asked to briefly describe the role of an
integrity officer. I recently re-read the text that I wrote at the time. I can
still recall the feeling that I described at the time. Fortunately, I also recog-
nise the growing interest. 
The role of an integrity coordinator (March 2013):
‘The loneliness of the integrity coordinator is marked by a search for kindred
spirits. As an integrity coordinator, you are continually searching for people
who are willing to contribute ideas on the subject of integrity. As an integrity
coordinator, you are very keen for other people to regard the subject as just as
important as you do. Unfortunately, that is very often not the case. You can
send information on the subject. You can continue to say that you are keen to
join talks in which the subject of integrity will be raised (which, by contrast, is
very often the case). You can be nice, you can smile, you can continue to share
information ... And then finally, you have the subject on the agenda! Then,
due to lack of time, or because there are ‘more important matters that really
must come first’, right away, it is the first to be cut from the agenda again.
Very slowly, you see some progress, a growing interest in this subject. People
 increasingly get in touch with you for questions, information or just a chat
about a subject that relates to integrity. It just takes patience, a lot of patience.
But honestly ... it is worth the effort!’
The organisation with integrity as a feasible ideal
An organisation with complete integrity, where no misconduct ever
 occurs, is an idealistic picture. People work in organisations, and where
people work, mistakes are made. Sometimes consciously, sometimes un-
consciously. The power of a good integrity policy is reflected in an organi-
sation that offers employees an opportunity to report misconduct ‘safely’.
On the one hand this leads to more reports, but on the other to an organi-
sation with greater integrity and thus a good working environment.
Hellevoetsluis municipal authority invests in integrity. At present, it has
an up-to-date and widely supported integrity policy. Successes have been
achieved in the past few years. In addition to the adoption of an integrity
policy, employees have been trained. The subject receives structural atten-
tion. Clear rules have been established, which are followed if there is a sus-
picion of misconduct. A reporting centre has been set up, which employees
can contact with questions. This reporting centre also provides for advice
to the competent authority. A start has been made on setting up a regional
network for the exchange of knowledge and experience. The confidential
integrity counsellors have been trained and appointed as confidential
 integrity counsellors for undesirable conduct and integrity. Integrity has
become a permanent item of the agenda for work meetings. The Manage-
ment Team has also placed integrity on the agenda. Each year, the munici-
pal council is informed about the policy pursued.
In addition to these successes, there are also points for improvement. One
of these points for improvement is the code of conduct, which is due for an
overhaul. This will be addressed in the foreseeable future. Attention must
also be devoted to the visibility of the confidential integrity counsellors
and the integrity reporting centre, so that everyone knows who he or she
can contact. Continual attention must be paid to the subject of integrity.
Integrity must become part of the mind-set of the employees. This will
only be possible if the management sets a good example. As an integrity
 officer, you have to continually invest in this, so that attention for the sub-
ject does not fade away. In this way, an organisation with integrity, where
people continually work to realise ideals, has become feasible.
122 an organisation with integrity: feasible or a question of ideals?
Literature
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Vereniging van Nederlandse
Gemeenten, Interprovinciaal Overleg, Unie van Waterschappen, & Het Nederlandse
Politie Instituut. (2006). Modelaanpak basisnormen integriteit openbaar bestuur en
politie (Model Approach for Basic Integrity Standards for Public Administration and the Police
Force). Viewed on www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/brochures/2005/09/26/modelaanpak-basisnormen-integriteit.html.
www.justis.nl/organisatie, viewed on 29 June 2015.
Zweegers, M., & Hoekstra, A. (2013). De Integriteitsfunctionaris: niet het geweten van de
organisatie, maar pionier en strategische aanjager (the integrity officer: not the conscious
of the organisation, but pioneer and strategic driving force). In M. Zweegers & E. Karssing
(red.), Jaarboek Integriteit 2013, pp. 82-85. Den Haag, Nederland: BIOS, Bureau
 Integriteitsbevordering Openbare Sector.
integrity management in the public sector • the dutch approach 123
Integrity  Part of day-to-day practice 
in the City of Amsterdam
Jeanine Kooistra, head of the Integrity Bureau, City of Amsterdam
Introduction 
The Integrity Bureau (IB) of the City of Amsterdam supports the organisa-
tion in attaining, practising and maintaining integrity. The IB promotes
the integrity of civil servants and administrators in the performance of
their work by providing advice, on request and otherwise, and support for
integrity issues. The aim here is that integrity should be regarded as a self-
evident part of policy and behaviour, meaning it should have a place in
 creating frameworks and planning, but should also be visible in the
 actions of the employees. The City of Amsterdam employs about 13,000
civil servants. Within the municipal organisation, the IB is the expertise
centre in the field of integrity. It currently consists of twenty employees,
with experts in the field of internal investigation, risk analysis, screening,
training and advice. The Reporting Centre and the Central Confidential
Integrity Advisor also form part of the IB.
The Integrity Bureau in more detail
History
In the final decade of the last century, a number of developments took
place within and outside the City of Amsterdam which ultimately led to
the formation of the IB. With her speech in 1992, the former Minister of
the Interior Ien Dales placed the importance of government with integrity
on the agenda. In 1996, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into
 Investigative Methods chaired by Van Traa issued its report, which
 opposed the intermingling of the underworld and normal society. Within
the municipal authority, a major fraud in the Parking Authority came to
light in 1997. Investigations showed that cash couriers from the Parking
Authority embezzled millions. An important finding of the investigation
was that fraud was very easy to commit and that there were also no barriers
to this in the working process.
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In the year 2000, the ‘Correct or corrupt’ report appeared, describing the
integrity risks of the City of Amsterdam The purpose of the report was to
increase resilience to violations of integrity. In 2001, partly in response to
the above developments, the IB was formed, with the tasks of conducting
internal investigations, risk analysis and providing training and advice. In
2015, screening of external parties with which the City of Amsterdam does
or wishes to do business was added to these. The City of Amsterdam had
been conducting such screening since 1998, but within a different depart-
ment. 
Structure and sections
In outline, the IB consists of four pillars: internal investigations, risk
analysis, screening, and training and advice. The Reporting Centre and the
Central Confidential Integrity Advisor also hold a place within the IB.
Reporting Centre
The Integrity Violations Reporting Centre is open to civil servants, admin-
istrators and councillors of the City of Amsterdam, as well as to private citi-
zens and companies. Suspicions of violations of integrity can be reported
here. The reports are recorded and validated. The sub-division of viola-
tions used is described below. In order to give an impression of the number
of reports, the number of reports in the first half of 2015 is shown in
brackets after each type of violation: 
• conflicts of interest (1);
• manipulation or abuse of (access to) information (7);
• abuse of powers or position (4);
• incompatible positions/commitments/activities; 
• inappropriate conduct: sexual harassment, discrimination, aggression
and violence (8); 
• criminal offences during working hours, such as theft, fraud or
 corruption (4x theft/embezzlement, 6x fraud, 4x corruption); 
• criminal misconduct outside working hours (2);
• wastage and misuse of municipal property (4).
In total, fourty reports were made in the first six months of 2015. In twelve
cases, the suspicions were reported to the police and in nine cases, the IB
conducted an investigation itself. Conducting an investigation is not
 opportune with every report, and on nineteen occasions, a report led to
recommendations to the relevant organisational unit itself. 
Internal investigations
If there are concrete suspicions of a violation of integrity, a director of a
municipal service, a city district chief secretary or, (a member of) the
 municipal executive can order a personal investigation. The IB will then
conduct an internal investigation. The investigation falls under the pow-
ers of the employer and may include interviews, dossier investigations,
digital investigations and observations. The report on the investigation is
delivered to the internal client. After taking legal advice, this client may
impose measures relating to legal status.
In addition to the findings on individual conduct, an investigation also
often provides a picture of the context in which a violation of integrity was
able to occur. On the basis of the picture of the context, the IB notifies the
management of the learning points and points for attention and makes
recommendations, so that the entire organisation can learn from an inves-
tigation. In the case of criminal offences, the relevant director can report
the incident to the police. The IB then serves as a liaison centre of the
 municipal authority for the police and the public prosecutions service.
Risk analysis
A risk analysis is a technique in which various methods can be applied to
determine which integrity risks lie in a working process and/or organisa-
tional unit and the extent to which these are controlled. An integrity risk is
the risk that a violation of integrity can occur in day-to-day practice within
a particular working process or within a procedure during the work. In-
tegrity risks can arise if insufficient control measures, such as establishing
rules and procedures, have been taken. Often, risks cannot be completely
eliminated, but they can be controlled as effectively as possible. A risk
analysis focuses primarily on the control measures: whether these are ade-
quate, whether they reduce or eliminate the risks and above all, whether
the existing control measures work and are complied with.
Screening
In the case of projects and tenders, screening means that an investigation
is conducted into the integrity and the financial and economic stability of
a party with which the City of Amsterdam wishes to do business, and
 recommendations are made. The essence of the screening method is that
screening is risk-driven. This means that the depth of the screening is
 determined by:
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• the extent to which risks are associated with the agreement; 
• the sector in which an agreement is to be contracted;
• the type of counter-party (complexity of the group structure, foreign or
Dutch company). 
The performance of the screening process starts in the municipal service or
city district in the form of a basic test, an initial assessment of the docu-
ments provided by the party on the organisational structure and financial
accounting. Depending on the results of the basic test, the Screening unit
may screen parties with, for instance, a complex corporate structure, com-
plex financial situation or incidents in the past in more depth. If necessary,
upscaling to the Coordination Office BIBOB of the City of Amsterdam is
possible. The BIBOB Act gives municipal authorities the possibility of con-
ducting investigations into possible criminal activities by a company with
the aid of information from the police and the public prosecutions service.
An advisory report, including recommendations, is drawn up as a result of
the screening process. These recommendations often relate to control
measures that can be taken in order to limit or control the integrity risk for
the City of Amsterdam as far as possible.
Training and advice
The IB advises the city districts and services on the integrity policy that
they pursue and its translation in terms of their specific working practice.
Together with the unit, an integrity programme can be developed, aimed
at building an organisation with integrity by instituting an effective and
efficient learning process and effective and fair enforcement practice. The
IB provides advice and support for the formulation of such an integrity
programme and its implementation. The implementation includes the
 supervision of training and education for employees and supervisors in
the field of integrity. The objectives here are to help to increase insight into
both the concept of integrity and the specific integrity issues of the work
and to improve knowledge and skills in dealing with moral dilemmas and
the integrity risks in the work. 
On the basis of its expertise in the field of integrity, the IB also acts as a
sparring partner for civil servants and administrators in relation to in-
tegrity issues. Efforts are made here to take the context of the civil servant
or administrator into consideration as far as possible and to look at who
else bears responsibility for the person concerned. This means that if
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 possible, in the case of civil servants, the supervisor also takes part in the
discussions, in the case of a deputy mayor, the mayor, and in the case of
councillors, the chairman of the municipal political party. 
Central Confidential Integrity Advisor
Confidential integrity counsellors act as sounding boards, advisers and
 referral officers. They are trained to identify integrity issues and to support
employees in addressing these themselves. They provide a listening ear
and can offer support in the determination of any follow-up steps. The
Central Confidential Integrity Advisor coordinates and supervises the con-
fidential work within the City of Amsterdam by providing for recruitment
and selection of confidential integrity counsellors, organising training,
 education and intervision, guidance on difficult casuistry and regular
meetings. The Central Confidential Integrity Advisor is also the individual
confidential integrity counsellor for people who are unable or unwilling to
contact one of the local confidential integrity counsellors. 
Key elements of policy
Integrity is not a matter that is the responsibility of the IB, but is the
 responsibility of all employees, administrators and civil servants of the
City of Amsterdam. The IB advises and provides support in this regard,
aimed primarily at building an organisation with integrity. It does this on
the basis of the vision that learning and enforcement must go hand in
hand, expressed in the seven structural elements of an organisation with
integrity. Attention to these structural elements means attention to both
preventive and repressive activities. The first three elements constitute the
moral learning process. The final three elements of the model constitute
the enforcement practice. The fourth element, the rules, forms the turning
point. 
The model is presented on the next page.
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The basis: seven structural elements
Learning means that as an organisation, you have the task of organising
the discussions on the application of the regulatory framework and in-
tegrity issues in a broad sense, at the individual level, at the team level and
at the organisational level. This can be achieved through training, inter -
vision and sessions on the oath of office, the code of conduct or other inter-
nal regulations, for example, with the ultimate aim that discussions of
integrity will become a normal part of day-to-day practice. It means that
the organisation has enforcement tasks in which risks are analysed and
controlled, steering takes place for compliance with the rules, screening is
performed and investigations are conducted if violations of integrity are
suspected and, if necessary, sanctions are imposed. 
Developing learning practice supports the power of judgment, the way in
which employees take their own well-considered decisions. With the devel-
opment of enforcement practice, the organisation relieves the burden on
employees, who can then rely on a framework of regulations and standards
in their work. They do then have to implement this as effectively as possi-
ble, or must call on their own willpower (the ability to want something
and to actually put this into action). 
In recent years, the IB has learned that an integrated approach to integrity,
in which learning and enforcement go hand in hand, is a condition for
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Learning proces
Enforcement
practice
1 Independent moral judgment
2 Moral learning colsultation
3 Moral manifest
Code of Conduct Oath 
of Office
4 Rules
5 Removing temptation
6 Monitoring compliance with 
the rules
7 Enforcement Imposing 
anctions
Power of 
judgment
Willpower
 ultimately becoming, being and remaining an organisation with integrity.
The integrity investigations have shown that simply removing the rotten
apples in the barrel is not enough to realise an organisation with integrity.
The personal investigations and any punishment that results from them
execute only one structural element and do not increase resilience against
future violations of integrity. 
Another key finding is that the supervisor’s interpretation of his or her
tasks and the visible actions that he/she attaches to this are important for
the management of integrity. If the quality of the management is not
good, an organisation with integrity cannot be built. The conduct of inves-
tigations will then achieve no more than the removal of a rotten apple and
the training of employees will be a once-only action which will be forgot-
ten again a few days later. 
Attention to integrity within the organisation 
Working on integrity faces some persistent difficulties, precisely because
integrity is a concept that you cannot be opposed to. When asked, everyone
always says they regard integrity as very important. But this is no guaran-
tee that they will actually be working to create an organisation with
 integrity. Certainly in a result-oriented environment, many other matters
demand attention, so that integrity is not always high on the agenda. 
So how can integrity nevertheless be placed on the agenda? Roughly
 speaking, in two different ways: via perceptions or via the structure.
The formation of perceptions is incident-driven. For integrity incidents,
the shock effect applies: the greater the damage, the greater the attention
to the incident and its prevention. Naturally, this can serve as a catalyst for
working on integrity, but prevention of incidents is, of course, preferable.
For that reason, it is important to build a structure which promotes atten-
tion to integrity. That is why the City of Amsterdam opted to set up the IB,
with staff appointed especially to work on integrity. The positioning of the
IB is important here. It stands close to the chief executive within the
 executive organisation, but with a critical view of the executives and in
close connection to the line management. 
Regular meetings with the mayor in the Integrity meeting also contribute
towards good positioning, in particular in order for an independent voice
to be heard. This is important for the IB, in order to be able to conduct
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 investigations and provide advice from within the organisation and in
connection with that organisation, but nevertheless in an independent
manner. In order to stimulate that independence, the IB also conducts
talks with and works with academics and other players in the field of in-
tegrity, with the Amsterdam Audit Office and the municipal Ombudsman.
Another example of how attention can be devoted to integrity in the struc-
ture of the organisation is the explicit reporting obligation for directors.
Every employee is urged to report any suspicions of integrity violations to
the IB. For members of the senior management, that is not enough, for
their role of setting an example is reflected in the reporting obligation.
Risk analysis in more detail
On the instructions of directors, the BI has primarily conducted risk analy-
ses of field work processes, such as waste collection, the building and hous-
ing inspectorate, enforcement and supervision in public spaces and market
management in the past fifteen years. This is because a relatively high
number of suspicions of integrity violations are reported to the IB each
year for these working processes. As a result, the IB has conducted fewer
risk analyses of other parts of the official organisation, where there may be
conflicts of interest, fraud and corruption, for example in decision-making
processes, contracting, procurement and external employment.
In the Amsterdam integrity risk analyses, the IB considers, together with
those who perform the tasks, where their work may be vulnerable from an
integrity point of view and whether the existing control measures have an
adequately risk-reducing effect. On the basis of its expertise and practical
observations, the IB also independently forms an opinion on the vulnera-
bility of the working process. An effect of this approach is that employees
become more aware of integrity dilemmas in their work and discussions of
this begin more easily. This makes a contribution towards performance of
work with integrity. This distinguishes the Amsterdam integrity risk
analyses from conventional audits, which determine on the basis of a pre-
formulated framework of standards whether the work of an organisational
unit is performed in accordance with the current organisational objectives. 
A recurring finding in these risk analyses of field work processes is that
‘neglected organisations’ are relatively common here. Employees then
 perform their work at a physical distance and in isolation from the parent
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organisation. In addition, employees are extra vulnerable to integrity risks
because supervisors rarely appear on the shop floor and there are no shared
or explicit values and standards set for the performance of the tasks. In
their contacts with the public, employees must independently assess the
application of their discretionary powers, such as whether to take enforce-
ment action or to leave matters with a warning, or whether or not to grant
a licence. If a regulatory framework is not working well, employees may
act for their own gain or, under pressure, take action that favours members
of the public. This carries the risks of conflicts of interest, fraud and
 corruption. Performing work in isolation without very much supervision
from supervisors can also lead to the exclusion of employees and other
forms of inappropriate behaviour on the shop floor. 
With risk analyses in such situations, the IB has advised clients to remove
the vulnerabilities as far as possible, or to control these at an acceptable
level. On the one hand, this involves measures that are aimed at the
 management of integrity by direct supervisors. It is their task to work on
strengthening the risk awareness, attitudes, behaviour and skills of the
staff, to discuss standards and values and to make dilemmas open to
 discussion. On the other hand, it involves measures that create barriers to
conduct without integrity, such as the introduction of job segregation and
job rotation, and improvement of internal control.
A condition for the success of risk analyses is that they must be of high
quality: are the facts correct and is the line of reasoning sound? In order to
ensure this, the IB always submits the draft risk analysis to an advisory
group of subject experts for validation. This can lead to sharpening and
supplementation of the risk profile. It also provides input for potential
 improvement measures. The IB then submits the findings to the client for
feedback and the IB and the client review potential improvement measures
together. The trick here is to find a good balance between better control of
integrity risks and working according to the current business operation
principles, such as efficiency, throughput times and customer-friendliness.
Because of their result-oriented focus as managers, clients tend to tip this
balance in favour of business operation principles, while the IB, on the
basis of its role, focuses precisely on eliminating stimuli for conduct with-
out integrity as far as possible. Insight into these positions is important for
the determination of strategy in the after-care process, in which the BI and
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the client consider whether the proposed improvement measures are effec-
tive. Sometimes, due to resistance or other organisational constraints, im-
provement measures are not implemented, while the risk analysis shows
that the integrity risks are high. It is then the IB’s task and mandate to
 consider a strategy for ways to implement the proposed measures in the
 organisation after all.
A lesson from many risk analyses is that the organisational culture is an
important success or failure factor for the implementation of improve-
ment measures. This conclusion calls for further development of the exist-
ing instruments, because organisational culture does not yet have a place
within these. In the coming period, the IB will be working to expand the
risk analyses with a diagnosis of the organisational culture. This diagnosis
will give direction to the change strategy that must be chosen in order to
be able to implement the improvement measures effectively in the
 organisation.
Reflection
In early 2015, the City of Amsterdam carried out a radical reorganisation.
The municipal organisation is built on the basis of the view that the citi-
zens and entrepreneurs come first. The leading management principle is
formed by the central creation of frameworks and steering, based on the
concept of ‘1 Amsterdam, 1 city, 1 challenge’. This means that more than in
the past, the organisation will work on uniformity and consistency in the
field of integrity on a top-down basis. This provides an opportunity to
 create more uniformity in the approach to both enforcement (risk analyses,
investigations, sanctions) and learning (programme-based approach,
 organisation-wide learning from investigations and risk analyses).
To that end, the IB will set up a city-wide integrity management pro-
gramme for the first time this year. In this integrated programme, enforce-
ment and learning will be developed in outline. The IB will coordinate the
setting of priorities in the field of integrity for the coming years with the
City Management Team. The input for the programme comes from signals
and observations from the different IB disciplines (integrity investiga-
tions, risk analysis, screening and training and advice) and the needs and
requirements of the City Management Team in the field of integrity
 management. Current developments in the municipal organisation and
society are also taken into account here, such as location and time-
 independent work, the use of social media and area-based work. The objec-
tive here is that the City of Amsterdam works systematically, throughout
the organisation, to increase resilience to violations of its integrity. It is
 important to note here that integrity is not purely the responsibility of the
IB, but of everyone in the organisation, from politicians to civil servants
and from policy-makers to implementers. 
With an outline central programme, custom work does remain important.
Not all working processes and teams can be served through the same ap-
proach. Development and realisation of the integrity policy call for contin-
ual coordination with the intractable everyday situation in practice. 
The centralisation of the organisation is also reflected in the role of creat-
ing frameworks for and supervision of integrity that has recently been as-
signed to the IB. The role of creating frameworks means that the IB
provides for uniform frameworks, a uniform method for building an or-
ganisation with integrity and a structured approach to current integrity
themes. The supervisory role means that the IB can assess whether the
frameworks are developed and if they are complied with. A point for atten-
tion with regard to the supervisory role is that the IB performs this on the
basis of a supporting attitude, with the focus on improving, not on calling
to account. 
In this new organisation, the IB, after fifteen years, is still full of life. It has
acquired a wealth of experience and developed a large network, and is still
building on its expertise by reflecting on its own work, by monitoring
 scientific research and by conducting research of its own. In the coming
period, the focus will remain the further development of the integrated
work of the IB, in which learning and enforcement will be associated still
more closely. Insights from risk analyses, screening and research can be
connected and included in the creation of frameworks, advice and
 training. 
One reservation here is that it proves to be difficult to take time within the
IB for reflection and further development, as the pressure of incidents
 remains high and the connection with and activation of the organisation
demand a great deal of time and energy. Naturally, this also develops the
IB’s own expertise, but securing and recording this, and reflecting on it,
 require more time and attention than they receive at present. For this is
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certainly necessary in order to be able to support the City of Amsterdam 
in the future in becoming, being and remaining an organisation with
 integrity. Creating scope for reflection and expanding the expertise are
therefore important assignments and also major challenges for the IB in
the coming years.
One further comment in conclusion. Attention to integrity has grown
 substantially in recent years, particularly in the media, but this does not
 always mean that the intrinsic motivation to work on integrity has
 increased accordingly. Attention within the organisation for the basis for
integrity, with the regulatory framework, the code of conduct and man-
ners, therefore remains essential. Integrity must not be solely a game at the
strategic level or a subject that is raised once a year in a team session. It
 demands daily attention and hard work, precisely because integrity affects
the heart of the City of Amsterdam and thereby, its raison d’être.
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Integrity management behind bars
Dick van Lingen, director security and integrity office, Custodial Institutions Agency
Introduction
The Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI) provides for the execution of
 sentences and custodial measures. The DJI has more than seventy
 establishments spread throughout the Netherlands and the Netherlands
 Antilles, and more than 14,000 employees. Each year, it has an intake of
about 45,000 new prisoners. Confinement takes place in different types of
institutions: prisons and remand prisons for adults, which are known as
penal institutions, but also in special institutions for juveniles, the young
offenders institutions. For patients for whom treatment has been ordered
by the courts (detention under a hospital order, TBS) there are forensic
 psychiatric centres. For foreign nationals without residence permit the DJI
uses detention centres.
The DJI is an agency of the Ministry of Security and Justice. This means
that the DJI has a degree of autonomy. Each year, the DJI is allocated a
budget by the ministry and agreements are reached on the performance to
be realised by the DJI. 
In addition to confining detainees, the DJI is also responsible for their day-
to-day care. DJI employees work on preparation for a return to society with
each target group in a different way. For a personalised approach is neces-
sary. For example, the DJI offers adult detainees structure, stability and
 assistance. The DJI helps juveniles by giving them the necessary education.
Detainees in forensic care are offered treatment and guidance by the DJI.
With foreign nationals who must leave the Netherlands too, the DJI
 ensures that alliance partners are given every scope to prepare for the
 deportation as well as possible.
Integrity and a good cycle for integrity policy are important for the DJI,
not least because the organisation is in transition. The way in which the
DJI is managed is changing, and a DJI Master Plan 1 with a substantial
 challenge to realise cut-backs is in full swing. 
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Integrity at the DJI
The most important principle of the DJI’s integrity policy is the promotion
of a culture in which ethical standards and values can be openly discussed.
The DJI employees must be able to tell each other if something is going
well, but also if something is not going well. 
Work is in progress on the creation of a safe working environment with
and for all employees. In addition, the possibility and opportunity is
 offered to discuss matters and conduct that are important in order to be
able to operate safely. That is a goal that it would be hard to disagree with.
The DJI does not regard integrity as an isolated phenomenon. Integrity is
embedded in ‘security’. But how does the DJI put this into practice?
The DJI uses four key elements here:
• respect
• reliability
• openness
• professionalism
These are four strong values. In an executive organisation, strong values are
extremely important, because they concern human behaviour. Firstly, they
must be identifiable at every level of the organisation, and must be recog-
nised by everyone. At the same time, strong values are a binding factor
which contribute towards operations with integrity in this regard. In that
way, they contribute towards a good organisational culture in which the
employees can rely on each other. This leads to a ‘high reliability organisa-
tion’.2
Respect involves an understanding of your colleagues and detainees, show-
ing involvement and interest and taking account of each other. It involves
treating not only people and their perceptions with due care, but also their
property and their living environment. This also refers, for example, to
how to deal with incidences of violence.  
Reliability is ensuring that colleagues can trust each other, and that they
and the detainees can always count on someone. Detainees and society
 assume that a DJI employee will comply with the current rules, keep to
agreements and ensure that his or her interests do not harm those of the
DJI. ‘Just as you must be able to rely on your colleagues, the DJI relies on
you.’ Breaching that trust not only leads to dangerous situations in the
workplace, but also harms the reputation of the DJI. Observing the rules
reduces the risks that staff will face undesirable or dangerous situations. In
the practical translation, this includes the explanation of which contacts
are not permitted and the fact that absence without leave is forbidden.
Openness is communicating honestly and effectively with colleagues
through expression, discussion, agreement and calling each other to
 account. These principles support the working atmosphere and effective-
ness. Firstly, a person must be able to express themselves. This may relate
to an opinion, questions, doubts, errors or initiatives. Agreements are
reached on matters that have been discussed. These reflect the standards
and values of the DJI. Such agreements can be recorded in team agree-
ments or in individual agreements with the supervisor. On the basis of
agreements, staff can also call each other to account if agreements are not
met. DJI employees keep their word. In day-to-day practice, this means
‘put your cards on the table’. The same applies with regard to reporting in-
formation that is of importance for the DJI. Do not keep that information
to yourself, but share it with your supervisor and your colleagues. Do not
walk around worrying about unasked questions either, but put them to
your direct colleagues, supervisors or the confidential integrity
 counsellor’.
Professionalism is doing the work competently, observing the rules and
helping colleagues to keep to the rules too. Professionalism is using the
 resources made available by the DJI correctly. Treating detainees correctly
also shows professionalism. Training, professional knowledge and insight
play an important role here. The DJI assumes that employees will maintain
a professional distance in contacts with detainees, but will nevertheless be
close to them. Professional conduct is essential in finding the right balance
and in showing respect and being respected by the other person. That
 supports the working environment in the office or penitentiary focus and
thus the atmosphere in the institution. ‘Penitentiary focus’ is a broad term
which combines security, alertness and a sense of responsibility. A practical
example: alcohol and drugs are not permitted at work and employees may
not bring any items with them for detainees.
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The situation in practice
Integrity thus merits our attention. But not solely as a regularly recurring
item on an agenda. There is always a particular context. 
At the DJI, people are detained against their will. These are people who
often exhibit behavioural problems. That makes security a top priority
which requires permanent attention. As I have already argued, integrity is
inseparably connected with security. It is also part of the culture of an or-
ganisation. The DJI is an organisation in which (major) risks can arise, with
enormous personal and political consequences. Comparisons can also be
made with industry, for example, or aviation. It is interesting and instruc-
tive to see how others deal with integrity. To be brief, I refer to an inte-
grated approach in aviation, where security, safety and culture are
addressed as parts of a consistent system (Shorrock et al., 2014).
An organisation in which the above key elements are sufficiently present is
safe and you can rely on each other as colleagues under all circumstances.
Integrity also forms part of the regular appraisal interviews. And finally: a
matter for which repressive instruments must also be present. 
Each year, an internal investigation agency handles around 250 integrity-
related cases. This agency takes on integrity investigations based on a
 report from a supervisor (in legal terms, the ‘competent authority’, which
as a rule is a director of a prison or other DJI institution), or based on a
 report from an employee. Obviously, a report must always be addressed, in
observance of the privacy guidelines. Furthermore, proper execution of re-
pressive integrity policy makes the boundaries drawn by the organisation
clear, but also helps to ensure that employees are more likely to report
cases, because they feel they can count on adequate, fair action being taken,
with due care, in the event of actual incidents. 
The competent authority is required to involve the investigation agency if
the integrity of its organisation or its employees is at issue. In that case, the
agency observes the principles and provisions of Dutch administrative law.
In order to obtain an insight into a concrete suspicion of a breach of in-
tegrity, the agency opens and investigation. If it is revealed during or after
an investigation that a criminal offence may have occurred, a criminal in-
vestigation may be necessary. By agreement with the competent authority,
the agency may submit the facts to the Public Prosecution Service. If this
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leads to a criminal investigation, this will be carried out by or on behalf of
the competent authority. An important element in the approach to an in-
vestigation is the obligation to rehabilitate employees who were improp-
erly the subject of an investigation of which, despite all the safeguards,
third parties (often close colleagues) become aware. This takes place by
agreement with the employee concerned, but is always a task that the
 management must address in a personal manner and with integrity. 
The investigation agency of the DJI has eleven qualified investigators and
a small executive staff. The agency is independent and answers directly to
the management of the DJI. All reports and their settlement are reported
to the management of the DJI. A review is also presented each year to the
Ministry of Security and Justice and, for the Government-Wide Annual
 Review of Operations, to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
 Relations. Part of this report on 2014 is presented below. Records of staff
members guilty of confirmed dereliction of duty are kept in a database.
These records are kept for up to five years after the termination of the
 employment. The database is checked as part of the screening of applicants
for jobs at the DJI. The investigation data in the database are confidential
and are used for (anonymised) trend reports according to the nature and
scale of the breaches of integrity. 
Most breaches (in both absolute and relative terms) take place among em-
ployees who work directly with detainees. They are our ‘front-line’ workers
and are therefore very frequently put to the test. That sometimes leads to
undesirable conduct. Swearing at detainees, writing about detainees on
 social media and fights are a number of more frequently occurring expres-
sions that can lead to integrity investigations.  
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Breaches of Integrity, number of cases 2014
Types of (suspected) breaches reports/ total 
suspicions confirmed
involvement with (suspected): 
• financial breaches 14 5
• abuse of position and conflicts of interest 0 0
• leaks and misuse of information 8 1
• abuse of powers 4 3
• abuse of powers of force 5 2
• forms of undesirable treatment 13 4
• misconduct in a private capacity 35 16
• improper use of agency resources/breaches of internal rules 186 91
• misconduct according to the whistleblower scheme 0 0
Total number of types of breach 265 122
Source: DJI, Security & Integrity Office
The DJI has its own training institution. Every employee who comes 
into contact or may do so on a professional basis receives a basic training
course. That course encompasses attention to integrity. A number of fol-
low-up courses are also offered.3 More important, however, is that a super-
visor devotes attention to this on the formal appointment as a civil servant.
As a rule, this takes place by enclosing the DJI code of conduct with the
 papers for the appointment. This could be done differently and better.
Subjects relating to integrity are now explicitly raised on the occasion
when DJI employees take the oath. The subject of integrity is also on the
agenda in the training for managers. The DJI is aware of the important role
that managers play in setting an example for employees, in which active
communication of the importance of acting with integrity may not be
 forgotten, but also in dealing with potential breaches of integrity with due
care and in a balanced manner.
The DJI has two central confidential integrity counsellors. Employees who
do not feel secure enough to report situations concerning integrity or un-
desirable behaviour (also an aspect of integrity) to a confidential integrity
counsellor within their own institution can contact one of these counsel-
lors. The Ministry of Security and Justice also has an external confidential
integrity counsellor and a central integrity coordinator. Employees who
are not willing or able to report (suspicions of) breaches of integrity within
their own service unit can contact the external confidential integrity coun-
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sellor for this. As the name suggests, the external confidential integrity
counsellor is not an officer of the ministry. In conclusion: the DJI has
 created an ‘Integrity & Society Knowledge Network’. In addition to a
 number of DJI employees from across the organisation, this knowledge
network consists of people from the academic world (universities) and
 organisations affiliated to the DJI (such as the Dutch National Integrity
 Office (BIOS), the Police Force and the Ministry of Defence).
Next steps?
This article has described how integrity is integrated with and fits into the
operations of the Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI). Specific attention is
already devoted to the subject of integrity. Efforts are made here not to
draw attention to integrity in isolation. For example, ‘integrity’ is one of
the elements of the regular appraisal interviews between supervisors and
employees. The most senior level of the DJI is also required to discuss this
with the various management tiers. Discussion of management dilemmas
cannot yet be regarded as self-evident. But the DJI is gradually making
progress. 
The Netherlands Court of Audit conducted surveys of the status of the
 integrity policy at the DJI in 2013 and 2014 (The Netherlands Court of
Audit, 2014). The Court of Audit took an approving view of some matters,
while a number of other points required improvement. It was recom-
mended, for example, that an umbrella policy be formulated via a single
integrity coordinator. Firstly, this coordinator will gather all information,
so that it will be possible to draw on a single source. Secondly, policy initia-
tives can be proposed on the basis of analyses to be conducted by this coor-
dinator. And thirdly, by appointing a single integrity coordinator, an
internal supervisory role will be given shape in order to keep attention
 focused on integrity. Furthermore, an annual report will be drawn up. 
The DJI has now appointed this coordinator and the first results will be
presented to the management team top-level in 2015. This significantly
increases the opportunities to learn with and from each other.
A second point for improvement raised by the Netherlands Court of Audit
was that attention seems to focus more strongly within the DJI on the
‘hard’ side of the integrity policy than on the ‘soft’ side of integrity, while
the ‘soft’ side is an important factor for the support of the ‘hard’ side.
 Because monitoring and accounting for the integrity policy to the manage-
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ment was primarily confined to the number of reports of breaches of
 integrity, it was questionable whether preventive aspects and the concept
of professional ethics4 received enough attention. A point for attention
here is that there appears to be little demand from the work floor for the
integrity courses that the DJI’s own training institution offers. Profes-
sional ethics and prevention merit more attention. Although the DJI does
devote attention in the regular employee satisfaction surveys to aspects in
the organisational culture relating to integrity (such as ethically aware
conduct) and to preventing forms of undesirable behaviour, no research
has been conducted at the DJI into the aspects mentioned above. The sur-
vey of the Netherlands Court of Audit emphasised the importance of a full
policy cycle for integrity policy.5 Evaluation surveys of the operation of the
policy will assist the DJI in this.6 Such a survey focusing specifically on the
DJI is a good way to determine the effects of the integrity policy and, in
this way, to develop the integrity policy further. The DJI made a start on
this in 2015.
The world around the DJI is changing and the DJI will have to change with
it. That, too, calls for a flexibility, not only in terms of capacity, but also in
terms of the attitude of the staff. Staff with integrity are competent to
 perform their tasks and comply with the agreed rules. It is interesting to
consider how organisational and technological developments affect people
and the performance of their jobs. For example, the shrinking organisa-
tion makes it increasingly necessary for employees to use the available time
to best effect and to make still more use of technology and the knowledge
and skills of close colleagues. Technological developments such as Google
Glass and drones throw a new light on current forms of work. Increasingly
compact appliances (telephones, cameras and the aforementioned drones)
imply changes in the field of security and security awareness. For example,
are the present education and training and thereby, the experience re-
quirements that the DJI sets for the staff then still adequate? This question
is being formulated as I write, and must become a point for attention in
the staff development agenda of the DJI. 
Conclusion
The DJI faces major challenges. A shrinking organisation, a rising number
of detainees with behavioural disorders and rapid technological changes
that have an impact on the detention climate. These developments have
their effects on the staff of the DJI and consequently, on the integrity of the
DJI. This is precisely the time when we must ensure that we remain alert to
developments within and outside the DJI. I have illustrated in this article
that these developments receive close attention, so that in the future too,
the DJI can operate as an organisation with integrity.
Notes
1 The Master Plan concerns the realisation of the cabinet’s target of cutting H 271
 million from a budget of H 2.1 billion (letter of 19 June 2013 to the House of
 Representatives from the State Secretary of Security and Justice), which will involve
the closure of a large number of institutions and will mean that many employees
will have to look for a new job.
2 Just compare the DJI with the police force! See: De Bruine, Noordhoek & Tjon Pam
Tau, 2011. 
3 Dilemma training (for employees who may have to deal with integrity issues);
 professional integrity: dealing with occupational risks (for all DJI employees);
 integrity management (training for directors and managers of institutions on 
giving shape to the integrity policy and the ethical learning process within their
 institution); basic training local confidential integrity counsellor; refresher training
local confidential integrity counsellor.
4 Professional ethics: every decision or action is morally correct if it does justice to the
other; if the rights and interests of all concerned are sufficiently taken into account.
5 To be divided into general (overall framework), preventive (contributing to
 prevention of breaches; culture; creating conditions for safely drawing attention to
breaches) and repressive (setting boundaries; adequate and fair action with due care)
integrity policy.
6 Such forms of research have already been conducted before for the public sector as a
whole, usually commissioned by BIOS and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations. An example of such research is the study entitled Een luisterend oor,
 onderzoek naar het interne meldsysteem integriteit binnen de Nederlandse overheid 
(A listening ear: survey of the internal integrity reporting system within the Dutch
government), conducted by the Quality of Governance research group of the Public
Administration department of the VU University of Amsterdam.
Literature
Bruine, H. de, Noordhoek, P., & Tjon Pam Tau, J. (2011). Hoog betrouwbaar organiseren
(Highly reliable organisation). Sigma nr. 1, February 2011.
Netherlands Court of Audit (March 2014). Report: Integriteit bij de Dienst Justitiële
 Inrichtingen (Integrity in the Custodial Institutions Agency).
Shorrock, S. et al. (August 2014). Systems thinking for safety. Eurocontrol.
144 integrity management behind bars
integrity management in the public sector • the dutch approach 145
Integrity incorporated in strategy and 
daily processes  The Netherlands Tax and 
Customs  Administration 
Hans Visser, chairman, Integrity Knowledge Group, Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration
About the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration
Every country needs money to be able to function: for education, security,
infrastructure, health care et cetera. As part of the Dutch Ministry of
 Finance, the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA) is
 responsible for collecting taxes and social insurance premiums. The Tax
and Customs Administration1 also pays out benefits, monitors imports,
 exports and transit of goods and protects society against fraud and the
risks of goods, such as (counterfeit) medicines and drugs. 
Over 10 million Dutch residents regularly have dealings with the Tax and
Customs Administration. The aim of the NTCA is to collect as much of the
due taxes as it can, efficiently and fairly. The focus here is on maintaining
and strengthening the willingness of citizens and companies to comply
with their statutory obligations. With modern communications, up-to-
date information and smart linking of existing systems, the NTCA wants
to give them the treatment that they deserve: equal, fast, unbiased and
 respectful. Deliberate failure to comply with rules will result in firm
 action. 
Europe is changing, the Netherlands is changing and the Tax and Customs
Administration is changing. In order to respond to the demands of
 modern society, how the NTCA works will also be changing in the coming
years. In preparation, the State Secretary for Finance sent a Tax and Cus-
toms Administration Investment Agenda to Parliament in mid-2015. This
focuses on modern communications with citizens and companies (digital
where possible and personal where essential) and smart use of data for better
monitoring. The new approach will generate higher tax revenues for a
structural reduction in the costs. 
11
To perform these tasks, the NTCA has varied and professional staff (SAP
BI-Center Tax and Customs Administration, 30 June 2015). In mid-2015, it
had 29,688 employees: 34 percent women and 66 percent men. The aver-
age age of the staff is 50.9. The average number of years of service is 25.9. 
Integrity is the basis for the performance of the Tax and Customs Administration
The Tax and Customs Administration operates at the heart of society.
Everyone has business with the NTCA at some point. Everything the
 administration does (or fails to do) is observed with a critical eye. We have
an open society in which transparency is becoming a key feature. How
 citizens and businesses view the NTCA largely determines their willing-
ness to comply with the (fiscal) obligations. Any incidents which cast doubt
on the integrity of the NTCA and/or its employees can negatively affect
that willingness. This is why an integrity policy and its management are 
so important and must be continually addressed. 
Citizens and companies must have trust in the Tax and Customs Adminis-
tration. To achieve this, the integrity of the service must be raised above
any form of doubt. The main requirements set the NTCA for the conduct
of its own employees are consistent with the three basic values of credibil-
ity, responsibility and carefulness. 
The basic values and the code of conduct
Discussions about integrity conducted within the organisation often con-
cern what is and what is not permissible. A standard that offers support is
always sought here. All civil servants must conduct themselves as befits a
good civil servant. But what is good and what is fitting?2 The Tax and Cus-
toms Administration has developed the answer to this question in terms 
of three basic values: credibility, responsibility and carefulness. The values
are described and explained in the code of conduct and provide a guide for
the actions of the NTCA. The code of conduct makes clear what the NTCA
stands for.3 The values are developed in practical examples. These are in-
tended to give people pause for thought and to encourage discussions. The
code of conduct does not provide a ready-made answer to every question.
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Credibility
The Tax and Customs Administration takes its mandate seriously. Agree-
ments are met, not only with people outside the NTCA, but also between
colleagues. Credibility calls for exemplary behaviour, independence and
avoidance of (any appearance of) conflicts of interest. 
Responsibility
The Tax and Customs Administration and its employees deal responsibly
with the powers assigned to them and are willing to account for their
 actions. They say what they do and do what they say. Employees also call
each other to account. They let it be known if they do not understand each
other’s behaviour or decisions. They are reliable, accessible and trans -
parent.
Carefulness
The Tax and Customs Administration and its employees treat everyone
with respect and take expectations, rights and interests into account. This
does not mean that they always have to please everyone, but it does mean
that the different interests are carefully considered in each case in order to
reach a good decision.
Integrity: in discussion
Rules, codes and agreements are important and essential. Nevertheless,
 integrity does not only concern the correct application of codes and rules.
Acting with integrity says everything about how people think, which
choices they make and what their own views and values are. The NTCA
considers it particularly important to conduct discussions on this. It is no
longer a question of what is right or wrong, but far more one of ‘what
should be done in this situation’ and ‘why?’.
The employees of the Tax and Customs Administration regularly face dif-
ficult choices and dilemmas which do not always have ready-made answers
and solutions. For them, integrity means continually testing their own
standards in terms of those of the NTCA: what does the NTCA stand for
and what does this demand of me? A safe environment in which employees
can openly and respectfully share their views is important. These discus-
sions strengthen awareness which then becomes visible in the day-to-day
behaviour.
The Tax and Customs Administration is an inclusive organisation. Differ-
ences in origin, gender, sexuality et cetera are valued. Everyone is unique
and welcome. Optimal use is made of a diversity of talents. Inclusiveness is
all about treating each other in a careful, credible and responsible way.
This makes mutual respect for individual characteristics the norm.
Who does what?
The employees of the Tax and Customs Administration are in a unique
 position to demonstrate what the NTCA stands for. ‘Integrity is for all of
us.’ Everyone bears their own responsibility for this. Integrity is a part of
everyone’s professional actions. This awareness is present and is growing
within the service.
Within the Tax and Customs Administration, specific responsibilities have
been assigned for the development, application and monitoring of the
 integrity policy. The officers responsible work together as an internal
 integrity network and complement each other.
Tax and Customs Administration Administrative Body
In the Tax and Customs Administration Administrative Body (with the
Dutch acronym BOBD), service-wide matters are discussed at senior level
on a monthly basis. As part of the organisational policy, integrity policy is
regularly on the agenda for these meetings. Each year, policy choices are
made within the BOBD and the results are published (see paragraph 6.3).
Every two years, the BOBD conducts an internal survey of the effectiveness
of the policy and its application (see paragraph 6.7). One of the members of
the BOBD has integrity as a field of policy in his portfolio and is account-
able for this theme within the BOBD. It is important that this administra-
tive body takes responsibility for and conveys integrity. Attention from
senior management is essential!
Directors and team leaders
Directors and team leaders manage the daily operations within their own
business units and this includes integrity issues. Focus on integrity is
therefore part of every manager’s day-to-day work. They have a duty to set
an example in this regard. The theme of integrity is regularly addressed in
management meetings, work meetings and appraisal interviews. 
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Integrity coordinators
Within each business unit, an integrity coordinator has been appointed to
act as the primary advisor for the director and team leaders in that unit.
The integrity coordinator advises and supports the implementation of the
integrity policy. He or she is familiar with the business unit and can there-
fore identify local needs and requirements, such as the adjustment of pro-
cedures, necessary training and the required explanations. The integrity
coordinator serves as the link between the Integrity Knowledge Group and
his or her business unit.
Integrity Knowledge Group
The Integrity Knowledge Group consists of ten employees with a national
task in the field of integrity. This concerns the task fields of policy, labour
law tasks, communications, education/training, research, compliance offi-
cer and national confidential integrity counsellor. The Integrity Knowl-
edge Group advises the Tax and Customs Administration Administrative
Body on policy choices. The Integrity Knowledge Group also represents
the NTCA in interdepartmental meetings on integrity, including the Inter-
departmental Integrity Management Platform (IPIM) and the group of
 departmental integrity coordinators. 
The members of the Integrity Knowledge Group work closely with the in-
tegrity coordinators. Policy and implementation are thus carefully coordi-
nated. Supporting products are produced together. Advice for the Tax and
Customs Administration Administrative Body is discussed with the
 integrity coordinators in advance. Within this alliance, there is scope for
intervision and professionalisation.
Confidential integrity counsellors
If an employee faces a dilemma and is unable or unwilling to discuss this
with a colleague or manager, he or she can talk to a confidential integrity
counsellor. Each business unit has at least one confidential integrity coun-
sellorwho provides advice and help employees deal with dilemmas.
Group Works Council
The chairman of the Integrity Knowledge Group has regular informal
talks with representatives from the Group Works Council (COR). The COR
members are involved in making plans and products. This involvement
promotes the quality of the products and the speed of the process. The
talks are open, respecting everyone’s responsibilities. On request, the
chairman of the Integrity Knowledge Group is invited to provide an
 explanation or presentation during a plenary meeting of the COR.
The integrity policy
The responsibility of each individual employee is central to the integrity
policy of the Tax and Customs Administration. It acts as a mirror, as it
were, in which everyone can check their own conduct. 
Responsibility to taxpayers and other external parties
The Tax and Customs Administration wants employees to treat citizens
and entrepreneurs with due care, professionally and with respect. A neu-
tral and independent attitude is also required. This means that employees
are polite, listen carefully and remain calm. 
• The NTCA requires extreme caution with regard to the acceptance of
gifts and services. Accepting gifts can create the impression that em-
ployees are allowing themselves to be influenced. Employees may only
accept gifts with a maximum value of P 50;
• If an employee does business with an external party and has a personal
relationship with them, this could create the appearance of a conflict of
interest. In such cases, the employee must contact his or her manager in
advance; 
• Trading in securities with insider knowledge is a criminal offence.
Even more stringent rules apply to the employees of the NTCA, because
it possesses a great deal of price-sensitive information. Positions
 associated with such risks are identified. The employees concerned are
designated as insiders and are subject to the Tax and Customs Adminis-
tration Insider Trading Regulations;
• Employees of the NTCA have access to confidential and personal data.
This information may never be used for their own benefit. In fact, 
such information may only be used for the purpose for which it was
 obtained. The Tax and Customs Administration attaches considerable
importance to its employees’ duty of confidentiality. This duty remains
in effect when  employees leave the NTCA. 
Responsibility to the employee’s own organisation
Employees have a responsibility to their own organisation. This also
means that they must treat the business assets and reputation of the Tax
and Customs Administration with carefulness.
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• Employees may perform ancillary activities in their free time. They are
not entirely free in their choice of which activities may be performed.
For  example, ancillary activities are not permitted if they could lead to
(the  appearance of) a conflict of interest or damage the reputation of
the Tax and Customs Administration;
• Employees are expected to treat business assets (laptops, telephones,
iPads et cetera) with due care;
• The Tax and Customs Administration supports the use of social media.
However, texts, photos et cetera may not harm the reputation of the
NTCA or embarrass it. Sensitive information on the NTCA, taxpayers
and alliance partners may never be shared on social media.
Mutual responsibility
How employees treat each other is important, as this partly determines the
working atmosphere and the effectiveness of the Tax and Customs Admin-
istration.
• The Tax and Customs Administration is an inclusive organisation.
Everyone is unique. This includes differences in origin, faith, political
preferences, gender, sexuality, et cetera. These differences may never
lead to preferential treatment, disadvantaging or ignoring employees
or to bullying;
• Colleagues support each other with difficult assignments and show an
interest in each other;
• Employees and managers are aware of the effect of their own behaviour
on their colleagues. Example is better than precept.
• Employees are open to questions and feedback. They make clear
 agreements and call each other to account if necessary.
Violation of integrity
Like other organisations and companies, the Tax and Customs Administra-
tion, as a large government organisation, faces breaches of integrity. These
may include improper use of business assets, undesirable conduct or non-
compliance with internal rules. The most common breaches at the Tax and
Customs Administration are listed below.
Review of the most common breaches:
1 Misconduct in private life (including undesirable contacts, abuse of
drugs and alcohol, garnishment of wages, failure to comply with fiscal
obligations); 
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2 Improper use of business assets and/or breaking internal rules
 (including with regard to sick leave and time registration);
3 Financial violations (theft and fraud);
4 Abuse of position and conflict of interests (ancillary activities, bribery,
gifts);
5 Undesirable conduct;
6 Leaking/misuse of information (violations of the duty of
 confidentiality, viewing files for private purposes).
There are also breaches of integrity that the Tax and Customs
 Administration may face as a specific organisation. 
Dealing with confidential information
In connection with its specific tasks, the Tax and Customs Administration
has access to a great deal of confidential information relating to citizens
and companies. They must be able to rely on their information being
 secure with the NTCA. For that reason, stringent action is taken within the
NTCA if employees use or view confidential information for purposes that
are not relevant to the work of the Tax and Customs Administration.
Compliance with fiscal obligations
With a view to the reputation and credibility of the service, the Tax and
Customs Administration requires its own employees to strictly comply
with their own fiscal obligations. This means, for example, that employees
must file their tax returns in the correct manner. Failure to do so is
 regarded as a breach of integrity.
Integrity permanently on the agenda
The theme of ‘integrity’ is more current than ever. Public expectations of
politicians, administrators, the government and thus the Tax and Customs
Administration have risen. Social media have made the world around us
far more transparent. Conduct lacking in integrity (both at work and in
private situations) is no longer accepted from anyone. One only has to open
a newspaper to see this. The NTCA is also openly monitored and assessed
by the outside world. This fact necessitates continual attention to the
theme of ‘integrity’. This does not take place automatically. 
How does the Tax and Customs Administration embed and secure
 integrity within its operating policy and how can integrity be kept high on
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the agenda? The NTCA has learned the following lessons through practical
experience.
Ensure that policy, regulations and procedures are well organised
Policy, rules, codes and procedures establish the frameworks for acting
with integrity. They apply to everyone: no one is exempt. They are the basis
and the compass for day-to-day actions. The Tax and Customs Administra-
tion has built up a meticulous system. Rules and procedures are included
in the code of conduct, brochures and on the NTCA website. Every year, the
rules and procedures are assessed and if necessary, adapted to meet new
 requirements, new agreements and developments.
Assign responsibilities and identify the resulting tasks, then connect these within an 
internal integrity network
The responsibilities and tasks of the Tax and Customs Administration
 Administrative Body, directors and team leaders, the integrity coordina-
tors, the Integrity Knowledge Group, confidential integrity counsellors
and the Group Works Council are listed in paragraph 3. 
Every year, create focus and show what has been achieved
Every year, the Integrity Knowledge Group and the integrity coordinators
jointly draw up an annual plan. Taking account of the changing society
and developments within the NTCA, appropriate actions are established
for the planning period. The plan is adopted by the Tax and Customs Ad-
ministration Administrative Body (BOBD) and discussed with the Group
Works Council (COR). The plan is then published via our digital news -
paper (Beeldkrant). Every manager and every employee can read the plan. 
At the end of each year, the Integrity Knowledge Group draws up an an-
nual report to which each business unit contributes. After being presented
to the BOBD and COR, this report is also published via the digital news -
paper. Anyone can read the report.
Contents of annual plan and annual report:
• the necessary adjustments to rules and procedures;
• the joint activities of the integrity network;
• the activities in the field of training, education and communication;
• the way in which the integrity policy is monitored;
• the way in which the integrity policy is enforced.
Make the theme recognisable: connect integrity to the work
We regularly hear from managers and employees: ‘We find it difficult to
talk about integrity. What should we discuss?’ The policy plan of the Tax
and Customs Administration was recently screened with regard to the
 application of the basic values. It was established that the plans of the
NTCA can only be implemented with careful, responsible and credible
 employees. 
On that basis, we encourage managers and employees to discuss how they
can make the basic values (even more clearly) visible in their work:
• Via internal contacts: how they treat each other as colleagues;
• Do we always not only say what we do, but also do what we say? Do we
help each other and share knowledge? Are we honest and open and do
we call each other to account?
• Via external contacts: how they treat private citizens, companies and
 alliance partners;
• Do we treat powers awarded with care? Do we fulfil agreements
reached? Does every citizen and entrepreneur receive equal, unbiased
and respectful treatment?
• In the design and implementation of processes: how they organise and
perform the work. Are our processes consistent with public require-
ments and modern expectations? Are the risks defined within the work
processes and sufficiently covered? Have we built in control points at
the right places in our processes and do we conduct correct and timely
checks at these points?
• In steering: how the work and the employees are steered;
• As managers, do we deal with agreements reached with our employees
with due care? As managers, do we set an example and are we credible
to our employees, and what form does this take?
Communicate clearly and provide explanations
Policy, rules, procedures and their application require explanations: not
just once, but on a regular basis. The NTCA has an extensive intranet site
for this purpose and various brochures have been produced:
• A Tax and Customs Administration with integrity: our basic values and
code of conduct;
• Tax and Customs Administration Integrity Investigations Protocol;
• Communication in the case of breaches of integrity;
• Dealing with breaches of integrity.
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A publication regularly appears via the digital NTCA newspaper. These
publications always relate to topics of current interest. Every two years, an
Integrity Day is organised, at which a representative selection of the staff
(more than 200 participants) meets and discusses various integrity themes.
Forum discussions are also organised, for example on the theme of ‘exem-
plary management behaviour’. 
Make integrity a fixed value in training and education courses
Within the Tax and Customs Administration, integrity is a fixed value in
the available training and education courses for both new employees and
professionals with a long service record. Besides knowledge of integrity,
the main focus of every course is how to deal with moral dilemmas. The
training material can be applied digitally and flexibly. A digital library is
available with theoretical material, practical exercises, films, presentations
et cetera. 
Every new employee is required to follow the integrity module as part of
the induction programme. Human Resource Management (HRM) employ-
ees can follow a specific HRM module. Managers receive courses and mod-
ules tailored to the target group (including moral opinion-forming). 
The digital integrity programme ‘Response and Insight’ is widely used.
Participants are shown films covering familiar working situations. In each
situation, four different types of response are shown. The participant is
 required to choose the most effective response. The personal score is then
compared with the score of a reference group. The programme can be
 followed individually and as part of a team. The programme supports
 discussions on integrity and is aimed at increasing awareness.
Regularly monitor the application and effect of the policy
The Tax and Customs Administration regularly asks itself: Are we doing
the right things and are we doing them right? Are we on track? Are adjust-
ments needed? Every two years, the NTCA organises an integrity monitor
among a representative group of employees. Questions are asked on the
following aspects: cooperation, fair treatment, honest attitude towards
work, exemplary management, integrity policy, rules and procedures. 
The outcome is presented within the Tax and Customs Administration
 Administrative Body and the Group Works Council. Each business unit
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then produces its own improvement plan. The plans are coordinated at an
intervision meeting with the integrity coordinators.
Results of integrity monitor 2015:
• The Tax and Customs Administration is an organisation with integrity;
slight progress in relation to 2013 is visible;
• Cooperation is good and solid within all business units;
• Employees perceive better moral awareness and compliance with rules;
• The conduct of managers in setting an example could be improved;
• Employees are more familiar with ‘what’ (rules) and less familiar with
‘how’ (procedures).
Enforce agreed rules and procedures
Besides formulating policy, regulations and procedures, enforcing them 
is also important. The Tax and Customs Administration has developed a
uniform registration system in which (alleged) breaches of integrity are
recorded, along with the related reports, processes and decisions. An  
up-to-date review of reports and the current status of each case are
 available at any time.
The NTCA has chosen to describe all aspects that could be raised in an in-
tegrity investigation in a document: the Tax and Customs Administration
Integrity Investigations Protocol. This protocol improves the clarity and
due care in the conduct of an investigation. This is in the interest of the
NTCA and of the employee concerned. The protocol promotes equal treat-
ment of cases of this kind. 
Reflection
The Tax and Customs Administration has given high priority to integrity
for many years. Much has already been developed and published and there
has been training and education on this subject. Nevertheless, we are not
there yet. Public and political requirements remain subject to change. The
design and organisation of the work continually requires adjustment. This
all has a direct impact on the integrity policy to be pursued. One thing is
certain: integrity will continue to demand our attention. Our work is never
done!
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What is going well?
• There is structural attention to integrity within the Tax and Customs
Administration Administrative Body;
• The operations of the Integrity Knowledge Group, the performance of
the integrity coordinators and the joining of the two groups in an
 enthusiastic and effective alliance;
• Annual update of the integrity policy;
• Every year, we draw up an annual plan and annual report: focus on
planning and implementation;
• Linking the work with integrity and vice versa: integrity is part of the
business! 
• Application of the insider trading regulations: implementation and
 supervision of compliance with the regulations;
• Integrity as a fixed value within the induction programme for new
 employees;
• Composition of various brochures and publications;
• The organisation of integrity days;
• Regular monitoring of the integrity policy and its perceptions and
 application by employees;
• Mandatory use of the uniform registration system in the event of
 (suspected) breaches of integrity;
• Mandatory use of a uniform working method/protocol for
 investigations into (suspected) breaches of integrity. 
What can be improved?
• Integrity is everyone’s responsibility. This discussion can be deepened
further. What does this responsibility involve and how does that affect
me? Thinking and talking about this together and learning from each
other;
• Integrity is not yet a standard subject during management and team
meetings or in appraisal interviews;
• The content of the integrity policy is not always quickly available;
• The procedures to be followed are not always clear;
• Communication in cases of breaches of integrity could be improved;
• The quality of the performance of integrity investigations could be
 improved;
• Managers have low scores for their role in setting an example;
• More attention to risk analyses.
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Ambitions for the coming years
• Show even more clearly how we can deal with dilemmas in a positive
and simple manner;
• Work on the role of management in setting an example;
• Integrating integrity into the management and meeting cycle;
• Continue to promote a conscious and professional approach to work;
• Develop an even more accessible code of conduct for all employees and
managers, highlighting integrity;
• Study the existing and further professionalisation of employees
 involved in integrity investigations;
• Study effective ways to deploy integrity investigators;
• Structural performance of risk analyses;
• More and more effective cooperation within Central Government.
Notes
1 The Tax and Customs Administration has eleven business units. Customs and the
Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD) are part of the NTCA, as business
units.  
2 The literal translation of ‘fitting’ is ‘proper, appropriate, becoming, decent, civilized’.
3 The brochure Een integere Belastingdienst (A Tax and Customs Administration with
integrity) can be downloaded via www.werken.belastingdienst.nl/
arbeidsvoorwaarden.
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The Province of Limburg
The integrity network works 
Rick Duiveman, senior integrity policy advisor, Limburg Provincial Authority
Introduction
Administration with integrity
Integrity is an intrinsic part of good public administration. The govern-
ment’s monopoly position, coupled with the fact that it spends public
funds, means that a high degree of integrity is demanded of the adminis-
tration. Public trust in the government and its civil servants depends
largely on the ethical status of public administration and the ways in
which it is manifested. In the province of Limburg, that awareness is
strongly represented. Promotion of the integrity of public administration
in this province is a joint effort of the municipal authorities, the water au-
thorities and the provincial authority. Limburg puts effort into integrity.
This article outlines the alliance formed within Limburg in the field of
promotion of official (concerning civil servants) and political-administra-
tive (appointed and elected office holders) integrity; ‘the Limburg
method.’
Public administration 
Dutch public administration consists of central government, the provin-
cial authorities, the municipal authorities and the water authorities, with
each of these tiers of government having its own duties. The provincial au-
thority is an administrative tier lying between central government and the
municipal and water authorities. The provincial authority has a supervi-
sory role in relation to the municipal and water authorities. ‘Province’
refers both to a tier of government and to a geographical region of the
Netherlands. The key tasks of the provincial authority lie in the fields of
spatial development, the environment, energy and climate, public trans-
port, the economy, culture and the quality of public administration.
Limburg is one of the twelve Dutch provinces, lying in the southernmost
part of the Netherlands, between Germany, Wallonia and Flanders. Lim-
burg has a population of 1.2 million. The public administration consists of
the provincial authority, 33 municipal authorities and two water authori-
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ties. The Limburg Provincial Parliament is the highest legislative body in
Limburg, while the day-to-day management is in the hands of the Provin-
cial Executive, with the King’s commissioner chairing both administrative
bodies. According to an old tradition, in Limburg the commissioner is
known as the governor. 
The provincial objective for the coming four years is best summarised 
by the name of the coalition accord recently drawn up: ‘In action for a
 prosperous and socially committed Limburg’. The provincial authority
employs 750 civil servants.
Joint integrity policy
Following a recent legal amendment, the King’s commissioners are
 responsible for providing for integrity promotion at the provincial level.
The mayors and chairmen of the water authorities have the same responsi-
bility in relation to their organisations. In laying down the duty of care for
integrity in law, the legislators aimed to eliminate the vulnerabilities
 relating to the position of these administrators in this field and to support
them in the unrestricted enforcement of administrative integrity within
their own organisations. On the basis of this joint responsibility, the may-
ors, the chairmen and the King’s commissioner decided in 2012 to work
 intensively together in the field of integrity, on a voluntary basis. 
In the southern part of the province, officials from the different authori-
ties had already been working together in the field of integrity since 2006.
In order to be able to advance the development of the integrity policy and
to broaden this to the political-administrative environment, this alliance
was upscaled in 2012 to the level of the entire province. Because the
 administrators took the initiative for this jointly, on the basis of the
 responsibility relating to their duty of care, it became clear to stakeholders
that in Limburg considerable value is attached to ethical administration.
The members share the view that the theme of integrity merits permanent
attention. 
Limburg has several alliances for different dossiers. Over the years, the
larger municipal authorities have adopted the role of core municipal au-
thorities, with both large and smaller municipal authorities experiencing
the importance and power of administrative collaboration. The resistance
to alliances that apparently exists in other provinces is considerably
160 the province of limburg
smaller in Limburg, due to predominantly positive past experiences. In
that light, the willingness to enter into far-reaching collaboration in the
field of integrity can be explained. 
Collaboration Objectives 
The objective of the alliance is to develop the integrity maturity of public
administration in Limburg. Every public administration in the Nether-
lands, including those in Limburg, has a duty to develop its domestic in-
tegrity policy and to set its own priorities. As a result of this policy,
enormous diversity in the development of domestic integrity policies has
arisen. Not every administration attached the same importance to the de-
velopment and implementation of a balanced integrity policy and some
municipal authorities all but lost interest in the theme of integrity.
 Con sequently, the development of integrity policy remained primarily
 incident-driven across the board.
In Limburg too, the development of a uniform vision of integrity has only
partly been realised. Not every administrative body proved able to deploy
resources, experience and expertise in order to develop and implement a
high quality integrity policy on its own. By addressing policy development
together and linking the parties that are trailing to the leaders, strong
 professionalisation is now taking place in all the organisations working
 together in this domain, with relatively little effort. 
Due to some incidents in the past, Limburg suffers an image problem con-
cerning integrity. The members of the public administration in Limburg
accept that little or no influence can be exerted on shifting perceptions.
The decision to work together intensively in the field of integrity was
therefore based on the need for professionalization of policy-making and
to address the administrative duty of care. Furthermore, the fact that in-
tensification of policy could be coupled with an increase in the number of
reports and further to this, increased national attention to incidents in
Limburg, was accepted without reserve. The envisaged secondary effects of
the alliance therefore lie in the field of sharing knowledge, experience and
expertise and the joint application of the instruments developed. The
 alliance offers the possibility to learn from each other at all levels and to
consequently develop a common vision of integrity. 
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Improving the quality of the integrity policy, increasing efficiency, the
 development and application of best practices and creating the ability to
address the theme of integrity on a permanent basis are also objectives of
the alliance. 
The integrity structure in Limburg
Embedding of collaboration 
In order to be able to embed the alliance in the affiliated organisations, a
form was sought in which the development of the joint integrity policy
could take place. This led to the creation of the Limburg integrity struc-
ture. The structure consists of a steering committee, a working group, an
official counsellor (for civil servants), an administrative counsellor and
 integrity officers. The organisations participate in the structure on a
 voluntary basis. The administrative bodies have consented fully to joining
the alliance structure. The structure has an informal character and the
members are equal; there is no hierarchy. That enables a fast and effective
collaboration
The steering committee 
The steering committee heads the alliance. The steering committee con-
sists of four mayors, the chairman of a water authority and the governor,
who also serves as chairman of the steering committee. The committee
meets as often as is considered necessary, but at least twice a year. 
The tasks of the steering committee are:
• To promote administrative collaboration in integrity policy;
• To develop a long-term vision;
• To focus continual attention on integrity risks in public
 administration;
• To stimulate new developments;
• To create support in the members’ own organisations;
• To assign tasks to the working group and confidential integrity
 counsellors;
• To monitor product quality criteria;
• To act as a sparring partner and sounding board for administrators.
The steering committee discusses proposed or developed policy with the
mayors and chairmen of the water authorities each year. This meeting also
serves as input for future policy development or for the adjustment of
 existing policy. 
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The working group 
The working group supports the steering committee. The working group
also has the objective of supporting administrators and organisations in
the field of integrity, either with expertise or with the development of con-
crete instruments in the field of integrity. The working group meets once a
month. The chairman is also an advisor of the steering committee and in
that capacity, serves as a linking pin within the structure. The working
group is broadly-based, consisting of civil servants of the member organi-
sations. Various disciplines and competencies are represented (by choice),
such as legal, financial, management, registrar, human resources manage-
ment and executives. The broadly-based composition ensures that the
theme of integrity can be addressed from the most varied range of angles,
viewpoints and experiences. This approach promotes the expertise of the
working group and improves the quality of the output.
The tasks of the working group are:
• To perform tasks for the steering committee;
• To support the steering committee;
• To develop integrity instruments;
• To support and advise public administration within the integrity
 domain;
• To create support in the members’ own organisations; 
• To act as a sparring partner and sounding board for official
 organisations;
• To keep attention to integrity alive;
• To develop expertise and make this available. 
In order to increase the support base for the joint integrity policy and pro-
mote the use of the instruments, the working group organises meetings
with the stakeholders in the official (civil service) and political-administra-
tive environment, where the policy proposals or the instruments devel-
oped are presented and discussed. 
The official counsellor 
The official counsellor was installed in order to enable civil servants to 
discuss integrity dilemmas with a completely independent confidential
 integrity counsellor. The counsellor is available to the civil servants of the
administrative bodies in the alliance. The counsellor is the designated offi-
cial with whom to discuss misconduct in confidence. In the collaborating
organisations, policy is aimed at immediate reporting of misconduct to 
the management of the organisation concerned. If this is not possible or
desirable, the report can be made to the confidential integrity counsellor.
The position of counsellor is held by different persons in the alliance.
 Because the counsellors are not affiliated to the member organisations,
they can operate entirely independently. The position of counsellor has a
statutory basis. In the interests of good employment practice, official
 organisations are required to create the position for their civil servants.
The administrative counsellor
In order to facilitate counselling for political administrators, the position
of administrative counsellor has been created. This counsellor is available
to provide advice and information in the field of integrity for administra-
tors, i.e. mayors and aldermen, the governor, the chairman and members
of the water authority executive. The counsellor is available to administra-
tors who face questions and dilemmas relating to integrity in the perform-
ance of their duties. This position has no statutory basis but was created to
meet the need of administrators to be able to discuss dilemmas in confi-
dence. The counsellor must be seen as a coach, who has a supportive role. 
This counsellor is an experienced administrator who holds a completely
independent position and is subject to the confidentiality obligation. In
view of the confidential nature of the work and the increased risk of trace-
able casuistry, the administrative confidential integrity counsellor does
not account for his or her work in public. Structural policy-matters are
submitted to the steering committee in the form of policy recommenda-
tions.
The official integrity officer
In order to increase the integrity network, the position of official integrity
officer was added to the structure. Every member of the alliance is repre-
sented in this group by officials. These officers are civil servants with a (co-
ordinating) task within their organisations, or in any event, with a
responsibility in the field of integrity. They are also responsible for the im-
plementation of the jointly-developed policy or promoting the application
of the instruments developed. The integrity officers also develop (regional)
alliances and provide input for the working group. 
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Innovation
The structure chosen is not new or innovative, but the alliance within Lim-
burg public administration is. The policies and the supporting instruc-
tions and best practices have been developed in a way that allows the
members to add or omit their own accents, without prejudicing their
essence. Consequently, each individual organisation can now take steps
forward with their own integrity policies in a manner appropriate to the
local context, while preserving their own identity and autonomy.
The intensive collaboration has led to a joint integrity framework in public
administration in Limburg which can count on wide support. The struc-
ture is an alliance organised on the basis of voluntary participation and as
such, does not have its own entity or legal status. The members contribute
on a proportional basis to the alliance, in time and money, so that the
structure functions without a budget of its own. The provincial authority
facilitates the structure (in advance), but any costs are shared afterwards.
Its own website at integriteitlimburg.nl is used in the communication of
the policies. Via this website, the policy and the instruments developed are
shared and are made widely available. This methodology has led to the
 application of the policies and the instruments outside Limburg too. 
Development of joint integrity policy
The first step
During the meeting of the mayors, chairmen of the water authorities and
the governor in 2012, it was decided that the alliance should focus on pol-
icy development in the broadest sense within the integrity domain. The
policies and the instruments and methods developed were to be made
 accessible and applicable within the public administration in Limburg and
also, if necessary, beyond. The steering committee establishes the policy
frameworks, while the working group is responsible for the execution and
implementation. The municipal authorities expressed a wish to develop
two instruments to support the integrity policy for the municipal elections
in 2013. The steering committee decided in the start-up phase to assign
priority in the alliance to the promotion of integrity in the political-
 administrative environment, because a catch-up drive could still be made
there.
The first step in the joint policy development was the development of a
screening procedure for proposed administrators, as well as an integrity
introductory programme for newly-elected representatives.
Screening (risk analysis) of administrators
The essence of the approach is the performance of screening prior to the
appointment of an administrator, so that integrity risks are identified and
can be managed. The screening process is recorded in an instruction that
has been made freely available. In the jointly developed process, candidates
for appointed offices / administrators are subjected to screening. On the
basis of open sources and with the cooperation of the candidate, an exter-
nal agency investigates whether circumstances have arisen or could arise in
the field of integrity that could prevent unobstructed performance of the
candidate as an administrator. If such circumstances are revealed, it is in-
vestigated whether sufficient preventive measures can be taken to manage
the risks and thus make the appointment possible. After the analysis of the
screening has been discussed with the candidate, an advisory report is
drawn up, with his or her consent, and is then discussed with the chairman
of the executive, the mayor. The mayor monitors integrity within the exec-
utive. The screening is therefore also the starting point for integrity devel-
opment during the term of office of the executive.
For the appointment, the chairman of the executive shares the findings
with the elected representatives, the municipal council, which then takes
the outcomes of the screening into account in the nomination of the candi-
date. In this form, the screening, in the form of an integrity risk analysis, is
an aid for the person involved in relation to integrity awareness. It is not a
selection tool or a barrier. Naturally, the outcome of the screening may be a
reason for the candidate to withdraw from the appointment procedure
 before the municipal council takes a decision on appointment.
This approach was followed in all municipal authorities in Limburg
 during the last elections in 2013. In de rest of the Netherlands, after the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations had sent a letter to all ad-
ministrators drawing attention to the instruction 250 of the 403 munici-
pal authorities participating in the elections applied the screening process.
In the elections in 2017, the application of this screening process can be
 expected to be a fixed part of the appointment procedure. The screening
approach was made available to the municipal authorities in good time,
via the website. 
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After this, the screening approach was used nationally in two thirds of the
administrative bodies for the provincial elections and the elections of
water authorities in 2014. Here too, the process can be expected to become
a fixed part of the appointment process for administrators in 2018.
Integrity introduction programme for elected representatives
At the same time, an integrity introduction programme was introduced
for newly-elected representatives. The programme was set up in order to
provide newly-elected council members with guidance regarding integrity
in relation to service as people’s representative. The programme supports
the elected representatives in interpreting integrity rules, strengthening
their own ethical opinion-forming and in jointly maintaining a justifiable
form of enforcement of integrity rulings. The programme also provides a
first step towards a long-term integrity programme, focusing on deepen-
ing these themes. The mayor, as holder of primary responsibility for in-
tegrity in the municipal authority, is responsible for the implementation
of the introductory programme. In this case too, the process is recorded in
an instruction which is made freely available within the public administra-
tion.
Both the screening approach and the introductory programme were pro-
duced by the working group in a short space of time and, in order to in-
crease the support base, were presented at a meeting with the
stakeholders. An evaluation of the process with the e municipal authorities
showed that this is a successful approach to implementing integrity
 policies. What makes this working method exceptional is that the policy is
realised and applied jointly, without prejudicing the individual contribu-
tions and input of each member. This strongly promotes the application of
the jointly-developed approach.
State of affairs
Review
The alliance has been active since 2012, enabling a form of reflection. A
number of successes can be noted. The alliance is administratively embed-
ded and its importance is recognised and acknowledged. The most striking
result is the realisation of a shared integrity framework within public
 administration in Limburg. The integrity policy has passed the incident-
driven era and the panic factor has been sharply reduced. 
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This does not alter the fact that not all the members have yet reached the
same level of integrity maturity. At some members, the Basic Standards
have not yet all been implemented. Some of them regard taking preventive
measures to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest as fairly invasive
of personal privacy, which leads a number of members to take a cautious
line in this regard. The voluntary nature of the alliance also makes it possi-
ble for members to deviate from the joint policy with regard to certain
dossiers or subjects. This could harm the common vision of integrity. 
Outlook
The steering committee’s challenge for the coming years lies in continually
activating the members to work together to reach a higher level of in-
tegrity maturity. Now that the start-up phase lies behind us, the ambition
of the steering group is directed at embedding the theme of integrity in
the thinking and actions of the organisations, with the aim of including
integrity as a core value in the quality of public administration in Lim-
burg. In order to achieve this goal, apart from the activities in the political-
administrative environment, the promotion of integrity in the official
environment is also being addressed.
The working group is currently developing policies in the field of financial
integrity (conflicts of interest, the reporting of secondary positions and in-
come, claiming behaviour and the possession of financial interests and
avoiding the appearance of conflicts of interest in the broadest sense. At
the same time, the working group is developing codes of conduct for may-
ors, aldermen and elected representatives. In response to growing demand
from Limburg administrators, the working group is setting up a general
advisory functionality in which questions relating to policy or the applica-
tion of instruments can be answered within a reasonable term or can be
given policy follow-up. 
The alliance will soon be holding a theme-based meeting with the stake-
holders of the joint integrity policy. In this way, the involvement of the
members is stimulated and the theme of integrity remains on the adminis-
trative agenda.
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Summary and conclusion 
Since 2012, the provincial authority, the municipal authorities and the
water authorities in Limburg have worked together to promote the
 integrity of public administration. The alliance has been embedded
through the creation of an integrity structure with broad, active participa-
tion by the members. This form of collaboration is unique in the Nether-
lands. It has ensured that a joint framework is developing in Limburg
around the theme of integrity. This has made integrity open to discussion
and identifiable, within both the official (civil service) and the political-
 administrative environment. In short, Limburg is genuinely working on
integrity.
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Integrity as a shared responsibility
Willeke Slingerland, lecturer/researcher Corruption and Integrity at the School of Governance, 
Law & Urban Development Saxion University of Applied Sciences
Introduction
In the Netherlands, major steps forward have been made in recent years
with the development of an organisation-specific integrity policy. For the
embedding of integrity, it is important that organisations also look beyond
their own organisational boundaries and ask themselves how they can
work on integrity together. This chapter concerns the Dutch ‘National
 Integrity System’ (NIS). The NIS model shows what individual institutions
contribute towards a country’s integrity performance. At the same time, 
it opens our eyes to the opportunities available if integrity becomes a
 common goal and institutions perceive this as a shared responsibility
Outcomes of the NIS study
We have already been thinking for decades now about the questions of
whether and how we can organise our society in a way that promotes
 integrity and prevents corruption. Policy-makers and academics now share
the view that this requires a joint approach: an approach in which central
and decentralised institutions work together. Partly for that reason, the
 international anti-corruption NGO Transparency International (TI)1 has
developed the National Integrity System (NIS)2 model. This model makes
it possible to investigate the extent to which a country’s system of institu-
tions, policy instruments and laws and regulations is effective enough to
stimulate integrity and prevent corruption. In 2011/2012, 25 European
countries were investigated on the basis of this model. The study3
 (Slingerland et al., 2012a) commissioned by TI Netherlands shows that  
the Netherlands has a fairly solid NIS. This means that the Netherlands is
strong in promoting integrity and the prevention, detection and punish-
ment of corruption. This does not alter the fact that the study also exposes
weak points in the Dutch NIS. Some of these have since been addressed.
This chapter briefly explains the most striking features of the Dutch NIS.
13
The formal NIS is strong
If a country wants a strong NIS, a condition for this is a strong political-in-
stitutional and socio-economic basis. After all, the 13 central institutions
of a country, which are individually and jointly responsible for promoting
integrity and preventing corruption, are based on this. Critical factors here
include the available resources, the degree of independence and trans-
parency, the method of accountability, the realisation of the integrity pol-
icy and the institution’s interpretation of its own role. On this basis, most
Dutch institutions appear to be adequately to very well organised (Slinger-
land e.a., 2012a: 285). Three institutions stand out, through their watch-
dog function and strong focus on the field of integrity.
The Netherlands Court of Audit
The Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer)44, for example, is
one of the stronger institutions in the Dutch NIS. (Slingerland e.a., 2012a:
183-197) The Court of Audit monitors the accuracy of central government
income and expenditure and whether the central government implements
policy as intended. The Court of Audit does this entirely independently
and decides for itself what it investigates. One example is the Trendrapport
Open Data (Open Data Trend Report) published in 2015 (Netherlands Court of
Audit, 2015a). In this report, it warns that the supply of data of importance
for public control of government finances and government action has not
yet increased substantially and that furthermore, there is a fragmented
landscape on the supply side of open data (Netherlands Court of Audit,
2015a: 41-42). Its critical findings are not always warmly welcomed by
government organisations, but do ensure that political and public discus-
sions on certain policies can be substantiated on the basis of its reports.
The website of the Court of Audit contains an Integrity Guide on the main
tips and standards for integrity within public organisations (Netherlands
Court of Audit, 2015b). The Netherlands Court of Audit conducts regular
audits of the status of integrity management, including in central govern-
ment, and makes clear statements on any shortcomings (Netherlands
Court of Audit, 2010).
The National Ombudsman
A second strong Dutch institution is the National Ombudsman.5 This
 institution enjoys a high degree of independence, both by law and in
 practice. The Dutch House of Representatives appoints the National
 Ombudsman on the basis of criteria that it formulates itself. The National
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Ombudsman is successful in the way in which it settles complaints of
 individual citizens regarding government actions. The organisation is also
successful in advising public organisations on the quality of their service
provision (Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 168-182). Because the National Om-
budsman also conducts research on its own initiative into the propriety of
government action in individual and structural matters, the institution
 increasingly makes statements on cases in which integrity is at issue. For
example, the National Ombudsman emphasises the importance of inde-
pendent investigation of potential abuses or tragic events in which the
 responsibility of a government organisation is investigated. In such cases,
the appearance of any conflict of interest must be avoided (National
 Ombudsman, 2011: 9). At the same time, the institution is alert to conflicts
of interest that arise when government organisations both maintain
super vision and handle complaints. A recent example is the Ombudsman’s
criticism of a Bill which would make the Intelligence and Security Services
Review Committee also responsible for independent handling of
 complaints (National Ombudsman, 2015). The decisions of the National
Ombudsman are not enforceable, but in practice, they do have a degree of
authority, as the media reports on them and the House of Representatives
regularly calls the government to account in response to these decisions
(Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 181-182).
The media
The media form a third substantive pillar in the strong Dutch NIS. Dutch
law guarantees free and independent media. As far as we are aware, censor-
ship is rare in the Netherlands and journalists enjoy a high degree of free-
dom. The media play an important watchdog role (Slingerland e.a., 2012a:
218-240). They regularly report on matters concerning violations of in-
tegrity and corruption. In some cases, it was also the media that brought
these instances of corruption to light. Thanks to these publications, local
administrators and businesses were investigated by the judicial authorities
and court cases are currently in progress regarding this local corruption.
The watchdog role of the media is under pressure, partly through cut-
backs in the public broadcasting service, the falling number of newspaper
subscriptions and a strong concentration of ownership in the media sector.
This primarily constitutes a risk for control of local and regional adminis-
tration. The emergence of new media such as the internet and smart
phones offers citizens the possibility of sending digital messages into the
world which reach large numbers of people in a short space of time. This
public journalism is important, but only partly fills the gap that has been
created.
Corruption not easy to investigate
It is notable that the strong institutions are not those specifically focused
on integrity, such as the Law Enforcement Agencies, Anti-Corruption
Agencies or Civil Society. If we look at the Dutch Law Enforcement Agen-
cies, we find that the complex, major corruption cases take up a large part
of the capacity of the police force, the Public Prosecution Service (Open-
baar Ministerie) and the Rijksrecherche (Central Criminal Intelligence
Agency), sometimes at the expense of other (corruption) cases. Corruption
is not easy to investigate. In practice, suspicions of corrupt conduct are far
from always reported, but are often settled through disciplinary measures.
This means that no lessons can be learned from the incidents and further-
more, the risk remains that those involved will continue their corrupt
practices elsewhere. Private research agencies are also often involved in an
investigation into possible integrity violations. As a result, important evi-
dence has sometimes disappeared at the moment that the enforcement
agencies were called in (Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 128-152). The enforce-
ment agencies still do little to prosecute Dutch companies that are guilty
of  corruption in other countries. The Public Prosecution Service is not ac-
tive enough in countering foreign corruption. It is important that extra
 resources become available to counter corruption and that there is open-
ness regarding settlements in corruption cases. (Transparency Interna-
tional, 2015). The Public Prosecution Service should also prosecute natural
persons more often, in order to eliminate the impression of impunity
(Transparency International, 2015).
None of the pillars cooperate enough yet with other public, social and
 private organisations in the field of anti-corruption. One could therefore
justifiably ask whether the NIS forms an integrated whole that works
jointly for integrity, or whether each one is working for itself, to perform
its own tasks, without being sufficiently aware of their interdependence in
promoting integrity and combating corruption. 
Promoting of integrity in the forefront
In the Netherlands, most matters concerning anti-corruption and promo-
tion of integrity are well laid down in law. Institutions are also sufficiently
well-equipped to perform their own tasks. In addition to this strong for-
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mal basis, the Dutch NIS is distinguished by the positive central message
of promotion of integrity, while there is less attention to the negative mes-
sage of combating corruption (Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 287). Various forms
of fraud and bribery are penal offences in Dutch criminal law and many in-
stitutions are responsible for the enforcement of this. However, in general,
the emphasis can be said to lie on prevention. For a number of years, for
 example, all government organisations have been required to pursue an
integrity policy, including a code of conduct and attention to increasing
 integrity awareness. Self-regulation in the public and private sectors also
focuses primarily on promoting integrity. A conscious choice was also
made to form the Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS),6 rather than an
Anti-Corruption Agency. This organisation supports government agencies
in setting up and implementing their integrity policies. For example, BIOS
organises an Integrity Day each year (National Integrity Office, 2015).
 Scientists, policy-makers and those involved with integrity in the public
domain conduct talks with each other here. 
Various studies show that it is primarily local government that is vulnera-
ble to corruption (Veldhuisen & Snel, 2014: 45-46; Koster, 2014a; Koster,
2014b; Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 26). In the relatively small community of a
town or village, administrators and people’s representatives often ‘wear
different hats’ and are active within the local social networks, as a result of
which the risks of (the appearance of) conflicts of interest and corruption
are lurking around every corner. The Netherlands does not have anti-cor-
ruption agencies and the local integrity offices can also be counted on the
fingers of one hand. Amsterdam is one of the few Dutch cities with an In-
tegrity Bureau (IB).7 This Bureau has expertise in the field of integrity and
its objective is to promote the integrity of the administrators and civil ser-
vants of the Amsterdam municipal authority. Among other things, it con-
ducts integrity studies and risk analyses, and provides training courses.
Citizens, politicians and civil servants can report suspicions of violations
of integrity to the Integrity Violations Reporting Centre, which is part of
the Bureau (Amsterdam municipal authority) (undated). The Netherlands
has no civil society organisations which work for local integrity. Further-
more, local audit offices and local media do not always have sufficient
 capacity to monitor the local administration, while at the same time, more
and more powers are delegated to municipal authorities due to the decen-
tralisation in the field of healthcare. 
Both central government and local authorities have now implemented
local integrity policies. In the past, these policies were aimed primarily at
civil servants. In recent years, local integrity policies have also been
 directed at holders of political office and councillors (National Integrity
Office (undated); Koster, 2014a; Koster, 2014b). For example, integrity is
included in the induction programmes for new municipal councillors.
After elections, mayors may subject their candidate Aldermen to an
 integrity test. Consequently, the emphasis of the Dutch NIS lies primarily
on the promotion of integrity and the prevention of corruption. Dutch
criminal law has recently been amended and now imposes more severe
penalties for corruption, but the criminal law is in every respect the ‘ulti-
mum remedium’, which is reflected in the actions of the NIS institutions:
prevention rather than repression.
Towards effective protection of whistleblowers
The active promotion of integrity within Dutch public administration is
qualified as positive in both the NIS study and in the Anti-Corruption
 Report of the European Commission (Slingerland e.a., 2012a: 289-290;
 European Commission, 2014a: 4). At the same time, the NIS study shows
that the protection of whistleblowers is still inadequate, both on paper and
in practice. Various institutions are involved in handling reports from
whistleblowers, but their powers vary from merely advising whistleblow-
ers to actually investigating abuses. Furthermore, some institutions can
only be contacted by civil servants, while others are also authorised to han-
dle reports by employees from the private sector (Slingerland e.a., 2012a:
115-116). Temporary reporting centres have also been set up in response to
structural abuses within specific sectors. For example, the Netherlands has
the ‘Housing Corporations Integrity Reporting Centre’ and the ‘Tempo-
rary Integrity Reporting Centre for National Police Force Procurement and
Contracting’. 
Since 2012, the Netherlands has been working hard to improve the protec-
tion of whistleblowers. In July 2015, the ‘House for Whistleblowers’ Bill
was adopted8 unanimously. The House for Whistleblowers is to become a
central institution where whistleblowers from both the public and private
sectors can report abuses and that must guard against whistleblowers suf-
fering difficulties as a result of their reports. The House can provide advice
and has the competence to investigate.  Its independence will be assured
partly because the members of this House will be appointed by royal
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 decree.9 Public organisations and companies will be required to set up
 internal regulations for handling integrity violations. If whistleblowers
cannot obtain a response internally, they can contact the House for
Whistleblowers. Nevertheless, various social organisations have expressed
concerns about the House now to be set up (Transparency International
Netherlands, 2015). For example, it is not clear how the House will offer
adequate protection against reprisals resulting from the report. The inade-
quate protection for the self-employed, temporary workers and seconded
persons after they make a report is also insufficiently thought-out. These
organisations also call for segregation of the advisory and investigation
functions of the House. The protection of whistleblowers is now high on
the political agenda, but the fact that the wide variety of reporting centres
could be perceived as non-transparent by whistleblowers, which could
have the effect of raising the barriers to making a report, remains a point of
concern. The House for Whistleblowers will advise the whistleblower on
where to turn to.
Political parties under the microscope
Political parties are a weaker pillar of the Dutch NIS (Slingerland e.a.,
2012a: 212-217). Less than 3 percent of the Dutch population is a member
of a political party, but nevertheless, these parties play an important role in
Dutch society. Not only are people’s representatives elected, in practice, via
the line of political parties, but the key positions in the Dutch (semi-)pub-
lic sector are also largely held by members of political parties (Slingerland
& Wempe, 2013). The NIS study also found a serious lack of transparency
in the field of the financing of political parties. As a result of this, donors
(both individual persons and organisations) could exert and influence on
the determination of the positions of political parties (Slingerland e.a.,
2012a: 209-213). In 2013, the Political Parties (Financing) Act 10 was
adopted, as a result of which donations, subsidies and debts must now be
registered and published. This should make visible how the parties raise
their funds, in order to avoid (the appearance of) conflicts of interest.
In addition to insight into the financing of political parties, Dutch
 political parties should account for the strong influence that they exert on
the functioning of Dutch society. A number of national political parties
have now created their own Integrity Committees, which party members
can contact for advice or to report violations of integrity. This does not
alter the fact that in the case of all political parties, either there is no clear
vision of their own integrity or this vision is not adequately translated into
practice (GRECO, 2015: 11-12). Recent corruption cases in the Netherlands
show that there is an urgent need for political parties to address the matter
of integrity. It is precisely politicians and administrators who, together
with civil servants and entrepreneurs, form part of networks, often local
ones, where there is a risk that lobbying for certain interests could result in
unfair competition and corruption (Slingerland & Wempe, 2013).
Importance of system awareness among institutions
The NIS model shows what every institution contributes towards the
 embedding of integrity in a society in a formal sense. An official role is
 assigned to each institution, which is tested in practice. But what does it
mean to form part of an NIS? As soon as we refer to a system, this implies
that institutions do not operate entirely independently, but that a certain
relationship and dependence exists between them (Slingerland, Six &
 Huberts, 2012b: 220-221). For every system, in order to be able to realise a
certain objective, it is necessary that all actors have this same objective in
mind (Meadows, 2008: 14). It is therefore a requirement that all central in-
stitutions in the NIS are aware of the role that they play in relation to the
promotion of integrity. Integrity is a value, and that value must be named
in laws and regulations and in policy. Even more important is that this ob-
jective should become visible in the actual actions of all parties. Precisely
because a value is involved, its significance is time and context-dependent.
Integrity can only be captured in laws and rules to a certain degree
(Slingerland, Six & Huberts, 2012b: 233-236). The finding that the formal
NIS is strong, is an encouraging conclusion. At the same time, it forces us
to think through the concept of an NIS in more depth. An initial step
would be to not to leave thinking and talking in terms of integrity systems
to academics alone, but to ask the institutions and persons who work in
them to consider themselves as part of this larger system, so that the
awareness is embedded in the breadth. Which cog do they represent in this
larger machine and which role do they actually play? In this way, a better
understanding will be developed of the translation and functioning of the
NIS in day-to-day practice. 
In order to illustrate this distinction between the formal NIS (the model)
and the actual NIS (the translation into practice), the role of political
 parties in Dutch society could be considered, for example. The NIS model
assumes that political parties form an independent pillar and political
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 parties are therefore assessed in terms of aspects such as individual
 independence, transparency and integrity. At the same time, in practice,
political parties are not an isolated pillar but also form part of other NIS
institutions (Legislature, Executive, Civil Society and Business). A vote for
a candidate of a political party, for example, results in the appointment of
people’s representatives and administrators, which form two separate in-
stitutions in the NIS. In addition, the influence of political parties in the
Netherlands goes far beyond politics alone. (Former) administrators and
politicians also play other roles in society, for instance as members of exec-
utive boards or supervisory boards in the (semi-)public or private sector
(Slingerland & Wempe, 2013). In the NIS, these too are separate institu-
tions. The role that political parties play in the NIS is consequently far
greater than that shown on paper. In the Dutch situation, political parties
play a key role in the NIS. As soon as these parties embrace their key role
and take more responsibility for promoting integrity, many institutions
will become (still) stronger and consequently, so will the NIS as a whole. 
Importance of embedding
It is precisely the interplay between these institutions and the way in
which they interact that determine the protection of integrity in a society.
A system is dynamic and is subject to many different influences (Meadows,
2008: 76-85). At the time of the economic crisis and the austerity measures
that followed, for example, there were fears of the consequences that the
crisis was expected to have on the actions of persons and organisations
(Hoekstra, Hoogeveen & Zweegers, 2012). A NIS that functions well will be
resilient enough to manage changes of this kind and corrective measures
can be taken. This requires a system awareness among institutions and of
everyone who works in these institutions. Matters that constitute a threat
to integrity within or outside their own organisations must be raised. It is
extremely important in this respect that organisations and officials work
together, so that they can learn from and with each other and a picture is
formed of what is happening beyond the boundaries of their own organi-
sations. This type of informal exchange of experiences and the joint devel-
opment of integrity instruments will then take place within external
integrity networks (Hoekstra, 2014: 25). An example of this is the coopera-
tion in the Netherlands between the different enforcement agencies (the
police force, Rijksrecherche, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation
 Service (FIOD) and the Public Prosecution Service) in the detection of
 corruption. 
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The integrity policy described above is essential for this purpose. In
 addition to the fact that it is important for every civil servant, employee,
administrator or people’s representative to be aware of the specific
 integrity rules that apply, it is very important that continual attention is
devoted to ethics and moral dilemmas. In this way, a moral compass devel-
ops for situations that are not encompassed by policy. Education and
 training play a crucial role in this. In the Netherlands, more and more pro-
fessional training courses and educational institutes devote attention to
integrity in their curricula. Through practical (investigation) assignments,
students and employees come into contact with integrity dilemmas, 
which forces them to think about the values and interests at stake and the
consequences of their actions in the short and longer term. This feeds the
critical thinking, moral judgment and investigative attitude of everyone 
 (Bildung), in particular also that of students: the integrity guardians of the
future. 
Actual embedding of integrity requires that, in addition to the tasks for-
mally assigned to them, institutions also recognise their role in protecting
a strong NIS. Cooperation with other institutions is a prerequisite for this.
Rules of conduct and an integrity policy can contribute towards a strong
NIS, provided that they are coupled with continual attention to integrity
in education, in training programmes, during meetings and above all, in
the discussions that everyone conducts with others on a daily basis. After
all, integrity is a never-ending issue and stands or falls with its concretisa-
tion and discussion in day-to-day practice.
Notes
1 www.transparency.org
2 www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nis
3 Transparency International developed the NIS instrument in the 1990s with the aim
of defining each country’s exposure to corruption. It is a tool for qualitative research
on the basis of primary and secondary literature, international reports and inter-
views with people working in the institutions studied or who have an insight into
these. The NIS model is based on the metaphor of a Greek temple, for which the
 political-institutional, socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural foundati-
ons of a society form the base. On this foundation, the 13 pillars of a country are
built: Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Public Sector, Law Enforcement Agencies,
Electoral Management Body, ombudsman, Supreme Audit Institution, Anti-Corrup-
tion Agency, Media, Civil Society, Political Parties and Business. These pillars each
have their own, but also a shared responsibility for promoting integrity and control-
ling corruption. The extent to which this takes place is assessed on the basis of the
criteria of facilities, independence, transparency, accountability, integrity and the
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way in which the pillar performs its own role. The full Dutch NIS report is available
on the TI website at www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nisarticle/netherlands_ 2012,
viewed on 29 July 2015.
4 www.rekenkamer.nl
5 www.nationaleombudsman.nl
6 www.integriteitoverheid.nl
7 www.amsterdam.nl
8 Parliamentary Papers I 2014/15 34 105 A.
9 Kamerstukken II 2014/2015 34105 nr. 12
10 Political Parties (Financing) Act, in force on 17 July 2015.
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A ‘forerunner’ in public service ethics in 
Europe  A critical evaluation
Christoph Demmke, Professor of Public Management and Public Policy, University of 
Friedrichshafen
Introduction
In the Netherlands, public discussions on ethics and integrity took a
broader direction than in many other countries. Here, the debate focused
on holistic discussions about ethics and value-based strategies. One could
also say that the Dutch distrust legal or compliance-based approaches. This
opens up the horizon for broader discussions. In fact, values, standards,
morals, ethics and integrity have been discussed on the political level and
in the academic community.
Despite the fact that the Dutch discourse about integrity is less abstract
and more political than in other countries, it is still a discussion conducted
in niches and amongst elites. Also in the Netherlands, discussions on in-
tegrity are rarely linked to power, other politics, justice and organizational
issues. 
The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the role of the Dutch
 government and Dutch academics in the European debate around ethics
and integrity in the last fifteen years, when the subject as such was debated
intensively on the EU-agenda. 
Comparative ethics in the EU – the role of the Netherlands 
Policies in the fight against corruption and supporting public service
ethics are not formal competencies of the European Union. However, this
lack of formal competencies does not mean that the EU is not active in
these fields. For example, the European Union actively monitors the ef-
forts of accession countries in the field of anti-corruption. In fact, intensive
discussion on ethics and integrity take place in informal settings: the
meetings of the Directors-General of Public Service of the member states of
the European Union and the European Commission. These meetings have
discussed the issue of ethics and integrity (indirectly or directly) on several
occasions within the European Public Administration Network (EUPAN).
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The Dutch government played an important role in this context.
Initially, under the German EU Presidency, preliminary discussions took
place in 1994 on disciplinary rules in the European member states, and 
the findings were presented in 1994. Subsequently, different questions
 regarding the ethics of civil servants were discussed during the French
Presidency in 1995.
This illustrated that, until 2004, the study of ethics and integrity was asso-
ciated with normative and theoretical issues and the focus was on compli-
ance approaches or legal matters. No further research in the field of ethics
and integrity was conducted at EU level until 2004. 
In 2004, the Irish and the Dutch EU Presidencies decided to pursue the
issue in greater depth. It was agreed that two studies should serve as dis-
cussion documents, and provide common voluntary standards of integrity
in the member states of the EU. At the time, one interest of the Dutch Pres-
idency was to win international support for the adoption of an EU-wide
informal EU code in the field of ethics and integrity. Ultimately, this initia-
tive failed because of the lack of support from a number of EU member
states. However, another initiative was very successful: the Dutch govern-
ment used political leadership as a supportive platform for a wider Euro-
pean debate in order to professionalize ethics policies in the ten new
member states. 
Thus, Dutch international leadership has contributed to progress in the
field: ethics and integrity became a (politically) popular agenda item. As a
consequence, those member states that entered the European Union in
2004 have developed an impressive arsenal of laws, standards and codes
after accession to the EU. Overall, in all EU countries, there are more
 policies, rules, procedures and monitoring procedures in place than ever
before (Demmke et al., 2008). In the meantime, ‘achieving an ethos of
 honesty and transparency becomes the Holy Grail’ (Oonagh 2006: 107).
The reasons for these developments are manifold (and cannot be discussed
here in full detail). However, it is fair to say that the Dutch initiated a
 debate on integrity on the EU level that has continued ever since. 
In 2006, the Finnish EU Presidency continued working on the subject
(Moilanen & Salminen, 2007). In 2007, the European Commission com-
missioned an empirical study on regulating conflicts of interest for hold-
ers of public office in the EU member states (Demmke et al., 2008) which
was supported by the EUPAN network. In 2008, the Slovenian EU Presi-
dency carried out a study on successes and failures in the field of HR
 management (Demmke, Henökl & Moilanen, 2008) and included a chapter
on ethics and public trust. Next, a study on improving trust in government
was carried out in 2009 within the informal settings of the European social
dialogue for central public administrations (Tarren, 2009). 
Finally, in 2011, the Polish EU Presidency commissioned the author of this
chapter to undertake a new comparative study and to analyse and compare
the effectiveness of various policies, rules and standards of professional
ethics in the field of good governance. At this time, countries were eager to
learn more about the Dutch National Integrity Office (BIOS), one of the
European forerunners as regards a more holistic approach to  institutional
integrity in government.
Thus, judging by its capacity to initiate an international debate in the
field, the Netherlands has been a clear forerunner since 2004. It therefore
comes as no surprise that, for 2016, ethics and integrity was again chosen
as a priority topic for the Dutch EU Presidency. 
The state of affairs in 2015 – one step forward and two steps back? 
Today, new ‘austerity’ reforms have supported perceptions of increasing
organizational injustice. From what is known in the academic field,
 current austerity reforms are most probably linked to increased distrust in
leadership, misconduct, and less work commitment. In all of these situa-
tions the emergence of new dilemmas, value conflicts, abuses of power,
conflicts of interest, corruption and fraud are likely to occur more
 frequently. This again can also result in more ethical violations, such as
stealing organisational resources, misconduct at work, inappropriate
 behaviour, et cetera. 
In a study by Demmke/Moilanen (Demmke & Moilanen, 2012), officials
from central administrations of all EU member states were asked whether
reform policies which were introduced as a reaction to the financial crisis
have had effects on workplace behaviour, such as decrease of trust in lead-
ership, less job commitment, lower job satisfaction, anger et cetera. In line
with this, Hoekstra reported on negative effects of austerity measures on
the Dutch integrity system (Hoekstra, 2016). Official statements take a
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more moderate tone. However, the reality seems to be harsh. In fact, the
 results of the Demmke/Moilanen study show a strong relationship
 between the introduction of austerity measures and workplace behaviour.
Recent data from the OECD (Demmke, 2015) confirm these findings.
Whatever the right interpretation of reform effects, one thing is certain:
the impact of austerity reforms is also contextual and – sometimes –
 contradictory. For example, whereas some countries experience strong
 decreases in loyalty, unethical behaviour and job satisfaction, in other
countries this is not the case. Thus, although it is possible to derive general
conclusions as regards the effects of HR reforms on workplace behaviour,
the impact of reforms is also influenced by other contextual factors such as
culture and parallel developments in the private sector. 
Ethics infrastructures – best practices or best fit?
For many years, international research on ethics and integrity has focused
on the characteristics and prevalence of high performance ethics infra-
structures that are applicable in both the public and in the private sector.
This research, which was originally initiated by Transparency Interna-
tional (Pope, 1996), has also been influenced by Dutch scholars.1
Much of this literature assumes that high performance ethics infrastruc-
tures constitute ‘best practice’ and universally applicable management,
 although a distinction can be drawn between those arguing for a contex-
tual best-fit approach and those arguing for more of a best-practice
 approach, based on a belief in the more universal advantages of these sys-
tems. The best-practice approach (European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions, 2009) is based on the belief that
ethics infrastructures can be used in any organisation and the view that all
organisations can improve performance if they identify and implement
best practices. 
In the meantime, there is considerable consensus on what constitutes bad
practices, for example, the absence of codes of ethics, poor leadership,
 unfair HR policies, lack of training, unprofessional performance measure-
ment etc. However, it is much more difficult to identity institutional best
practices, although the search for benchmarks is becoming ever more
 popular. 
Still, the search for best ethics infrastructures is confronted with a context
and institution-based, fragmented and pragmatic reality. Overall, institu-
tional differences – notably the levels of budgetary resources, social legiti-
macy, work systems, labour markets, education and training systems, work
organisation and the collective organisation of employers and employees –
mediate the impact of converging processes. 
Consequently, the proposition for implementing institutional and
 organisational models such as ethics infrastructures is ambiguous. In fact,
according to neo-institutional theories, the political and institutional
world is currently moving away from universal or even European  
best-practice institutional configurations towards more specific best-fit
context-related models. New developments lean more towards the testing
of new organisational models and work systems that fit into the national,
regional, local or even organisational and leader-follower context. Best fit
schools are  associated with this contingency approach and argue that
 organisations must adapt their strategies and implement reforms to the
specific local strategy and to its environment.
In fact, the effectiveness of any particular ethics infrastructure system 
will be determined by the degree of consistency amongst its constituent
 elements and the way they fit into the organisation, HR policies, culture
and leadership styles. 
To conclude, one may agree about the importance of the socio-political-
 institutional context in the field of building up ethics infrastructures.
 According to Huberts (2014), it is possible to stress the ‘basics of an
 integrity system’ (Huberts, 2012: 190). However, whether it is possible to
define complex best-practice infrastructures in the field of integrity is
 another question.
I also claim that the performance of an ethics infrastructure always de-
pends on the management of multiple and conflicting goals. Furthermore,
in the future, ethics management strategies will not be associated with any
particular philosophy or style of management. Working conditions, lead-
ership styles and work organisations continue to differ, ranging from tra-
ditional taylorist models to high-involvement or high-job autonomy
models with low hierarchies and high levels of job autonomy. Also, the role
of employees varies from very paternalistic to very communicative and
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partnership-oriented forms of social dialogue. Consequently, there will be
multiple forms of organisational structures, ranging from traditional and
bureaucratic working systems to innovative workplaces and learning
 organisations within different governmental organisations and even
within the same organisations (OECD, 2010). 
All the same, it is important to continue the work on ‘common elements’,
‘best practices as regards the effectiveness of instruments’ and ‘suggestions
for ethics infrastructures that really work’ in the field of ethics. In this
 regard too, the Dutch have advanced progress in the field. 
The Dutch and the value based approach 
Rightly or wrongly, the Dutch like to see themselves as modern, dynamic,
innovative, individualistic and tolerant. In the field of public manage-
ment, the Dutch were indeed one of the first to abandon a classical Civil
Service System and – within the process of ‘normalisation’ – aligned the
working conditions of civil servants and private sector employees. Unlike
their neighbours (Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg), they were also
much more supportive of the introduction of New Public Management
(NPM) trends.
In the field of ethics, together with the British, the Dutch were also the
first to call for an alternative to the ‘compliance-based’ ethics model. As a
consequence, discussions on the need for an alternative model (the ‘value
based’ model) were highly influential and successful. Many countries
started to move away from legal, top-down approaches. 
For a number of years, changes have been in progress. In fact, while past re-
form trends were characterized by a move away from the ‘old-fashioned’
compliance model, current reforms do not indicate convergence towards a
new value-based model. Let us take a step back to look at these interesting
trends. According to Max Weber, the essence of administrative behaviour
is to follow legally given orders. Following this, at a minimal level, admin-
istration was considered to be good and ethical if it achieved the imple-
mentation and enforcement of the existing laws and policy goals of the
government of the day. Moreover, ethically good or acceptable behaviour
was also defined in terms of obedience to the law, impartiality and stan-
dardization. The purpose of rule-orientation was also to achieve fairness
and equity, to implement the merit principle, to allocate rights to citizens
and to protect public employees against arbitrary administrative decisions.
Thus, ‘the ethics of neutrality and structure’ (Thompson, 1985: 555-561) is
the cornerstone of the traditional bureaucracy. From the ethical point of
view, following the law or the superior’s orders is usually not problematic,
as long as obedience and excessive adherence to rules do not become
 absolute values.2
However, the problem with the weberian concept is that as an ethical
guideline it is simply too narrow for today’s multi-level governance. Today,
the level of awareness is growing that work in the public sphere is much
more complex and no longer dominated by the principle of rationality as
Weber predicted. In reality, work in the public sector is more individual,
value-laden, emotional, pluralistic, political and more unpredictable than
ever. For example, modern public officials have much more individual
 decision-making discretion than that predicted by Weber. On the other
hand, the rule of law and administrative law as such remain the core
 principles of all administrative systems in Europe.
The opposite direction 
However, with the emergence of NPM euphoria, reform fashions moved in
the opposite direction. One reason for this may be that administrative law
was mostly seen as a constraint that blocks policy choices and reform poli-
cies. Traditional administrative behaviour was held to be rigid, rule-
bound, centralised and obsessed with dictating how things should be done
– regulating the process, controlling the inputs – but totally ignoring the
end results. As a consequence, NPM theories dominated from the 1990s
onwards and the compliance approach was seen as old-fashioned and
 ineffective. Suddenly, the focus was on codes of ethics, training, leadership,
 decentralisation, delegation and flexibility, instead of on law.
The Netherlands was a forerunner in this field. The Dutch perception was
that the field of anti-corruption and ethics and conflicts of interests was
defined too narrowly and should be complemented by more discussions
on a broader concept: integrity! The term ethics was seen as too narrow
and negative in terms of avoiding wrongdoing. Overall, the Dutch posi-
tion was also that there was too little focus on ethics management and
shortcomings in implementation, especially in the new EU member states.
Consequently, the Dutch call (within the EUPAN network) in 2004 for a
broader approach and a focus on soft and value-based instruments (such as
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ethics codes, better training, awareness raising and a more positive under-
standing of integrity) was instantly met with strong support. 
As a result, discussions focused on the adoption of new codes of ethics and
more countries followed the Dutch call for modernisation of ethics poli-
cies, evaluations and informal approaches and a move away from regula-
tory approaches.
A survey carried out under the Dutch Presidency (Demmke, 2004) con-
cluded with a number of optional solutions and strategies to maintain
high standards of integrity in the national administrations of the EU
member states. When looking at this list from some distance (i.e.: ten years
later), it is striking to see that suggestions for better ethics policies have
not changed much since then. But this also relates to the existing chal-
lenges.
The circle of new ideas and concepts has started again 
On the other hand, today, academic discussions have turned away from the
‘grand old’ dichotomy: value-based approaches versus compliance-based
approaches. This can best be seen in the field of conflicts of interest, where
countries have started to realise that the management of conflicts of inter-
est does not work without clear rules, formal procedures, and strong en-
forcement mechanisms but also not without awareness raising, strong
leadership, independent ethics committees, registers of interest and more
and better management capacity. Most ‘compliance-based’ countries such
as Germany no longer focus entirely on rules and trust in the effectiveness
of sanctions. However, the focus on both concepts has lost much of its ap-
peal, since the focus on NPM theories (and an excessive focus on rational
choice theories and soft-instruments) as much as on classical bureaucratic
approaches is in both cases also revealing many negative effects. 
This means that the circle of new ideas and concepts has started again.
Here, the focus is no longer on private sector models, or on new soft-man-
agerial models. Instead, it is about the search for more efficiency, effective-
ness, quality, better outcomes and citizen-orientation. In fact, it is all about
better administration and the ongoing search for new good-governance
models.
Unfortunately, the concept of good governance and good administration is
becoming broader and broader and includes different things, such as the
call for reduced administrative burdens, better quality of service, higher
levels of citizen satisfaction, more transparency while enhancing efficiency
and levels of public trust. Likewise, discussions on effective ethics policies
are also becoming more complex and have expanded from an early focus
on rules, sanctions, anti-corruption and fraud to many other fields, includ-
ing ethical leadership and the development of new incentive policies, such
as ‘nudging policies’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Moreover, our moral understanding is also becoming more complex. Con-
cepts such as good government, values, moral, ethics and integrity are
teeming with good intentions, but also with conflicting intentions, with
some unintended results. We want better governance, better leadership,
representative and diverse administrations, more flexibility, less hierarchy,
more job autonomy, participatory management, effective anti-discrimina-
tion rules, more performance, better accountability structures, more trans-
parency, more openness and more citizen-orientation. All of these requests
produce new unintentional effects.
According to Salminen et al. we are moving from a minimalist concept to a
maximalist concept of good and ethical governance (Salminen (ed.), 2010).
Thus, the increase in complexity in the society correlates with the increase
in the complexity of morality and ethics as such. Neither the compliance-
based nor the value-based approaches give and answer to the question how
ethics can be integrated into the different system logics. Likewise, the
search for new ethics policies, ethics management and ethics instruments
has become more complex and situative. 
The state of research in Europe 
In Europe, for a long time, literature on ethics focused on legal, abstract
and philosophical concepts. Parallel to this, the focus of attention was on
the fight against corruption. It is still astonishing to see that interdiscipli-
nary publications in the field of ethics and integrity appeared very late
and, if so, were almost entirely discussed in the private sector and, mostly
by US and Canadian experts. Debates on the relationship between NPM
and ethics also started on the other side of the Atlantic.
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Overall, Dutch academics changed the focus of attention in the field of
ethics and integrity. As long ago as 2002, Van den Heuvel, Huberts and
Verkerk broadened the discussions with the publication of ‘The moral face
of the Government’ (Van den Heuvel et al., 2002). Dutch scholars were also
the first to suggest a move away from a focus on fraud and corruption
 towards ethics, integrity (Van den Heuvel, Huberts & Muller (eds.), 2012)
and the integrity of governance (Huberts, 2014). Thus, whereas in most
countries, interdisciplinary academic discussions were almost completely
missing, Dutch (and, to some extent, Belgian3) scholars filled this gap. 
Moreover, for a long time, only a few publications existed on the ‘output’
side and the impact of reform policies on workplace behaviour, the institu-
tionalisation of ethics committees and agencies, the effectiveness of ethics
policies and the relationship between good governance and ethics policies.
The same can be said of literature on managerial ethics – and more con-
cretely on ethics infrastructures, integrity systems and institutional ethics. 
One of the greatest strengths of the Dutch academic discourse in the field
of public sector ethics lies in the diversity and interdisciplinarity of
 approaches which, mostly, focused on the (above mentioned) third trend 
in the literature. 
Where else could we find more empirical and analytical studies and publi-
cations and where else more leading ethics experts, public management
scholars, political scientists, moral philosophers, psychologists, criminolo-
gists, organisational sociologists and behavioural economists who are all
addressing the subject of ethics from different angles? 
Next, many of these experts carried out (empirical) research, which so far
has often been a subject of fashionable thinking: for example, as regards
the effects of NPM reforms on value conflicts and unethical behaviour. In
the past, the debate about NPM and ethics had an ideological tone, as
many experts offered (often, simplistic) explanations about contradictions
between public and private sector values. Overall, the mainstream argu-
ment was that NPM would lead to more ethical challenges (For example
Frederickson, 2005). In contrast to this, a Dutch scholar (Emile Kolthoff)
was the first to address this issue from an empirical angle and discussed
the effects of NPM reforms on ethics in a more systematic way. His conclu-
sions were more pragmatic and balanced (Kolthoff, 2007). 
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Dutch researchers were also forerunners in other fields such as ethical
leadership. According to Lasthuizen, ‘there is little empirical data on the
extent to which different leadership approaches contribute to organisa-
tional and employee integrity and discourage different types of integrity
violation within an organisational context’ (Lasthuizen, 2008: 149). Con-
sequently, Lasthuizen’s work on ethical leadership was the first to show
that not only is ethical leadership complex, but that different leadership
styles are needed in different situations (Lasthuizen, 2008: 149). This im-
portant piece of research put an end to the rather superficial and simplistic
discussion to which ethical leadership is regarded as the most important
instrument in the fight against unethical behaviour. 
Nevertheless, defining and measuring ethical leadership remains just as
difficult as auditing ethics or measuring corruption. 
Next, publications on managerial ethics, the institutionalisation of ethics
and integrity policies have advanced since the work carried out by Hoek-
stra and Kaptein (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 1998, 2013, 2014). Also, the first
 international comparative study on local integrity systems which devoted
attention to the policies, practices and actors at the local government level
was published, including important Dutch input from Anechiarico,
 Huberts and Six (Huberts, Anechiarico & Six (eds.), 2008).
One could easily continue along these lines. Of course, there is no space
here to mention the important contributions of Dutch scholars in aca-
demic networks such as the European Group of Public administration
(EGPA). It is therefore certainly no exaggeration to say that, while the field
was dominated by US and Canadian scholars (see Menzel, 2005) for many
decades, in recent years, Dutch scholars such as Huberts, Kaptein,
 Hoekstra, Lasthuizen, De Graaf, De Boer and Van der Wal have also greatly
influenced the field, worldwide. Interestingly, many experts are from the
VU University Amsterdam.
Quo vadis integrity policies – some tentative conclusions
Today, compared to the situation in 2004, the context of ethics policies has
dramatically changed, but whether it has changed to the better is not easy
to say. Is this the case in the former fifteen EU member states? In the ten
new member states that have since joined the EU?
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Recent trends also indicate a growing interest in evaluating the effective-
ness of ethics policies, powerful forms of institutionalisation of ethics and
in the right design of ethics infrastructures. This trend is also consistent
with important work already carried out by Dutch scholars. 
Obviously, there is still too little evidence regarding the outcomes and
 effects of ethics policies. There is still no objective answer as to whether 
we have too much or too little ethics or what the precise impact of specific
instruments is on trust, democracy, effectiveness, efficiency, performance
and behaviour. 
The concept of ‘Integrity of Governance’ is more complex than ever.
Progress in the field is combined with new challenges, conflicts and dilem-
mas. In his publication What money can´t buy (Sandel, 2012), Sandel suggests
that the ‘marketisation’ of societies leads to ever new forms of moral and
ethical dilemmas and conflicts. On the other hand, other experts believe
that trends are moving towards the end of the ‘secular state’ and a return
to ‘moral politics’.
Certainly, governance trends towards more decentralisation and individu-
alisation in the field of social policy and HRM (recruitment, pay and pro-
motion) are changing perceptions of fairness, attribution and justice: ‘The
age of standardisation and the decline of patronage government were well
suited for the belief in and practice that equal treatment for all is fair treat-
ment. Postmodern societies along with ethnic, racial, gender, and age
 diversity have challenged elected officials and administrators around the
world to rethink how to treat people unequally and yet to be fair’ (Menzel,
2011). 
In the field of governance, this is one of the biggest challenges as new ways
of conceptualizing merit and fairness are also creating new dilemmas,
flaws and fairness issues. One example is the abandonment of the stan-
dardised and seniority-based pay system observed in many member states.
Today, these systems are seen as being in conflict with our modern under-
standing of merit and fairness. In addition, the case law of the European
Court of Justice is addressing the question of whether seniority-based pay
systems are in conflict with the principle of anti-discrimination in relation
to age.4 Thus, countries have become more meritocratic but, at the same
time, more polarized. This also relates to the situation in the Netherlands.
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There is no space here to elaborate on these lines. In Europe, Mark Bovens
from the University of Utrecht (see amongst many others Bovens, 2006)
was one of the first to discuss the ambivalence of new merit and accounta-
bility conceptions. Swierstra and Tonkens continued along these lines in
‘De beste de baas?’ (Swierstra & Tonkens (eds.), 2008). 
Overall, it seems, the increasing interest in public-service ethics has not
necessarily produced more clarity and consensus on the effectiveness of
ethics policies in different contexts and the right choice of policy instru-
ments within the best-fit organisational design of ethics infrastructures.
More work is also needed as regards ‘what types of rewards or penalties
work best to create incentives for responsible and accountable behaviour,
including the search for improvement’ (Jarvis/Thomas, 2009: 11). 
As long ago as 2000, Paine published ‘Does Ethics Pay?’ and discussed the
added value of ethics (Paine, 2000). While evidence is indeed mounting
that ethics are related to organisational performance, significant method-
ological and theoretical challenges still exist. Consequently, European (and
Dutch) research is still relatively silent in this field, although it is badly
needed. Methodologically, there is no consensus regarding which practices
constitute a theoretically complete set of ethics policies, how to conceptu-
ally categorise these practices; the definition of ethical performance, the
link between ethics and organisational costs/benefits, discussions on the
effectiveness of incentives; or how ethics and ethical leadership are to be
measured. Theoretically, there is still no consensus regarding the mecha-
nism by which ethics might impact on outcomes. Therefore, we argue that
more empirical studies and more non-ideological deliberations in the field
of ethics are badly needed if we are to better understand ethical promises,
challenges and limitations.
Thus, ethics and integrity policies will never achieve a state of perfect in-
tegrity. Values as such are ambivalent (Seel, 2011). As a consequence, a ‘bit
of integrity’ should not be an objective (een beetje integer kan niet) but nor
should a state of full integrity. In the above mentioned Demmke/Moilanen
study (2012), only one country reported that ethics policies are mostly
value-driven. That country was – the Netherlands!
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However, a value-driven approach is not enough. Past experience shows
that the best integrity policies can only fill the gaps that other policies
 produce. Many countries are good at filling some gaps, or even many. The
Dutch are equally good, or even better at filling many gaps. 
However, ethics should not be a ‘plug-in policy’ that fills the gaps that
other policies and other governance logics produce. It is time to
 acknowledge that ethics is not only a normative question. It is a practical,
daily-life issue that is everywhere. It is therefore ‘our mission to relate the
significance of our topics to power and power politics, to organisation and
 management logics, and to other logics and rationalities of governance’
(Huberts, 2014: 200). 
Notes
1 Slingerland, Six & Huberts, 2012; Huberts, Anechiarico & Six (eds.), 2008; 
Huberts & Six, 2012.
2 Adams & Balfour, 2008; Zimbardo, 2008.
3 See especially publications by Jeroen Maesschalck.
4 See the ECJ cases C-17/05 (Cadman), C-184/89 (Nimz), C-243/93 (Hill and Stapleton),
C-109/88 (Danfoss) and C-297/10/298/10.
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Dutch approach to integrity of governance 
in context
Leo Huberts, Professor of Public Administration, VU University Amsterdam
Introduction
The preceding chapters offer a great deal of information on many exciting
initiatives and involvement in integrity and integrity policy in the Nether-
lands, at the national level and in organisations that shape policy within
that framework. The analyses of the Dutch system and its significance in
the European context are also very interesting. All in all, this does not
make it easy to (also) reflect critically on the ‘Dutch approach’ in this
 closing chapter and what it teaches us, for the Netherlands itself and also
for the many people who work for integrity in public administration
 elsewhere. I shall nevertheless make an attempt at this, coloured by the
 research that we have conducted and still are conducting at VU University
Amsterdam. 
‘The Dutch approach’ plays a key role in this. I shall first take a brief step
back in time. How did integrity win a place on the agenda within Dutch
public administration? This is followed by a summary of developments
since then, addressing the crucial question: does a Dutch approach actually
exist and if so, what does it involve? I summarise this approach from an
 international point of view, but that outline is followed by attention to the
dilemmas and reservations that can be made with regard to the present
 situation in this country in relation to integrity and the policy and organi-
sation directed at this. This is based on the idea that both insight into
 developments so far and openness on the current dilemmas can contribute
to the urgently needed reflection on the theme that concerns us: arriving
step by step at a policy and organisation that do justice to the integrity of
governance.
Start
The start of the Dutch integrity policy is often related to two speeches
given by the former Minister of the Interior Ien Dales in 1992 (Dales,
1994). There are good reasons why Minister Dales is mentioned in various
contributions in this book. 
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These reasons arose through a number of different circumstances. At the
time there were corruption scandals, particularly in Limburg (Dohmen &
Langenberg, 1994; Dohmen, 1996). The Society and Police Foundation
 organised the 5th International Anti-Corruption Conference in The Hague
in March (Punch et al., 1993). The General Intelligence and Security Service
(AIVD) named it a theme (after the Cold War) that ‘threatened the state’
and the minister herself was also well aware of the importance of this
theme. Whatever the case may be, Minister Dales placed the theme of
 ‘integrity’ on the political and administrative agenda with a speech which
attracted attention and led to a fair amount of discussion and policy
 development at different government levels. This took place step by step,
including in a number of organisations, partly under the influence of
problems and scandals and via leaders who played a pioneering role in
this.
The previous chapters and descriptions provide fine typifications and
overviews of this development. Regulations were introduced, units with
integrity included in their primary mandates (investigative, but also
 preventive) were formed, and the theme captured a place on various
 administrative agendas. This does not mean that there was consensus on
the nature and importance of the theme. Opinions that built on the consis-
tently positive scores for Dutch government and public administration in
international perception and other studies continued to conflict with the
interpretation that corruption and violations of integrity happen at all
times and places and that, therefore, permanent attention is desirable
(Bovens, 2006; Huberts, de Graaf & Nelen, 2006). 
In the meantime, attention for the theme also grew in research into poli-
tics and public administration. There were a few pioneers (Wertheim &
Brasz, 1961; Hoetjes, 1982, 1991), as well as research in the period in
which the theme landed on the administrative agenda, including research
into scandals and corruption and fraud investigations (Huberts, 1992;
Punch et al., 1993), followed by involvement in research and reflection in
many disciplines. There is no space here for an adequate overview, but I
shall return to some elements of this. It is clear that the work of Dutch
 researchers also had an influence on the international stage (Demmke
gives examples of this in this book).
A review and analysis of the current situation of integrity and the growing
attention for integrity are presented below, making use of scientific and
applied literature, as well as my own experiences and contacts working in
the field. I provide support for these insights, without claiming to provide
truly ‘scientific’ evidence. 
Typification of the Dutch approach
Of course it is always great if a country succeeds in taking the lead in a
theme that is regarded as important everywhere. If it does succeed in this,
the pride reflected in many contributions in this book from Dutch
 integrity practice is merited. I shall take a somewhat more critical view of
this below, but to start with, some appreciation of all the activities and
 initiatives is appropriate. This is also consistent with the more analytical
contributions of Slingerland and Demmke in this book. The former
 researched the Dutch National Integrity System (NIS), the outcome being
reasonable to good scores for the NIS on many points. Demmke uses his
long and broad experience in the European institutions to summarise
what the role of the Netherlands has been in European policy develop-
ment, building on and following from what can be distinguished as such
in national initiatives (see also Demmke & Moilanen, 2012). Demmke is
fairly complimentary, but also presents some reservations to which I will
return in a moment.
I distinguish six elements of the Dutch approach. This is expressly without
claiming that these are specifically ‘Dutch’ or have only been raised by
Dutch officials and researchers. On the contrary. All elements are also
raised in discussions and developments elsewhere. At the same time, the
combination of the elements to be named does typify many of the initia-
tives I see in the Netherlands, including in comparison with the discus-
sions and developments in other countries, and they are therefore logically
reflected in the Dutch contribution on the international stage. 
What it is about: integrity beyond corruption
Internationally, the discussion on good governance focuses strongly on
corruption. This applies for public attention, for policy development and
for research.1 This was and still is the case, although it is fitting to note
here that there are many definitions and interpretations of ‘corruption’.
The traditional one is that of bribery, in which a stakeholder promises
 benefits to a decision-maker if a decision is made in favour of the briber.
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The description in terms of ‘private profit from public power’ (Pope, 2000)
or ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Transparency Interna-
tional,2 ‘corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depend-
ing on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs’) is
broader. Unfair private profit without external stakeholder(s) involved
then falls outside the scope of the definition. The very broad view that is
frequently reflected in common parlance equates corruption with ‘every-
thing that is improper’. In the latter case, it concerns all types of integrity
violation distinguished in Chapter 1.
All in all, therefore, there is some confusion of definitions. Nevertheless,
the dominant view is that ‘corruption’ refers to the misuse of authority in
order to favour external parties with an interest in past, present, or future
decision-making. As a consequence, the focus on corruption ignores a
number of integrity violations, for example fraud and theft, leaking
 information, conflicts of interest, buying influence through campaign
 donations, misconduct in private time, sexual intimidation, and discrimi-
nation. This has led to the use of a broader typology in the Netherlands, in
research as well as in policy-making. This also seems to somewhat counter
the often-heard objection to the international focus on corruption, with a
cultural or Western bias on the  moral values and standards for evaluation
of the integrity of governance. What is relevant will vary in different social
and cultural contexts, and in ‘western’ countries, often rich and democratic
ones like the Netherlands, the broader spectrum appears to be necessary.
This is also confirmed via the information in this book on the content of
integrity reports and investigations (see the various contributions).
 Corruption and fraud are not missing, but integrity violations such as
 conflicts of interest, undesirable forms of treatment (intimidation,
 discrimination) and misconduct in private life are reported and investi-
gated far more often.  
Broad attention for integrity
It is clear that since 1992, the theme of integrity has become an essential
part of political, administrative and social agendas in the Netherlands. The
exact situation regarding attention in other countries is less clear. At the
same time, it is not illogical that the aforementioned broadening of the
theme from corruption to integrity should lead to more attention. This
 applies to attention from the public and the media as well as to the
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 relevant politicians, administrators (appointed office holders) and civil
 servants themselves. Officials must think in broader terms about the
 ethical quality of their actions, also devoting attention to conflicts of
 interest, manners, abuses of power, and the relationship between the
 personal and the public. 
Attention beyond the individual
Attention in the media and in the public debate is often directed at scan-
dals relating to prominent individual politicians and administrators,
 involving exorbitant self-enrichment or sexual escapades. In the Nether-
lands, too, the media report on individual scandals every year, with juicy
details and heated discussions on the consequences.
Alongside this, there is also explicit attention within public governance to
the context, the structure and culture in which things can go wrong, and
to the measures that can prevent repetitions of incidents. For example, in
the aforementioned speeches, Minister Dales explicitly referred to themes
such as leadership, culture and organisational structure (including open
and critical communication). The awareness that scandals must not only
lead to removal of the ‘bad apple’ but also to reflection on the organisation
in a broad sense is widely shared. The outline of policy development also
shows that step by step, attention and work have been devoted to rules and
legislation, as well as to awareness and culture. 
Attention beyond compliance
There are different views on how integrity can be fostered and how
 integrity violations can be controlled. This was discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 1, with reference to the hard and soft controls and to the typification of
policy as regulation-oriented/compliance versus value-oriented/integrity
(see also Hoekstra, Belling & van der Heide, 2008). Ultimately, the conclu-
sion is repeatedly drawn that both parts are important and cannot be
 separated. 
At the same time, Demmke’s outline makes it clear that the Netherlands is
distinguished in the international debate and policy-making by the atten-
tion to ‘soft’ instruments aimed at awareness, the culture and values. This
is consistent with developments within the Netherlands itself, as shown by
the outline of policy development.  
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This has been reflected somewhat more explicitly in recent years in more
emphasis on integrity ‘in a positive sense’. It is not only a matter of control-
ling violations, but the values that matter to politicians and civil servants,
the mission and significance of the work, professional ethics and profes-
sional pride are also crucial (Karssing, 2013).
Attention to the effectiveness of policy and policy instruments 
It is generally assumed that the integrity of politicians and public servants
is of crucial importance for the credibility and public trust in politics and
the government. When scandals occur, this almost automatically leads to a
reflexive need to ‘get to the bottom of the matter’ and to well-intentioned
attempts to show, primarily via new rules, that everything is being done to
ensure that the violations will not be repeated. In the heat of the moment,
there is little scope for reflection on the effectiveness of the measures. 
There is more scope for this in regular policy development and it is prima-
rily in that area that we have seen initiatives in the past few years. This is
 illustrated by the fact that: 
• which investigations of violations are conducted and which policy
 instruments are present are widely monitored within the
 administration;
• evaluation studies have been conducted into, for example, the NIS
(Slingerland et al., 2012), the quality of integrity investigations
(Zouridis & Van der Vorm, 2013), the system for reporting abuses 
(De Graaf, 2010; Maas et al., 2014) and specific instruments such as
training courses (Van Montfort, Beck & Twijnstra, 2013);
• a risk analysis has been performed with regard to the question of where
new integrity risks could arise (through changes such as globalisation,
decentralisation etc; Van Veldhuisen & Snel, 2014);
• lengthy and detailed debates have been conducted in Parliament on the
design of the national integrity system, entitled the ‘House of Whistle-
blowers’. 
Interchange between research and policy
There are many examples of research supported and funded by public ad-
ministrative bodies, as well as demonstrable consequences of such research
for the social and public debate and the development of integrity policy.
The contributions to this book show this, with an international dimension
too (see Chapter 14). A community of researchers in various disciplines has
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developed in the Netherlands, who have contributed and still contribute
to our scientific knowledge of many different themes, which also has an in-
fluence on policy. This chapter does not do justice to that diversity, as there
is not enough space to devote adequate attention to the countless books,
compilations and articles from many different research units,3 devoting
 attention to the development of understanding, including of the signifi-
cance of virtue ethics, professional ethics and ethical competencies, to
 reporting systems and confidential integrity counsellors, ethical leader-
ship, violations of integrity and scandals, including corruption scandals,
the operation of systems, policy and instruments such as training courses,
good governance and (conflicting) public values, et cetera. 
Through direct contacts during research assignments and the exchanges
in many networks, this fostered a profitable and exciting interchange
 between research and policy which, in my experience, was more intensive
than in many other countries. 
Critical reflection on the Dutch approach 
This book outlines how the integrity of public governance was and is ad-
dressed in the Netherlands. It contains fine factual material from the min-
istries and various public organisations and also, we hope, worthwhile
suggestions for all those who concern themselves with the integrity of the
public sector, particularly in a European context. I have summarised the
exceptional Dutch approach above, with in my view nice angles and sug-
gestions for policy and research elsewhere. This framework probably also
provides leads for initiatives from the Dutch EU presidency in 2016.
At the same time, it is clear that this chapter is intended to offer ‘academic’
reflection on the great deal of information on the Dutch approach and this
calls not only for an outline of the approach, but also for critical reflection
on the current position in the Netherlands regarding integrity, integrity
policy and research. In line with the foregoing, I shall consider the position
concerning the interpretation of integrity (and corruption) and attention
to this, the development of policy with special attention to the organisa-
tion/context and the policy strategies (beyond compliance), the extent to
which an effective integrity policy and system have been realised and the
interchange between research and policy.
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The broad interpretation of the integrity of the administration (beyond
corruption) is important and useful, but also leads to fundamental
 discussions on the question of what truly matters with regard to the in-
tegrity of politics and administration. It should be about current ethical
standards and values, about what really matters and is broadly recognised
and shared as the crux of the matter for the performance of politicians and
administrators. At odds with this is the fact that in practice and in the heat
of the political and social debate, the integrity of a person or organisation
is frequently put at stake, while the issue is in fact political differences of
opinion or labour or other conflicts. I have previously referred to this as
‘integritism’ (Huberts, 2005) and it is important that action is taken to
counter it. Accusing someone of acting without or of being without in-
tegrity goes far and should be linked to the core of professional ethics. This
should also not concern the content of the decision taken, but the way in
which the decision was taken. For example, did improper interests have an
influence? In the media and the public debate, a search is visible into what
precisely integrity is, what still qualifies as integrity and what does not. If a
politician or administrator has a say in local projects and at the same time
is good friends with the main local project developer, there is a conflict of
interest. But what is the position if he or she knows the developer, but at
somewhat more of a distance, for example through a Rotary club, or if he
or she is not personally best friends with the developer, but his or her
brother or neighbour is? The awareness of the grey area is then pertinent,
there are no simple black-and-white answers, but reflection and openness
are important, in view of the importance of the values of incorruptibility
and independence.
The discussion on the exact meaning and the particulars of ‘integrity’ also
play a role in the design of the system for reporting objections, dissatisfac-
tion or misconduct by citizens and organisations. This dissatisfaction can
relate to many different things. Someone may disagree with the procedure
for political or administrative decision-making, feel unfairly treated in
contacts with an civil servant or higher official, or have doubts about the
effectiveness of decisions. For complaints and reports of this type, we have
the regular political democratic system with complaints committees, om-
budsmen and audit offices. Doubts and reports on integrity go further
than this, affect the core of the performance of the accused and call for
other investigations, via institutions equipped for that purpose. In fact,
this concerns the design of the infrastructure for the system of good
 governance, within institutions that watch over important public values
(such as the audit offices, which watch over effectiveness and legality) and
an institution focusing on integrity fits within that infrastructure.
Some Dutch self-reflection on the position regarding policy development
with special attention to the organisation/context and the policy strategies
(beyond compliance) is also appropriate. The approach is clear, but the ex-
tent to which integrity awareness and integrity policy have penetrated to
all levels of politics and public administration is also open to question.
This applies at both the senior levels and in the ‘breadth’. There were good
reasons why earlier evaluations of the integrity system raised questions
about, for instance, the cabinet’s and parliament’s deployment of their
own rules and codes of conduct. This indicates the importance of (ethical)
leadership and of taking the lead in personal conduct, but also in policy
and management. Dutch cabinets and ministers have varied quite consid-
erably in that respect  
In general the good examples of initiatives in previous chapters show how
it should be done, but those efforts are still anything but standard in the
rest of public governance. What actually happens is often incident-based,
with little consistency. It is not the general practice of public leadership to
automatically attach importance to integrity, to translate responsibility for
this in terms of policy and organisation (units, officials) or for local initia-
tives to benefit much from an exchange of experience with others (in
which BIOS plays an important role in the Netherlands). 
A fair number of evaluations of Dutch policy (the Dutch approach) have
been performed since 2001, with other questions also being raised about a
number of policy themes. A number of these have been addressed (to a
 degree), such as disclosure of funding for political parties, but what still
 remains includes, for instance, the protection of whistleblowers and the
integrity of the private sector, including banks and businesses. In the past,
the regulation of this was appalling (with bribes/commission qualifying as
tax-deductible), but step by step the ‘merchant’ has given way to the
‘priest’, with more support slowly being provided for initiatives to prevent
tax avoidance by multinationals, efforts to address corruption by Dutch
companies abroad and action under criminal law against not only civil
 servants who accept bribes, but also against the businesses that pay bribes.
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With regard to the attention to the effectiveness of the present integrity
system, the national design of that system is at least a subject of vigorous
debate. That debate and policy development offer insights and lessons, but
it is also important to note the recognition of the dilemmas which were al-
ready raised above. What exactly does good governance involve, which role
does integrity play, and how do you translate this in terms of policy and or-
ganisation? 
A critical note is also appropriate here with regard to what I have called
‘the ethics industry’. The attention to the theme of integrity, which is a
good thing in itself, has led to consultancies and consultants spotting a
new market which they have addressed with vigour. There are no clear
shared requirements and criteria for research and assessment, so all in all,
this is a situation that gives cause for a fair amount of concern with a
theme that affects the core of a person’s actions. This continues to raise
questions. If laws and regulations are violated, we have an administrative
and criminal law system with all the accompanying care requirements.
Furthermore, the system leads to reflection on the concrete application of
the rules or jurisprudence. This is lacking in the assessment of codes of
conduct and informal moral standards and values, and no moresprudence
(ethical theory or system of ethical principles; Karssing & Spoor, 2009) is
built up. Integrity research was and is a free-for-all, with many different
stakeholders and interpretations which are open to question.
Finally, I turn to the interchange between research and policy. If I consider
recent decades, then there is no reason for extreme optimism about the
present state of affairs. The efforts of ministries and, for example, the
 police force and semi-public organisations, were crucial, but, to some
 extent, because of cut-backs and reorganisations, the picture is now a little
less bright. I regret this, partly because of my own interests as a researcher,
of course, but also in view of the agenda for the EU presidency, promoting
the interchange with research would be an obvious step.
Conclusion
Naturally, the Netherlands would like to present itself vigorously as a
 standard-bearer for a ‘Dutch miracle’,4 with wise and successful initiatives
based on the Dutch approach to serve the integrity of governance. The
foregoing shows that on the one hand, I see many reasons for this, but that
such an effort must be linked with openness on the dilemmas of the
 approach.
In the European context, the Dutch approach shows for all countries con-
cerned, and for the EU itself, that it is vital to the credibility and legitimacy
of politics and public administration that integrity is seen as crucial, and
that this involves far more than  corruption in a specific sense. This theme
is widely relevant to the governance agendas at every level, with attention
to the context and circumstances that promote and prevent violations.
What can and should be done to protect integrity and to control violations
therefore also relates to policy and organisation (including leadership),
throughout the public sector. This calls for a combination of compliance,
with adequate rules and  standards and sanctions, and value-based initia-
tives aimed at culture and awareness. At the same time, critical considera-
tion of the effectiveness of what is developed and applied in terms of
policy and organisation always remains important. It is precisely in that
regard that the interchange  between research and policy is also relevant.  
However, this approach, the Dutch approach, is not without its critics and
it is associated with dilemmas and questions that should be put on the
agenda. What exactly does integrity involve, is the relationship with other
values and who supports them sufficiently clear in our minds, how do we
design the system or infrastructure for good governance, and do we know
enough about how it really works... ? This offers a challenging agenda for
discussion, reflection and policy development, also through an inter-
change with the researchers involved. 
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Notes
1 For the focus on corruption, see, , Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption
 Research Network corruptionresearchnetwork.org/ and the EU-funded research at
anticorrp.eu/.
2 See www.transparency.org. 
3 An idea of their number and diversity can be obtained from the series of Integrity
 Yearbooks published by the National Integrity Agency (BIOS) and, for example, in
the overview compilation of Van den Heuvel, Huberts and Muller (2012).
 Unfortunately, there is less overview literature in English (for far more literature,
 including literature from the Netherlands, see Huberts, 2014).  
4 Term used for typifying Dutch model regarded as successful: Visser & Hemerijck,
1999. 
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